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We give readers the fourth volume of „Political Preferences”, an interdisciplinary journal devoted to the study of voting behavior issues, especially political determinants of identification. Magazine publishers are the Institute of Political Science and Journalism at the University of Silesia and the Center for Innovation, Technology Transfer and Development Foundation of the University of Silesia. Patronage of the project holds Polish Political Science Association and the Society for Academic Initiatives. The research community centered around „Political Preferences” was initiated by the Section at the Polish Electoral Studies Political Science Association and is actively involved in international research projects devoted to electoral behavior.

Journal in his intention promote empirical research in the plane of electoral behavior. Multidimensional and interdisciplinary research in political circumstances of individuals and their motivation to participate actively in political life is important for the development of civil society, one of the important dimensions of the electoral participation. Magazine publishers are particularly keen on cooperation with researchers of different disciplines who take an empirical analysis of the problem of political preferences: political science, psychology, sociology, linguistics, philosophy, and others. The degree of involvement of citizens and ultimately the decisions made in the electoral process is subject to many levels, giving you the opportunity to take the identification and analysis of the correlation existing between them.

This issue of „Political Preferences,” in contrast to the previous, is a report of empirical research, but devoted to the diversity of issues, the common denominator is the study of reality social, political and economic, affecting voting behavior. This is another step in the development of writing, involving not only the extension of the existing formula, but also its internationalization. The international dimension „Political Preferences” has been achieved not only by initiating the release number in the English language, but also by expanding the group of authors and reviewers who write about the people...
After the collapse of the non-democratic regime in the early 1990s, public opinion surveys became important factor in the process of democratic decision-making. Author is analysing the results of public opinion surveys, which bring together data on the attitude of the general public towards democracy, (dis)satisfaction with the political situation and (dis)satisfaction with most important political and administrative institutions with special emphasis given to the public’s (dis)trust toward the rule of law. Based on the data obtained article allocates Slovenia’s position compared to other established European democracies as well as post-communist countries from Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) on the scale of the relationship of the dimensions of societal (dis)trust in political power.

**Abstract:**

After the collapse of the non-democratic regime in the early 1990s, public opinion surveys became important factor in the process of democratic decision-making. Author is analysing the results of public opinion surveys, which bring together data on the attitude of the general public towards democracy, (dis)satisfaction with the political situation and (dis)satisfaction with most important political and administrative institutions with special emphasis given to the public’s (dis)trust toward the rule of law. Based on the data obtained article allocates Slovenia’s position compared to other established European democracies as well as post-communist countries from Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) on the scale of the relationship of the dimensions of societal (dis)trust in political power.

**Key words:**
democratisation, trust, rule of law, politics, institution, Slovenia

**Introduction**

In all post-socialist countries, democratisation was a process that resulted in the establishment of a democratic political system similar to that of Western European countries. It is a process of changing the regime from the beginning to the end and includes the concepts of transition and consolidation. The consolidation of democracy is a process that encompasses the complete establishment of new democratic institutions, the adoption of democratic rules and procedures, and the general acceptance of democratic values. Political changes that stem from the top can also play an important role in accelerating
democratic processes, yet they can also repress the political socialisation of citizens. For countries in transition, transforming the political and administrative institutions is particularly important, because the positive outcome of the whole democratisation effort largely depends on how these institutions are seen to be successful in the eyes of the public. The transition itself is a unique process. For a successful transition towards a more effective society, every country first has to define two elements and then define a third one. Since every country has its own tradition, the realisation of its success lies, on the one hand, on the starting point of its development and the development of its surroundings and, on the other hand, on the capacity to understand the development of the society. The understanding and steering of these ‘society flows’ lies within the competence of public administration systems that are, in comparison to the established systems, under greater stress, since they have to adapt and reorganise the public administration institutions [Brezovšek 2000: 239].

When thinking of the legitimacy of democratic systems, we cannot avoid a discussion regarding the trust in political and administrative institutions. Since they focus on the institutionalisation of society’s actions – which become more efficient, stable, and predictable under their influence – they represent the core foundations of society. Institutions act as mediators that, within the legal framework, force all citizens to respect certain legal and ethical norms, which consequently results in a higher level of trust. The greatest threat to the trust established between institutions and citizens is the systematic misuse of democratic principles. According to Sztompka [1999], citizens who live in a democracy develop trust in democracy that is the highest form possible for the system. When this basic trust is misused, the level of trust in all other ideals connected to democracy decreases. Our standpoint is that trust in politico-administrative institutions and the legitimacy of the democratic system are closely dependent on each other. Gasiorowski and Power [1998] offer three basic criteria of successful democratic consolidation: successful execution of second parliamentary elections, successful swap of the executive branch with the usage of constitutional means, and successful survival of the democratic system for twelve straight years. Additional criteria are frequently added: for instance, the relationship of citizens with democratic institutions, wide concordance on the rules of the political game, trust in the political institutions and trust into the rule of law [Fink Hafner 2000: 13-14]. In our paper we will a) emphasise the latter two criteria, locating Slovenia among other comparable democratic European countries according to public opinion surveys concerning public (dis)trust into the political institutions and the rule of law in the last decade and b) analyse the impacts of global economic crisis concerning the (dis)trust into both political institutions and rule of law.

No government in the world enjoys the absolute trust of its citizens. Since the power of every government dwarfs that of any individual citizen, even the most benevolent government represents a threat to individual freedom and welfare. Still, for a government to operate effectively, it must enjoy a minimum of public confidence [Mishler, Rose 1997: 418-419]. Gamson [1968: 42] argues that trust in political and administrative institutions is important, because it serves as the ‘creator of collective power’, enabling government to make decisions and commit resources without having to resort to coercion or obtain the specific approval of citizens for every decision. When trust is extensive, governments “are able to make new commitments on the basis of it and, if successful, increase support even more” [Gamson 1968: 45-46], creating, in effect, a virtuous spiral. Muller and Jukan [1977] state, that when trust is low, governments cannot govern effectively, trust is further undermined, and a vicious cycle is created. Trust is especially important for democratic governments because they cannot rely on coercion to the same extent as other regimes and because trust is essential to the representative relationship. In modern democracies, where citizens exercise control over government through representative institutions, it is trust that gives representatives the leeway to postpone short-term constituency concerns while pursuing long-term national interests [Mishler, Rose 1997: 419]. Trust is necessary so that individuals may participate voluntarily in collective institutions, whether in political institutions or in civil society’s institutions. Trust in civil institutions does not diminish democracy but completes it, enhancing the effectiveness of political institutions, creating what Dahl [1956: 83] refers to as the “social separation of powers,” which checks the emergence of an overly strong state. Trust, however, is double-edged sword. Democracy requires trust but also presupposes an active and vigilant citizenry with a healthy scepticism of government and a willingness, should the need arise, to suspend trust and assert control over government by replacing the government of the day [Mishler, Rose 1997: 419].

In the CEE post-communist countries, excessive trust was never a real concern. The immediate problem is overcoming the abiding cynicism and distrust that are the legacies of the half-century long non-democratic rule. Citizens in CEE have good reason to distrust political and social institutions. Most have lived their entire lives under authoritarian regimes, some more totalitarian than others, but all inclined to subjugate individual interests to those of the ruling party. The Communist system created a variety of civil institutions, but as Shlapentokh [1989: 9] has emphasized, ‘such organizations as the trade unions, the Young Communists’ League could be regarded as pertaining to
civil society, but in fact they are parts of the state apparatus. Instead of voluntary participation, citizens in CEE were forced to make a hypocritical show of involvement or at least compliance [Mishler, Rose 1997: 420]. The consequence was massive alienation and distrust of the Communist regime and a lingering cynicism toward both political and civil institutions. The new democratic regimes of CEE have not existed long, but they have existed long enough for many citizens to differentiate contemporary institutions from those of the past and to form at least preliminary judgments about the differences. This, by itself, can create a measure of trust or, at least, a tempering of distrust. In the short term, popular trust in government may be inherited. In the longer term, however, trust must be earned; it must be performance-based. The extent of public trust in the post-Communist regimes of CEE is clearly important for democratic consolidation. It also is an empirical question, about which the supply of speculation greatly exceeds that of systematic research. Even less is known about the sources of trust and distrust in post-Communist societies, although an understanding of underlying causes is vital for assessing the prospects for establishing civil society and consolidating stable democratic rule [Mishler, Rose 1997: 420]. This paper draws upon survey data from the European Social Survey and Politbarometer survey to examine the structure and determinants of public trust predominately in Slovenia, but also in over twenty European countries, with some from CEE.

In Slovenia, one periodical public opinion survey is the Politbarometer, which has been conducted by the Public Opinion and Mass Communication Research Centre and by the Institute for Social Science at the Faculty of Social Sciences in Ljubljana since 1995. The survey obtains the opinions of 900 to 1,000 randomly selected citizens of Slovenia aged over 18 years. The research focuses on opinions on the work of different institutions in Slovenia as well as on general assessments of the quality of life in the country. In connection to this, the main goal of the Politbarometer is to present average assessments of the satisfaction of citizens with democratic institutions, personal finances, and economic conditions in the country. If we compare the surveys over the years, then, some changes in satisfaction can be detected. In general, one of the most common observations is that in all new democratic systems there is a high level of dissatisfaction with democracy itself. Similarly, in Slovenia, more than half the citizens are not satisfied with democracy in the country (Table 1). The question remains as to how much of such dissatisfaction fragile post-socialist regime can withstand before this dissatisfaction changes into a denial of the legitimacy of the whole political system and legitimacy of various political and administrative institutions. Nevertheless, this dissatisfaction could also be connected to the outcomes of the democratic transition and consolidation processes and not democracy as a type of social-political relations itself. In this case, dissatisfaction can also be expressed through the existing mechanisms like elections, referendums and so forth.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: [Politbarometer: http://www.cjm.si/PR_rezultati (April 2013)]. We used the last survey conducted in each stated calendar year. The question was as follows: “Are you generally satisfied or unsatisfied with the development of democracy in Slovenia?”

As we see in Table 1 from 1998, when we can already speak of the normalisation of conditions in the country and of the establishment of democratic values, the trust in democracy was on the rise up to 2002 when it reached its historical peak of 44 percent. After 2002 it slowly started to decrease, while dissatisfaction slowly has been growing, peaking in 2010 to 2012 period. Sometimes, the distrust does not apply solely to the democratic system but the personification of democracy—the political institutions (parliament, government, and political parties). Besides dissatisfaction with political institutions, another very important factor is the economic climate in the country. After the end of socialism, the safety net of social care has more or less been deteriorating, leaving many marginalised. However, in Slovenia, economic stability prevented any greater dissatisfaction with democracy all the way until 2009, when consequences of the global economic crisis hit the country and the safety net of social care started to crack.

1 This emphasis is supported by a number of public opinion polls. For instance “Democracy in Slovenia” survey, carried out in March 2011 among 907 respondents across the country, asked whether democracy is the best possible form of governance and whether democracy in spite of its imperfections, is still better than other types of social-political relations. Respondents strongly agreed with both statements; on the scale from 0 to 4, where 0 represents “strongly disagree” and 4 “strongly agree”, first statement got estimation 3.49 and the second one 3.38.
General trust in the country is also reflected in the trust in major political institutions (Table 2). There is some minor deviation in the measurements between the years, but it is not very significant all the way until 2010, when the level of trust in all five major political institutions in the country drops quite significantly. However, if we observe a longer time period of this survey, we can detect some differences in the level of expressed trust. In 2000, we can see the peak of trust in government, political parties, and the prime minister, as this was the year of parliamentary elections that followed the publicly noted unsuccessful reign of the right-wing government that took over when the previous left-wing government broke apart in spring 2000. The drop of trust we can see from 2008 to 2012 is significant and visible in all five institutions stated in table 2, and also in total accordance with the dissatisfaction with democracy observed earlier in the same period.

<table>
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<th>GENERAL ASSEMBLY</th>
<th>PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC</th>
<th>POLITICAL PARTIES</th>
<th>STATE ADMINISTRATION</th>
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<td>3.9</td>
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<td>3.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>2012</td>
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<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: [Politbarometer: http://www.cjm.si/PB_rezultati (April 2013)]. We used the last survey conducted in each stated calendar year. Shaded windows indicate change in office. The question was as follows: “How much do you trust the listed institutions? Assess your trust on a scale from 1 to 5, with 1 meaning no trust and 5 absolute trust.”

The same survey also occasionally measures trust in the state administration (Table 2). The results of the survey indicate that it is obvious that trust in the state administration in Slovenia is more stable than trust in mainstream political institutions and that the drop in trust, which we observed in 2010 to 2012 period, is not so dramatic regarding the state administration. The reason for this is almost certainly the meritocratic nature of the state administration, which is seen as professional and non-partisan, although sometimes unpopular due to the protected status of civil servants, especially over the last years of the economic crisis. We can also observe that in the middle of the first decade of the twenty-first century, the state administration scored lower grades than the Slovenian government, prime minister, and president. One can perhaps link such low levels of trust with two factors: (1) the inheritance of the administrative system of the former regime, making it very rigid, or (2) the slow and unproductive reform of the public administration system in general.

If we compare public trust in institutions measured in other European countries in 1995 and 2010, the conclusion is that the level of trust is much lower in new democracies of CEE than the level of trust in established democracies of Western Europe. The survey covered a range of questions, and in Table 3 we can see the level of trust in national parliaments, political parties, and politicians in all of the observed countries. Even among CEE countries, there is a significant difference in levels of trust. In Slovenia, for example, the level of trust is among the lowest in the region. This indicates that the variations in levels of trust show how different the political systems are and that the level of trust in the region is much lower than in other Western European countries, probably because of the change in the regime [Kasse, Newton, Toš 1999: 322].

If we compare trust levels in the national parliament from data sets of 1995 and 2010, we can clearly ascertain that levels of trust have fallen quite significantly, except in Norway, Sweden, and the Netherlands, where trust in the national parliament was actually higher in 2010 than in 1995. The average level of trust was 4.63 in 1995 and 4.32 in 2010; the level of trust was measured on a scale from 1 to 10. Only two of the observed countries’ parliaments scored a lower level of trust in 1995 than in Slovenia (Poland and the Czech Republic), with two such examples again in 2010 (Bulgaria and Portugal). Besides that, we can see that the Scandinavian countries, on average, have a much higher level of trust, which could also be linked to their high levels of social capital that could play some role in their relatively high trust levels in general.

<table>
<thead>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BELGIUM</td>
<td>3.85</td>
<td>4.46</td>
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</tr>
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<td>5.04</td>
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<tr>
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<td>4.18</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GREAT BRITAIN</td>
<td>3.40</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>4.05</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In democracy, the confidence of citizens in repressive institutions such as the police and the judiciary (that is, legal courts) is of paramount importance. In a democratic political system, these institutions not only have the function of deterrence and forced submission, but also are important for the maintenance of the rule of law and the defence of a democratic regime against its advertisers. The police and the judiciary, which Linde and Ekman [2005] label as the fundamental institutions of the rule of law, refer in this case to the processes of informed consent, which is tied to trust in the political system rather than in the legal system alone. Namely, it is equally important that citizens embrace these institutions as those with a legitimate right to exercise authority. Confidence in these institutions obviously bears significance for the legitimacy of a political system. Citizens expect these institutions to be just, impartial, efficient, and effective, and their operation has to be based on professionalism, procedural justice, and the provision of equal justice and protection to all of society.

Public opinion surveys can sometimes be used to lend political decisions some legitimacy. Politicians and the media can use them to influence the policy-making process, strategic decisions, or the outcome of elections. In connection to our paper, the question still remains whether the publishing of public opinion surveys that show relatively low levels of trust in administrative and political institutions itself influences a further drop in trust levels among citizens.

(Dis)trust into the rule of law

In a democratic political system, these institutions not only have the function of deterrence and forced submission, but also are important for the maintenance of the rule of law and the defence of a democratic regime against its advertisers. The police and the judiciary, which Linde and Ekman [2005] label as the fundamental institutions of the rule of law, refer in this case to the processes of informed consent, which is tied to trust in the political system rather than in the legal system alone. Namely, it is equally important that citizens embrace these institutions as those with a legitimate right to exercise authority. Confidence in these institutions obviously bears significance for the legitimacy of a political system. Citizens expect these institutions to be just, impartial, efficient, and effective, and their operation has to be based on professionalism, procedural justice, and the provision of equal justice and protection to all of society.

From a wider comparative aspect, Europeans trust the police (42 percent) and the judiciary (41 percent) more than political representatives (six percent) and EU institutions (five percent), as far as fighting corruption is concerned [Special Eurobarometer 374 2011]. Compared to 2009, the police gained an additional eight percent, whereas the judiciary lost two percent. Of all the bodies, the police enjoy the highest confidence in 14 EU member states, with the greatest level of trust in Denmark (65 percent) and the lowest one in Slovenia (27 percent). Apart from Denmark, only in Ireland do a majority of survey respondents claim the police to be the most trustworthy institution (61 percent). The percentage of respondents who mention the judiciary system as the body they trust the most regarding problem solving varies from 62 percent in Denmark to 20 percent in the Czech Republic, with Slovenia being just ahead of the latter with 21 percent [Special Eurobarometer 374 2011: 103]. Other than Denmark, there are seven other EU Member States where a majority of survey respondents mentioned the judiciary, namely Germany (59 percent), Austria (57 percent), Sweden (53 percent), Luxembourg (53 percent), France (52 percent), and Finland (51 percent). The judiciary enjoys the highest levels of confidence in 13 EU member states, with the highest one recorded in Germany (59 percent) and the lowest one in Latvia and Lithuania (34 percent). As a rule, the degree of confidence in the aforementioned institutions of the rule of law is lower in the Central and Eastern European states than in the consolidated Western democracies within the EU. Slovenia, however, has recently been among the states with the lowest levels of trust in these institutions. It has already been mentioned that the percentage of respondents in the EU who trust the police has increased (by eight percent) since 2009 and in this manner has left behind the judiciary, albeit only by one per cent. In all but two EU member states, the percentage of respondents who say the police are the trustworthiest institution has increased. The greatest increase has been recorded in Great Britain (plus 21 percent), Ireland (plus 17 percent), Austria (plus one percent), Bulgaria, Italy, Spain and Malta (plus two percent), and in the Czech Republic (plus three percent). The two states that have witnessed a decline in confidence in the police are Portugal (minus one percent) and Slovenia (minus six percent) [Eurobarometer 374 2011: 104].

The differences in the degrees of trust in the police are to a great extent related to the differences between states, historical roles of the police, social orientation of the states, financial resources available for the police, the performance of other state institutions, the stratification of societies, and so forth. The degree of confidence in the police is to a great extent influenced by levels of corruption in state institutions and the status of institutions in charge of citizen security within the system of public services as a whole. Additionally, the comparison of
the average values of the estimated confidence in the police on a scale of 0–10² shows significant differences between individual parts of Europe. At the top, there are predominantly northern European countries (Finland 7.9, Denmark 7.58, Norway 7.04), followed by western and central European countries (Germany 6.58, Netherlands 6.34, Great Britain 6.24). The other half of the scale generally contains Mediterranean countries and new EU member states (Spain 6.1, Estonia 6.05, Cyprus 5.94; France 5.78) and at the lowest end of the scale, there are eastern European countries (Russia 3.7, Bulgaria 3.29). With an average value of 5.05, Slovenia does not significantly diverge from comparable states (Poland 5.12; Slovakia 4.8), as far as trust in the police is concerned.

According to the results of Slovenian public opinion polls [Political Barometer Survey 2011], the police is ranked among those institutions where trust prevails over distrust, namely 34 percent versus 28 percent (the army enjoys an even greater level of confidence—52 percent—and is not trusted by 12 percent of survey respondents). According to the public opinion poll performed in 2009 by the School of Advanced Social Studies, trust in the police is fairly high, as the average value of response for this survey was 3.50 and the police was trusted or completely trusted by 51.7 percent of all the respondents. Later on, the Political Barometer Survey (May 2011) showed an even greater percentage of distrust (31 percent) than trust (30 percent) in the police. The average values of responses concerning trust in the police were calculated as follows: May 2010 (3.05), October 2010 (3.13), December 2010 (2.96), and March and May 2011 (in both cases 2.92, respectively), which showed a negative trend [Political Barometer Survey 2011].

Compared to the police, the judiciary ranks much lower, and its trust percentages are lower than the percentages of distrust (54 versus 15 percent). However, from among all three branches of power, the legal courts still enjoy the highest level of trust³. Considering the fact that there is usually no formal connection between judges and citizens, this is somewhat surprising. Contrary to the executive and legislative, the judiciary has no institutionalised mechanisms that would guarantee the accountability of judges. Thus, the legitimacy of the judiciary is not ensured through institutionalised procedures, but is based on individual trust [Buhllmann, Kuntz 2011: 317]. In any case, these data show that the legitimacy of all three branches of power is exceptionally low, including the judiciary. The bodies of all three branches of power are at the bottom of the (public opinion) scale of confidence, as are the (Catholic) Church and political parties; therefore, political institutions have undergone an extremely

² Zero stands for “don’t trust at all”; ten stands for “trust completely.”
³ Legal courts 18 percent in 2010, 15 percent in 2011; National Government 12 percent in 2010, 8 percent in 2011; National Assembly 11 percent in 2010, 5 percent in 2011 [Political Barometer Survey 2010, 2011].

(Dis)trust into the rule of law in Slovenia

(deep)plunge in Slovenia. However, this is not to say that there is ubiquitous distrust or that this is a general atmosphere in the society, as people are nevertheless able to express their trust, even their utmost trust in, say, fire-fighters, who were ascribed average marks of 4.60 (of the maximum 5.00) in December 2010 [Political Barometer Survey 2010]. Additionally, oversight institutions of the state, the educational system, the military, the police, and its head also enjoy high levels of trust. “This nevertheless has something to do with the question of a predominant political culture and its proponents who are embedded in political institutions,” [Political Barometer Survey 2010: 23].

In a majority of counties, of all the three branches of power, the highest level of trust is usually associated with the judiciary. Before 2000, this was characteristic of Slovenia, too. However, the confidence in the courts began its decline afterwards and by the end of 2003. Public opinion surveys showed that trust in the courts was lower than trust in the government and the National Assembly [Political Barometer Survey 2007]. Confidence in the courts began its rise only in 2005 (to just over 32 percent) and 2006 (just over 37 percent); hence, the average level of trust in the courts for the entire post-independence period was 32.6 percent [Slovenian Public Opinion Survey 1996–2006], which is just a little more than the trust in the government and over 50 percent more than the trust in National Assembly. A marked decline of trust in both the judiciary and the remaining two branches of power began after 2007, which allows us to speak of the “emptying” of this space, of the contempt for political institutions, and, in general, of the “crisis of democracy” [Political Barometer Survey 2010: 23]. In 2006, trust in the courts was still at a good 37 percent, whereas in 2007, it already dropped to 24 percent; afterwards, it went down further to 15 percent in 2008 and bounced back slightly to 18 percent in 2009. Even though confidence in the work of the courts decreased by that much—from the 1991–2006 average of 32.6 percent to 18 percent in 2010 and a mere 15 percent in 2011—the Slovenian judicial system still enjoys higher levels of trust than the National Government (8 percent) and the National Assembly (5 percent). The reasons for this may rather be found in the peculiarities of the decrease of trust in political institutions than in the courts themselves.

In spite of all this, the paradox remains that the number of new cases before the courts is inversely proportional to the rates of decline of trust in Slovenian courts. There were “only” 530,056 new cases in 2001, whereas 824,562 new cases were submitted to courts in 2009 and 969,955 in 2010 (The Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Slovenia, 2010). Together with judicial backlogs and delays accumulated over the preceding years, Slovenian courts had to deal with 1.45 million cases in 2010 alone. In the past, courts were unsuccessful in regular and timely resolution of cases, and the number of
unsolved cases increased especially during the 1991–1998 period; the number of new cases, solved and unsolved alike, did not significantly change from 1998 to 2005; since 2005, the number of new and solved cases has been increasing, and the number of unsolved cases has been increasing somewhat faster, yet the total number of unsolved cases has been declining [Audit Report 2011: 16]. Actually, the projects for the elimination of judicial arrears have been fairly successful in providing better conditions for the work of the courts, but they have not solved the problems of arrears as such. With the implementation of the projects for the elimination of judicial backlogs and the results they produce, the so-called systemic reasons for judicial backlogs have been diminishing and the subjective liability of the chairs of legal courts, judges, and judicial personnel has been coming to the forefront.

The number of unsolved cases and the associated scope of judicial arrears are primarily affected by two factors: the inflow of new cases and the efficiency of case resolution. The average performance rate of judges and all employees in the judicial system somewhat decreased in the period of 1990–2009. The total number of solved cases per every employed person in the judiciary declined from 274 in 1990 to 173 in 2002 and in 2009, it amounted to 216 solved cases per every employee [Audit Report 2011: 18]. Slovenia is among the EU member states that have the highest number of judges and other personnel employed at legal courts relative to the number of inhabitants. In 2009, the total number of judges employed at Slovenian legal courts was 1076, and in 2010, this figure was 1024. Therefore, Slovenia, having just over 50 judges per 100,000 inhabitants (in 2009, there were 52.6 and in 2008, 53.5 judges), grossly exceeds the EU average (17.4 judges per 100,000 inhabitants). However, it must be mentioned that Slovenia is the second most burdened EU member state as regards matters of land register and their execution. Furthermore, in terms of matters belonging to the scope of criminal law, it is ranked seventh [Audit Report 2011: 12]. According to the evaluation performed by the International Institute for Management Development of Lausanne, Slovenia is ranked 45th in the judiciary category worldwide (mark 3.55 on a scale of 0–10). For the purpose of comparison, we list some other cases: Germany is 11th (mark 7.94), Estonia is 24th (6.22), and Romania is 51st (2.32) [Commission for the Prevention of Corruption of the Republic of Slovenia, Regular Annual Report 2011: 7].

The mission of the judicial system—which should guarantee versatile, just, public, and timely legal services; the resolution of interests, obstacles, discord, or disputes; whose services would be accessible to everyone, performed by a due process of law, efficiently and within reasonable deadlines, protecting people’s rights and freedoms, keeping and interpreting the law—is hence not implemented in the manner envisioned. The causes behind this are multiple; from judicial backlogs to unpredictability of judicial decisions, bad legislation featuring unclear procedures, and absence of practical measurement of the effects, negative images of the judiciary in the media, a lack of understanding of the roles of the courts on the part of the public, the strike of the judges, poor management, and mechanisms too weak to enforce accountability within certain sub-systems of the judiciary, and so forth. The fundamental long-term objectives of Slovenia as regards the judicial system, hence, include a maximum possible level of legal safety (reliability and predictability based on lawfulness and impartiality) and the assurance of the right to be judged within a reasonable period of time, plus the achievement of greater confidence in the judicial system through increased openness and transparency of operation and enhanced orientation towards service users.

Concluding remarks

The degree of confidence into the rule of law institutions in Slovenia has undergone a drastic decline after 2007 and poses serious problems from the aspect of political and legal culture. A low level of trust in the judicial system can cause great problems for the democratic regime. The judiciary needs a high degree of legitimacy, that is, public trust, as this is its main political capital. The support of the rule of law is a presumption of any democratic regime, whereas confidence in the judiciary is essential for the implementation of the rule of law. Hence, it is no coincidence that the doctrine and the practice of the rule of law place trust in the institutions of the latter among the very top legal values. However, the rule of law does not exist solely by itself, since it is connected to society, and so the values of the former have to be as present as possible in the latter; merely referring to them on the part of legal experts is thus insufficient. The degree of the judiciary’s independence influences its legitimacy and the public trust it enjoys. The confidence in the judicial branch of power is based on its independence, that is, on the impartiality, autonomy, and power of judicial institutions to assure their own independence.

The definite answer to the question of why trust in political, judiciary, and administrative institutions is decreasing in modern democratic systems remains elusive, although we can search for at least partial answers in recent drops of trust in political, judiciary, and administrative institutions in the global economic crisis. One can also wonder if this means that trust in democratic values, in general, is not seen as important as it once used to be. Instead of an answer, we can offer the opinion of Ronald Inglehard, who claims on the basis of empirical research that societies that are increasingly critical of hierarchical authorities are at the same time more participative and claim a more active role
in the policy-making process. Political leaders and senior civil servants are interacting with ever more active and more informed and educated citizens, who are simultaneously more critical of their actions. An alternative approach reveals that sympathy does not necessarily mean trust, but it can also be interpreted as some sort of obvious predictability, meaning that citizens do not a priori trust the institution but, since we can foresee its reactions and behaviour in the future, which should be consistent with those in the past, we trust the bureaucratic processes instead. The dimensions of trust between citizens and administrative and political institutions cannot be measured only through the parameter of trust–mistrust, but at best as a relationship of “inductive anticipation” (Warren, 1999). We can conclude that the legitimacy of the system increases with the level of trust in politico-administrative institutions. However, is complete trust in favour of democracy, or could it be that a constant ongoing critique and sober judgment of the everyday actions of administrative and political bodies is, in fact, in the best interests of a consolidated democracy?

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Abstract:

Elections are a procedure typical for democratic systems, but also systems which do not respect the principles of democracy often employ them. However, due to their different functional positioning, they fulfill various functions. The presented text is an attempt to present the most important functions performed by the elections in democratic systems. The adopted model of generalization has allowed for separation of seven basic functions, present in all elections: delegation of political representation; selection of the political elite; legitimisation of those in power; control over authorities; political accountability; creation of political programmes; recreation of public opinion image.

The presented typology allows for its use both in different types of elections (parliamentary, presidential, local, regional and European Parliament) as well as in relation to different electoral systems. The general nature of the described types of functions allows the separation of specific categories within its framework, but the objective of the present study has determined that the focus remains on the description and analysis of the presented types.

Key words:
elections; functions of elections

Introduction

Reviewing the research relating to the functions of elections, one can see two patterns. The first of these is the very nature of the subject- depending on the discipline they represent, individual authors make references to research characteristic for that discipline. Secondly, varying degrees of generality of the concepts presented should be noted - from the most general terms, based on
a few main categories, to much more detailed [Pomper, Lederman 1980: 14]. It results not only from a different approach to the subject matter of elections, but also from the changing nature of their impact over time. For individual researchers, functions of the elections will form part of slightly different processes and therefore the authors will consider them in a different causality context. Adopted systemic solutions may determine not only the social system and the significance of the election, but they can also be a factor in distinguishing the relative importance of their individual functions [Lijphart 2008: 209]. In systems based on different models of parliamentarism, elections are a form of seeking political consensus, which would as a result lead to creation of a parliamentary majority, able to govern. In the case of presidential regimes, the emergence of a stable government is the basic systemic assumption, and social concerns center around ensuring that real (for example in the control aspect) influence on those in power can be exerted by the representatives of the opposition. Similar reasoning can be used when dealing with the structural model of the state. The primary goal of unitary states election does not have to be the creation of an adequate regional representation, and emphasis can be placed on recreating – using the equality mechanism – the formal and material territorial structure of the population. In the case of federal states, it is necessary to ensure representation not only in the territorial aspect, but above all - regionally.

Other factors influencing the diversity of functions of the elections is the electoral system on which basis they are carried out, and the nature of organs that undergo the election procedure. The specificity of the majority and proportional election formulas makes it possible to classify the various functions, taking as an indicator the direction of their implementation in different types of electoral systems. A somewhat natural problem in the process described above is the need for a generalised classification of each electoral system into two basic groups – and it is possible that many system will manifest to a greater or lesser degree the characteristics of both [Katz 1997: 162]. Realisation of the various functions of elections depends also on the nature of the organ they concern. This specificity may result from: collegial or singular character of the elected body, level of the elections (supranational, national, regional and local), the organ’s powers (particularly imperative), as well as the electoral formula. Elections to a collective body mean that the dominant aspect is that of political representation, which in the case of a single-person body may be less relevant. The level at which the elections are held determines their social resonance, as can be seen clearly in the increased media interest in the actions and decisions taken at the national arena. However, in some cases, this factor is eliminated by the importance of choosing territorial representation (for example in federal states). In the case of a varying degree of imperative competences of the elected bodies, there is a difference in their perception in the public consciousness, what can affect the process of their legitimization.

Reference to the social structure emphasizes the role of factors such as strata, ethnic groups, dominant religions, interest groups and the depth of social divisions in the performance of the elections’ functions. Heterogeneity of modern social structure is a factor preventing the conversion of a wide range of group interests into one common political interest. That is why elections are a means of resolving political conflicts, and as a consequence formation of a hierarchy of political priorities in search of the most widely accepted solutions [Bernard 1991: 180]. At the same time the structural reference is not a simple explanation for the social base of political parties, as their base is more than just a result of the existing social divisions [Siavelis 2006: 367]. Deep social divisions, especially due to ethnicity and religion, could affect the elections by giving them the characteristics of a forced political cooperation mechanism for the different parts of the structure – especially as the source of conflict generation may lie not only in the ideological differences, but also in the economic [Lipset, Rokkan 1967: 99-101]. Peter Mair draws attention to the petrifying function of socio-political divisions, which results in stabilization of constituencies and their electoral behavior. In describing it, he refers to three basic mechanisms characteristic of the voters. First, it must be based on the original social identifications that allow individuals self-determination in relation to categories such as social status, religion or ethnicity. Secondly, the existing group identities should be seen as a manifestation of particular interests, and continuing support for certain political forces in this case – as protection of those interests. Finally, the socio-political divisions must find their institutional expression in the form of political parties, trade unions, churches or other organizations [Mair 2006: 363]. The original hypothesis of Seymour M. Lipset and Stein Rokke regarding the freezing of party systems at the level of petrification of models of relationships between the electorate and the political parties has been criticized, as the researchers have found new factors and events influencing these relationships, generally referred to as the “New Politics” [Lane, Ersson, 1999: 110], which may cause re-definition of the functions of the elections.

Functions of elections

Competitive elections determine the democratic legitimization of the exercise of public authority, and through this legitimizing criterion will be different from the non-competitive selection methods. Competition ensures legitimacy of decisions taken by the elected representatives, provided all adults
are eligible to participate in the elections. Key features of elections in democratic systems are: uncertainty of the electoral outcome, which depends only on the decision of voters; possibility of a real alternation of power and formation of a de facto division into those in power and the opposition. As a consequence, citizens decide to whom and to what extent they will grant legitimacy to exercise power on their behalf, and when a change in power should occur. Importantly, the decision legally made during the election is irrevocable, and cannot be changed in any other way than through the next election. The real empowerment of the opposition makes it that, as a result of the election, it has the mandate to control the ruling, and present solutions alternative to those proposed by the government. As noted by Andrew Heywood, mutual influence of the citizens and those in power, as well as elites and the masses is ensured through elections [Heywood 2000: 200].

Authors taking up the issue of functions of elections in the presented typologies at most name only a few, rarely more [for example Burdeau 1950; Rose, Mossawir 1967; Harrop and Miller 1987; Katz 1997, 2000; Birch 2001; Żukowski 2004; Glajcar 2004; Heywood 2006; Dye, Schubert, Zeigler 2009; Medvic 2010; Dalton, Farrell, McAllister 2011; Antoszewski 2012; Turska-Kawa, Wojtasik 2013]. In the presented article as a basis for analyzing the functions of elections, the following types of functions were adopted: (1) delegation of political representation; (2) selection of the political elite; (3) legitimisation of those in power; (4) control over authorities; (5) ensuring political accountability; (6) creation of political programmes; (7) recreation of the image of public opinion.

The function of delegating political representation allows voters to choose those persons who, in their opinion due to the views and values held, seem to be the best representatives [Żukowski 2004: 16]. As a result of the democratic mandate to exert power, the elected have sufficient legitimacy to make decisions on behalf of the public, and their decisions have the same value of legitimacy. The pragmatic will of transferring the decision-making level from all eligible to those who were elected may be due to three main reasons: (1) to increase the efficiency of decision-making, (2) presumption that those elected have higher competencies than the average, and this will positively affect the accuracy of their decisions, (3) to give a higher degree of importance to the decisions made, and thus increase their social impact.

Delegation of political representation as a result of the elections and transfer of the decision-making powers rests on the assumption that voters will be able to choose from among themselves those who have the appropriate attributes (knowledge, integrity, loyalty to the principles, ability to cooperate and reach a compromise), and furthermore that those who are elected will not make decisions based on their own particular interests, but pro publico bono. Neither of these two conditions is final, as the democratic freedom of choice allows voters to choose anyone who meets the regulatory criteria, and voters can select their favorites not by assessing their competence, but taking into account other factors. Among them we can indicate such as the represented political option, direct acquaintance, family ties and the previous social activity. Within the electoral systems one can identify solutions that at least in theory could serve to increase the competence of the winners of the election. These include for example high age limit for passive voting rights, restricting campaign financing and the possibility to vote for a particular candidate, not the party list [Haman 2003: 63]. Elections in a democracy are not a simple transfer of decision-making powers onto the level of political representatives, similarly as the mere possession of political subjectivity by a voter does not always determine his or her participation in the elections. Additional conditions have to be satisfied, among which the most important are: (1) possession by those elected of some of the political potential of implementation of the programme goals, (2) equipment of the authority with imperative powers, enabling the realisation of postulated tasks, (3) ability to select competing objectives thanks to political cooperation and compromises. In the present context, elections are not only a political mechanism to choose who will hold the office they relate to, but also who will represent the people [Medvic 2010: 12].

The function of elite selection has a two-stage character. The first results from the existence of political parties as entities the action of which leads to institutionalization of the political sphere, the second takes into account the causative role of the electorate. Against the background of the democratization process, the parties have become a factor in organizing the chaotic political objectives and demands of individuals, grouping around themselves members and supporters. The institutionalization of political parties is an ongoing process that began with establishing foundations of modern democratic principles, and is based on the possibility of their inclusion in the political system of links with other institutions, while enabling the implementation of the previously mentioned functions. Selection carried out by the parties can have two main dimensions: substantive and political, although one may also identify its other priorities that occasionally take the dominant role. The substantive postulate specifies the candidate needs to have the appropriate characteristics, which on one hand can help generate support and, consequently, votes, and on the other hand - predispose her or him to the proper fulfillment of the duties of the elected office. The political dimension presupposes the necessity of membership in the party, or at least ideological identity with the core values that form its axiological and programme values. The practical effect of selection of candidates for
the electoral lists is the process of nominating candidates to compete in elections. The process exists in four basic forms: non-regulated; nomination by the local party authority; nomination by the central authorities; primaries (selection by the members of the party) [Sokół 2003: 73-75]. Determinants of the role of the party in the function of recruitment and selection of political actors show [Antoszewski 2006: 21] that they are able not only to guide the decisions of voters towards the proposed candidates, but in specific situations also to actually significantly limit the choice [Wojtasik 2010: 390-391].

The second stage of political elites’ selection refers to the role of the electorate in their shaping by participating in the elections, and by manifesta-
tion of their personal preferences for the individual characteristics of the candidates and their political affiliations. In the context of individual voting behavior, there are three types of electoral votes: (1) vote of opinion, which is the result of the analysis of electoral programmes made by the voter, (2) vote of belonging, which is an expression of social and party identification of the voter, (3) vote of exchange, given as a manifestation of the strong relationship between the voter and a given candidate [Żukowski 1999: 93]. In the case of selection of political elites, a single voter can simultaneously act upon different types of motivations to vote for a particular candidate, with the resultant deciding about the final vote allocation.

Democratic legitimation of those in power is indicated as one of the basic functions of the elections and consequences that they bring [Raciborski 2003:67-69]. The possibility of universal participation in the elections, the resultant transfer of decision-making onto representatives and legitimization of authority are the stabilizing elements, giving legitimacy to the political system [Banducci, Karp 2003: 443]. In a situation of institutional crisis, direct and general elections may help to maintain the legitimacy of the democratic system by consolidating and mobilizing to participate in them the moderate voters, who will vote against the radical politicians, parties and their extremist postulates [Rose, Mossawir 1967: 179]. The question of the legitimacy of political regimes is one of the central problems that are posed by the researchers of political systems, especially in the context of change and transition towards democratic solutions. Classic authoritarian solutions drew their legitimacy from traditions, religion, divine right of kings and submissive stance of society that today have been replaced by nationalism and ideology [Huntington, 1995: 55]. Democratic elections in the presented approach are a legitimised procedure of peaceful takeover of power, giving those exercising power the comfort of having a social mandate, contributing to the consolidation of the political system. Such consolidation includes not only institutional changes that stabilize the functioning of democracy. It is achieved through participation of citizens in the creation of social development, formation of leadership mechanisms, and other functions carried out by civil society [Diamond 1994: 15].

Implementation of the function of control over those in power exists in two basic dimensions: (1) negative, when as a result of the elections the mandate of the governing is revoked, (2) positive, when the ruling, through elections, renew their mandate to govern for the next term. The main political consequence of the elections is the division into winners and losers, and indirectly – those who will exercise political power and the opposition (controlling the authority). Those in power obtain a mandate to govern thanks to legitimizing attributes they were granted, and their political opponents are legitimized to control the political authorities and create political alternatives to official governmental action. Control expressed in the vote, and the consequent ability to change those holding power is, according to Key, the only truly effective weapon of social control in a democracy [Key 1966: 76].

The impact of the control function of elections is manifested in two main areas. Firstly, thanks to the cyclical nature of the elections and preferences expressed in them, it is possible for the voters to control those in power. If voters decide to once again offer their support, the mandate to govern is renewed and awarded for the next term in office. In a situation where voters withdraw their support, alternation of power is a possibility. It is a procedural protection for individuals and groups against possible tyranny of power, voted in in democratic elections [Katz 1997: 309]. In the latter case, the citizens give their power of attorney to indirect control in their own name, carried out by the opposition over those in power. One factor that may determine the level of support for the opposition, even if the authorities are evaluated critically, is whether the opposition is a true political alternative. If aspiring political groupings are not seen as capable of replacing the ruling and doing their job better, the voters may refrain from offering their support, despite the declared opposition to the current government [Medvic 2010: 12].

Realization of the control function is based on the potential to cause reflection in voters whose aim is to assess what has been done by the government and make a comparison with the visions for the future, projected both by those seeking re-election, as well as those aspiring to seize power. In this case, voters may refer to two basic motivations when deciding how to vote: retrospective and prospective. In the first option, important for the decision is the aspect of evaluation of performance of those in power and, consequently, the desire to provide them with political mandate or the need to make changes. Prospective voting focuses on the political plans of entities competing for power (disclosed in the political programmes during the election campaign), triggering among voters the mechanism of assessing the direction, reasonableness
and feasibility of their implementation. The subject of this vote are the election promises, and its prospectivity refers to anticipation of future events, as political promises have not yet been fulfilled. Prospectivity is a basic assumption of the model of “economic voting,” oriented towards an analysis of the future effects of electoral decision [Kukliński, West 1981: 437] and their evaluation from the voters’ perspective [Lewis-Beck 1988: 135]. Some researchers raise two major concerns in terms of actual impact of these motivations. Primo, retrospective voting requires voters to possess enough competencies to make a retroactive assessment of effects of actions previously taken by the government. Secundo, in case of the prospective model, the ability of voters to assess what politicians should do in the future is equally questionable [Manin, Przeworski, Stokes, 1999: 30]. The control function of elections is therefore not only critical to ensure smooth operation of the political system, but also allows for proper orientation of the existing political potential. Thanks to the division into the ruling and the opposition, the latter can exert control over the authorities and inform about possible irregularities in the exercise of power; at the same time, preparing for the possible takeover of power, they should learn from the mistakes of their predecessors.

The function of enforcement of political accountability assumes the possibility of drawing consequences against persons holding public office. It consists in the expression of disapproval for their political activity – and the consequences thereof, including the political consequences. This distinguishes the political accountability from other types of responsibility found in the political system, such as constitutional or criminal. Scott Mainwaring and Timothy R. Scully see in elections the primary mechanism of enforcement of political accountability, focusing on the possibility of changing those in power as a result of the election. Elections provide parties with opportunity of creating communication links between voters and the government, and the elections themselves give them the option of replacing the existing political leaders and representatives with new ones [Mainwaring, Scully 1995: 21]. The enforcement of political accountability is expressed through the cyclical nature of the elections, as a result of which the previously granted power of attorney may be extended if voters are satisfied with the policies – or revoked, as a sanction for failure to meet the expectations placed upon the government [Antoszewski 2004: 13].

Enforcement of political accountability requires voters to participate in the elections by casting a valid vote. If voting against the incumbent authorities, voters should therefore vote for opposition candidates, who must be able to seize power, or vote “against all” if the electoral system provides for such a possibility. However, in the latter case, voting “against all” may be, in practice,
general principles and values represented by the parties into postulates of specific political action, (2) public dissemination of the programme in order to gain on its basis new members and supporters, and generate electoral support. Programmes are an attempt at modeling the expected shape of reality, assuming the possibility of a directional impact on the policies pursued. The approach remains a model only, as it employs high degree of generalizations and simplifications in order to create, in line with one’s abilities and knowledge, a comprehensive picture of social reality. The reality described is idealized, as by references to the category of ideal types it makes it possible to explain the positive (for potential recipients of the programme) aspects of implementation of the proposed solutions. Moreover, political pragmatism forces the winners of the election to try to fulfill as many election promises as possible, as it may increase their chances in the next vote.

Therefore, it can be assumed that the programmes of political parties are more of a general indication of the direction of their future actions, than a specific agenda. Implementation of the agenda is after all dependent upon many factors, many of which are independent from the political party itself. On the other hand, attention is also drawn to the uncertainty of the public as to the course of action after the elections, because: (1) government programmes may differ significantly from the declared election programmes, (2) political parties and candidates may during the election campaign refrain from revealing their real views and intentions [Stokes 1999: 102-103]. The difference between election programmes and government plans may result from their purpose – during the campaign social promises are emphasized, while after the elections the government, as a rule, chooses means of greater economic efficiency. The desire to hide one’s true political views and plans during the electoral campaign may be a function, for example, of the knowledge of preferences of the majority of voters, and expertise as to the necessity of undertaking a given action in the future. All aforementioned factors point to non-programmatic determinants of voters’ decisions.

The last function of the elections covered by the present article is recreation of the image of the public opinion [Turska-Kawa 2010A; 2010B]. They serve as a mechanism for translating public preferences into legitimization of power, and also by the opportunity to actively engage citizens in the processes of electing authorities and systemic channeling of their activity in this field. Elections build a map of significance of individual topics in the public consciousness, and translate them into the realm of current policy. Cyclical nature of the elections permits observation of possible dynamics of change in this regard, since both on the basis of the topics covered in electoral discourse, as well as the focusing of voters’ interest on specific demands, evolution in

Larry Diamond argues that today, just as there is no single form of democracy, it is also impossible to talk about one model of authoritarianism,
what affects the ability to describe various forms of political hybrids [Diamond 1999: 23]. This observation allows not only to distinguish different types of regimes, but also points to the existence of many systemic conditions that affect the elections, and consequently functions they perform. In democratic systems, the multiplicity of alleged election functions may result from both these systemic conditions, as well as from scientific approach of the authors raising this issue. In different political system contexts, elections will be able to fulfill varying functions. That conclusion is clear not only from their different normative location, but primarily from the relationships that exist between the elections and the potential possibility of emergence of the leaders and their alternation as a result of the vote. Therefore, outside the political system context, elections and their functions can be analyzed as consequences of the decisions of those in power, wanting to avoid the possibility of losing this very power [Gandhi, Przeworski 2009: 4]. Democratic systems referring to the competitive elections formula signify uncertainty of the final outcome, and possibility of actual alternation of power.

Elections respecting the free and fair principles will serve as a stabilizer for the democratic system, ensuring repeatable mechanism of recruitment and selection of candidates for elective positions in the political institutions. They create patterns of peaceful transfer of power in the event of changes in the political frame of reference. They are also a forum for cyclical opportunity to evaluate the government, renew or revoke its mandate to rule and, consequently, cause power alternation. Elections also offer a moral title to rule, granting legitimacy to take action in respect of the domestic and foreign policy. A function that increases stabilization of the political system is the socialization of citizens and their political integration, and the opportunity to present political positions and programmes by small political parties and independent candidates [Jackson, Jackson 1999: 366]. These factors will affect the adaptive changes in the political system, constituting the stabilization mechanism for democratic procedures and institutions.

References:


Functions of elections in democratic systems

Waldemar Wojtasik

Poland held its first ever popular presidential election at the end of 1990. Since then four such elections have been held i.e. in 1995, 2000, 2005 and 2010. In the meantime the position of the president gradually evolved hence giving rise to the question about which method for the election of the head of state is most “appropriate”. However, this issue was not an object of political deliberation for the major Polish political parties of the last 20 years. Firstly, this resulted from the popularity of the presidential election within society, which was reflected in high turnouts (considering Polish reality). Secondly, especially until the enactment of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 2 April 1997, no party wanted to run the risk of being accused of returning to the political transition solutions adopted at the Round Table. Thirdly, until the beginning of 2010, the competition for the office of president was “reserved” for charismatic leaders or party leaders. It was finally Donald Tusk, who decided not to contend for the presidential election of 2010 thus wanting to change the perception of the institution of president in the system of power and draw attention and emphasize the role and the importance of a government with a strong (normatively and factually) prime minister as the leader.

Key words:
model of election of the head of state, the position of the president. Third Polish Republic

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MODEL OF ELECTION OF THE HEAD OF STATE OF THE THIRD POLISH REPUBLIC – BALANCING BETWEEN INSTITUTIONAL COHERENCE AND POLITICAL PRAGMATISM

Abstract:

Poland held its first ever popular presidential election at the end of 1990. Since then four such elections have been held i.e. in 1995, 2000, 2005 and 2010. In the meantime the position of the president gradually evolved hence giving rise to the question about which method for the election of the head of state is most “appropriate”. However, this issue was not an object of political deliberation for the major Polish political parties of the last 20 years. Firstly, this resulted from the popularity of the presidential election within society, which was reflected in high turnouts (considering Polish reality). Secondly, especially until the enactment of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 2 April 1997, no party wanted to run the risk of being accused of returning to the political transition solutions adopted at the Round Table. Thirdly, until the beginning of 2010, the competition for the office of president was “reserved” for charismatic leaders or party leaders. It was finally Donald Tusk, who decided not to contend for the presidential election of 2010 thus wanting to change the perception of the institution of president in the system of power and draw attention and emphasize the role and the importance of a government with a strong (normatively and factually) prime minister as the leader.

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Method of election of a republican head of state as a theoretical issue

The restoration in 1989 of the institution of president into the political system of the state can be considered as one of the most important events ending the period of real socialism in Poland. Considering that the Communist Party was the main advocate of the restitution of the president as head of state, we can conclude that history’s wheel has come full circle. In this way, the heirs of the founders of the political system of the People’s Republic of Poland negated one of the key principles which the system was based on, namely that of collegiality. This fact was reflected in the removal by the system in 1952 of the single head of state in place of a collegial body - the State Council. At the end of the eighties of the last century, the representatives of the Communist Party, seeing the weakness of a hegemonic party, successfully pushed through the concept of restoring the institution of president in light of the changing constitutional order of the state. The president, who was to be the guarantor of the functioning of the regime within the framework of a socialist state, not only failed in his role (the presidency of General Wojciech Jaruzelski), but starting in December 1990 (after the taking of office by Lech Wałęsa) became a participant and very often also a contributor of democratic change.

An analysis of various democratic political regimes shows that they focus around three models: the parliamentary regime, presidential regime and semi-presidential regime (also referred to in terms of a mixed or a hybrid regime), though some authors believe that the latter is only one of many varieties of the parliamentary regime [Szymanek 2007: 63]. In the literature of the subject we can find numerous, sometimes significantly different concepts defining the characteristics of different political regimes. In all, however, the head of state plays an important role.

Taking into account the position of the head of state of a republic, the different democratic political regimes can be assigned specific models of presidency. For presidential regimes, the model of executive presidency is most appropriate, as the head of state has a real ability of shaping the policy of the state and directly performs the function of governance [Chorążewska 2008: 9]. As a result, the president’s permanent political activity and participation in the political game are constitutive attributes of the presidential model of a political regime. In the framework of the semi-presidential regimes and parliamentary regimes, an arbitral presidency may appear. But while in semi-presidential systems, arbitration has a primarily formal character and thus arises from the powers granted to the head of state, which are expressed in the constitution, in parliamentary regimes the arbitral presidency is rather related to the concept of informal arbitration, whose effectiveness depends mainly on the authority of the head of state1. Finally, in the framework of a parliamentary regime, there may appear the so-called neutral presidency, characterised by the head of state’s lack of power to take any decisions which would be executive in nature [Chorążewska 2008: 13-16].

It follows from the above that the basis behind the isolation of the three models of presidency are both institutional and behavioural aspects of the functioning of the institution of the head of state. The impact of the particular models in empirical political regimes is varied, and case studies appear to be the most useful research method in this respect. They require more variables to be taken into account and simple comparative analyses no longer suffice. This in turn reveals the specificity and uniqueness of specific solutions or practices. As a consequence, it becomes possible to state whether a given presidency is strong or weak, and moving beyond a strictly normative aspect of the analysis could prove crucial for a proper understanding of the actual role of the president in a given political regime.

In considering issues related to the political position and the role and importance of the president in his relations with the parliament and within the executive, it is important to mention the ways in which the head of state is elected. This issue is considered to be one of the most important in the context of the processes governing the arrangement of a particular political regime. Although in the literature of the subject one will find the view that the way a president is elected does not yet define the adopted political regime [Jarentowski 2009: 37], it seems however that such an approach is narrow-sighted, as the role of the legitimising aspect of electoral procedures is belittled. The way the head of state is elected should be considered in a broad context. One should relate both to the concept of exercising power and to the procedures for executing the accountability of the different state authorities, which is reflected in the orientation of the relationship between the legislative and the executive and in the framework of the latter (if it is dualistic in nature) as a consequence of how the principle of separation of powers is implemented in a given state. There is therefore no doubt that the status of the role of the president in the system should be a function of the way in which he is elected [Szymanek 2009: 363], while the scope of competence allowing him to take executive actions should be correlated with an appropriate legitimising mechanism. The way the head of state is elected is thus an element which constitutes a specified model of presidency, which subsequently translates into the adopted democratic political regime model being exercised.

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1 More on the concepts of „formal arbitration” and „informal arbitration” in [Szymanek 2009: 75-76].
The arrangement of the election process of a republican head of state should therefore be backed by far-reaching logic and consistency, allowing for a holistic approach to the presidency model being implemented. In this context, it is justified to put forward the assertion that “the way of choosing the president is (...) one of those elements in the constitutional arrangement of each presidency, which, practically speaking, directly or indirectly influences all the other elements defining the presidency model” [Szymanek 2009: 363]. This means that the election of the head of state should be correlated with the position of this body in the system of separate authorities, its position in the political system, and with the characteristics of its representative nature and scope of competence [Glajcar 2004: 164]. Thus, taking into account the need to create a pragmatic and functional institutional system, the method of selection of the head of state should be strictly correlated with the scope of its competence, and subsequently its place, role and importance in the entire institutional system. The method of election of the head of state should reflect the assumptions made about the presidency model being planned and executed [Lijphart 2004: 104] and in this sense it is not, in any case, peripheral.

**Determinants of the selection of the type of presidential election method**

The adoption of a particular model of election of a republican head of state should be considered one of the most important decisions concerning the creation of a democratic institutional system. The final decision is affected by various factors. By analysing this issue in the context of the political foundations of the Third Polish Republic, one must specify both the endogenous and exogenous factors involved. Among the first ones, the following are of particular importance: the legacy of the past, the situational context of the prodemocratic changes and preferences among the political actors, which is reflected in the competition for the most desired shape of the institutional system, the most essential component of which is the process of creating a fully democratic constitution. The latter of the factors includes: institutional standards derived from the democratic political regimes of the Western world and the experience of countries of the region, which have entered the path of democratic development more or less at the same time as Poland (at the turn of the eighties of the last century).

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**Endogenous factors**

Polish political tradition is rather modest in terms of the way the president is elected. The same can be said about the history of the institution of president itself. It was introduced under the March Constitution of 1921 and survived throughout the entire period of the Second Polish Republic. After WWII it was only briefly included into the power structure of the state. The creators of the July Constitution of 1952 did not see the need to maintain it, which was a reflection of their vision of how the political system should be structured, marked by their enthusiasm over collegiate bodies and, consequently, by the highlighting of the role of the State Council, often referred to as the “collegial head of State” [Glajcar 2004: 103-104]. The adoption of such practices was the result of the copying of Soviet standards, which were new to the Polish political tradition.

The institution of president did survive within the structures of the government in exile, and an event which emphasised its continuity and direct link with the Third Polish Republic was the handing over in 1990 of the insignia of presidential power by the last President of the Republic of Poland living in exile, Ryszard Kaczorowski, to the newly elected head of state, Lech Wałęsa. However, in view of the fact that from 1944 to 1990 the government in exile did not have any real possibilities to impact the situation in the country, their functioning was rather symbolic in nature.

With regard to the issue of how the president was elected, an analysis of the heritage of the past requires a distinction to be made between constitutional tradition and constitutional practices of the past. With regard to constitutional tradition, it needs mentioning that the Polish constitutions in force between 1921-1989 provided for both universal and non-universal suffrage in the election of the head of state. The latter of the two methods of election was predominant, which was enacted by the constitutions which were in force during the Second Polish Republic (the March Constitution and the April Constitution), as well as the Small Constitution of 1947. The election of the president in popular vote was only a fallback procedure laid down in the constitution of 1935, and confirmation of the powerful constitutional position of the head of state.

Constitutional practice, constituting another essential element making up the heritage of the past, has demonstrated that universal suffrage did not go beyond the constitutional standard. It never found application in constitutional reality, which meant that the non-universal election model was the only one used in the years 1921-1952.

It is worth noting that there is often a one-way relationship between the heritage of the past and the events to come. The issue concerning the way the...
presidents of the Third Polish Republic were elected shows that this relationship is not absolute, and that other factors, other than the legacy of the past, also determine the process of change. One key factor are the circumstances connected with the transition from authoritarian to democratic forms of governance. In their course, many political institutions characteristic of a transitional period, are created [Agh: 1] which are a foundation for the functioning of the political regime in a new environment and according to new rules. The duration of such institutions is not uniquely defined. They can last very briefly, but one cannot rule out the possibility of them becoming essential elements in the institutional landscape during the consolidation of democracy.

The restoration of the institution of president in 1989 was an example of reference being made to constitutional tradition. In the positive sense it meant a reference to the experiences of the Second Polish Republic, whereas in the negative meaning it involved a severance with the solutions of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of Poland of 1952, which were not familiar to the Polish constitutional tradition and which were imposed by force. This does not, however, seem to be the most important of issues. In fact, the direct circumstances surrounding the restoration of the institution of a sole head of state in 1989 turned out to be far more important. Their genesis dates back de facto to the seventies of the last century, when in the womb of the Polish Communist Party there began to appear ideas for the restoration of the institution of president. Many of those ideas never saw the light of day, while others were only a reflection of the intentions of finding a concept for the reform of the political system. However, in 1989, the government coalition, which was led by the Communist Party, promoted the idea of restoring the institution of president equipped with a wide array of powers. Through it, the coalition intended to control the process of democratisation.

In these circumstances, the primary objective of the ruling camp was to ensure such a form of election of president, which would guarantee the taking of office by one of the coalition’s representatives. Looking from the perspective of the interests of the camp at that time ruled Poland, non-universal elections, held by the National Assembly and based on an absolute majority of votes, seemed to be the best solution. In view of the fact that the Communist Party and its coalition members were guaranteed 65% of the seats in the Contract Sejm, parliamentary arithmetic indicated that the seat of president would be taken by a candidate proposed by this very group would become president, which became reality on July 19, 1989, though not everything had gone according to plan.

There is no doubt that the method of electing the president and the resulting legitimisation mechanism did not correspond to the scope of powers conferred on the head of state. Their scope, which, at least in respect of certain areas, meant unlimited power of the president (arbitrary decision-making power to dissolve parliament, the possibility of blocking the mechanism for the formation of government by choosing a prime minister having no support of the parliamentary majority, etc.), fully justified the direct involvement of citizens in the process of selecting the head of state. This, however, did not happen, and was rather a result of the compromise reached at the Round Table, which was reflected in the novelisation of the constitution of 7 April 1989 [Dziennik Ustaw z 1989 roku, Nr 19, poz. 101]. The constitutional reform of 1989 was evidently ad hoc in nature and was meant to provide a smooth transition from a monocentric system to a system characterised by political pluralism [Sokolewicz 1989: 6]. Therefore, in reactivating the institution of president, no comprehensive decisions were made on the model of presidency. In this sense, the institution of president orchestrated in 1989 represented a type of transitional standard, which could be used later as a point of reference for building more democratic structures of government.

In 1990, there was a significant change in the rules for the election of president. For the first time in the history of the Polish elections, universal suffrage became the sole method of electing this institution. It was no longer only an alternative. The grounds for such a course of events were mainly of a political and personal nature. Firstly one should take into account that prodemocratic changes were gathering momentum, which in turn eroded the calendar of changes agreed upon at the Round Table. Wojciech Jaruzelski was one of the people very well aware of this and he made the decision to resign from the further exercise of his office. Secondly, the new president had to be elected before fully free parliamentary elections were held. Therefore, maintaining the current election method would mean that the president would be elected by the National Assembly, whose mandate came from the contract election of 1989. It was therefore important to find such an election method, which would clearly give democratic legitimacy to the newly elected president. Thirdly, an election method which was different from the one used in 1989 marked the beginning of a new period of building democratic order, and the end of transition from authoritarianism to democracy. Fourthly, the implementation of the concept of universal suffrage was to help overcome the personal and political dispute between Lech Wałęsa and the Centre Agreement party on one side, and Tadeusz Mazowiecki with his Citizen’s Movement for Democratic Action party on the other [Ciapała 1999: 77].

It appears, therefore, that the adoption of a universal model of presidential election in 1990, was not an expression of a coherent vision of presidency, but rather a reaction to changes in the political system. Nevertheless, it should be
assumed that from this moment on, the method for the election of the head of state was in line with the scope of competences constitutionally conferred to it, which meant that the president became a very powerful political actor, especially with regard to parliament, and whose legitimacy was not fully democratic until 1991. Actually, one might consider that the implemented model was somewhere between an executive and an arbitral presidency. This was especially true for the first period of the presidency of Lech Wałęsa [Wiatr 2000: 92] when the Contract Sejm was still functioning, and the government, headed by Jan Krzysztof Bielecki, was referred to as the former Solidarity leader’s personal cabinet. Over time, after the first free parliamentary elections in 1991 and after the formation of the government of Jan Olszewski, the presidency being carried out was closer to the arbitral model.

With the coming into force of the Small Constitution, the constitutional position of the president was also adjusted. This institution was in fact formally set in the realities of the principle of the separation of powers. Although the head of state did possess significant powers, there were limitations concerning their actual application. One such limitation was the requirement for countersigning the executive acts the head enacted. In considering the relations between the legislative and executive and the relations between the authorities forming the latter, it can be concluded that they fit somewhere between the parliamentary and semi-presidential model. Constitutional practice, marked by a phenomenon called the Falandisation of law, made the latter model become the point of reference for the analysis of the democratising Polish political regime. The tensions, which as a result were appearing between the president and parliamentary majority as well as between the president and government, became one of the arguments for the limitation of the president’s competence in the constitution of 1997. Finally it happened that the political regime established and implemented in practice after 1997, was the one which received most coverage in literature [see e.g. Brodziński 1997: 48] as a form of rationalised parliamentarism.

Regardless of the evolution of the powers of the president, the universal suffrage introduced in 1990 with regard to this institution was maintained. What’s more, it was this very feature that did not, practically speaking, raise any major doubts among the participants of constitutional debates, while its opponents were few and far between. Indeed, psychological, propaganda and ideological arguments prevailed, which “pushed for universal suffrage as an expression of the democratization of the system, as a value in itself,” [Ciapała 1999: 82]. Over time, this method of election of the head of state was accepted by more and more Poles [Wojtasik 2011: 205-226] who were ready to treat any attempt at taking away the right to vote for the head of state as a restriction of citizens’ right to participate in public life.

The absence of the institution of president, which lasted for several decades and which was caused by the adoption after WWII of a Soviet style model of institutional organisation, forced the creators of the institutional foundations of the democratic regime to refer to the experiences of the developed Western democracies. Of course, the restitution of the institution of president in 1989 was the result of a compromise reached by the participants of the Round Table. In practical terms this decision was further expanded in July 1989, when the office of the president of the People’s Republic of Poland was taken by Wojciech Jaruzelski. This event, which was a part of the general political system change schedule in the country, constitutes a turning point in the discussion about the most desirable model of presidency. An important determinant for the emerging system proposals was the style in which Wojciech Jaruzelski and the subsequent Polish presidents exercised their powers. No less significant was the context of the situation, especially in the first period, which was marked by exceptionally dynamic changes undermining the agreements agreed upon at the Round Table. In such circumstances, the institution of president and the preferred model of presidency stopped being part of the Round Table compromise, and began to be the subject of in-depth analysis with Western standards as a point of reference.

The presidency models adopted in the twentieth century in the countries of the world entering the path of democracy were mostly influenced by American and French experiences. The first of the two was popular especially in the region of Latin America, while the second one left its mark on the Old Continent [Słomka 2005: 12-13]. Poland at least to a certain extent confirms this assertion. At the beginning of the nineties of the last century one of the most zealous proponents of the introduction of the political standards typical for French semi-presidentialism was president Lech Wałęsa. He sought to maximise the power of the executive, which would be headed by the president [Siemięński, 1992: 105-109], which in turn would lay the ground for the need to elect the head of state in universal and direct suffrage. This concept gained wide public support, though it garnered much opposition as well. As a result, the changes being introduced were not consistent enough to conclude that the solutions coming straight from the French Fifth Republic were pasted into the Small Constitution of 1992, but they certainly had a significant impact on the decisions of the founders of the emerging democratic regime. In this respect, over time the issue of a universal and direct election of the head of state was beyond dispute, and any suggestions to undermine this model were criticized as an attempt to return to the agreements of the Round Table.

Exogenous factors

The absence of the institution of president, which lasted for several decades and which was caused by the adoption after WWII of a Soviet style model of institutional organisation, forced the creators of the institutional foundations of the democratic regime to refer to the experiences of the developed Western democracies. Of course, the restitution of the institution of president in 1989 was the result of a compromise reached by the participants of the Round Table. In practical terms this decision was further expanded in July 1989, when the office of the president of the People’s Republic of Poland was taken by Wojciech Jaruzelski. This event, which was a part of the general political system change schedule in the country, constitutes a turning point in the discussion about the most desirable model of presidency. An important determinant for the emerging system proposals was the style in which Wojciech Jaruzelski and the subsequent Polish presidents exercised their powers. No less significant was the context of the situation, especially in the first period, which was marked by exceptionally dynamic changes undermining the agreements agreed upon at the Round Table. In such circumstances, the institution of president and the preferred model of presidency stopped being part of the Round Table compromise, and began to be the subject of in-depth analysis with Western standards as a point of reference.

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Over time, the fascination of the Polish political elite with the French institutional model began to wear off and was increasingly more perceived as unattractive, or even useless, in the Polish political reality, a fact reflected in the drafts of the constitution submitted to the Constitutional Commission of the National Assembly [Gduliewicz 1997: 111]. The decisions of this authority were impacted, however, by two issues. Firstly, the style of Lech Wałęsa’s rule as president was eventually frowned upon, which resulted in proposals to return towards a German-style parliamentary regime as a guarantee of greater stability in the relationship between the legislative and executive. Secondly, after the election of Aleksander Kwaśniewski as president, there appeared numerous proposals to maintain the strong position of president, which was an expression of the political opportunism of the political forces dominant in the Constitutional Committee of the National Assembly [Witkowski 2007: 327, 343]. As a result, a specific model of the institution of president appeared, characterised by an eclecticism of solutions typical for the three traditional models of political regime. The election of the head of state in a universal election has remained an important hallmark of the model of the Polish presidency, and is strongly akin to characteristics of a semi-presidential regime.

The second of the exogenous factors which it is worth noting, is connected with the experiences of countries in Central and Eastern Europe. These countries demonstrate a progressive tendency towards the election of the President by way of universal suffrage. What’s more, the introduction of such a method of election of the head of state is not the result of a conscious adoption of a given model of presidency. Instead, one can observe a tendency in which the method of election of the president is not correlated with the scope of powers granted to him (and if so, then only to a small extent). Changes relating to the election of the head of state made in the Slovak Republic and the Czech Republic are perhaps the best examples of such inconsistencies among the legislators. However, one should not treat changes of this type as ill-considered. It appears that electing the president by universal suffrage in young democracies may be a cure-all for any potential deadlock within the system, which could occur, if it was impossible to establish within the parliament (or in a newly established electoral collegiate body) a compromise candidate for the office of president. The Slovak example from the end of the last century showed that this type of situation is not only hypothetical in nature. In turn, taking the decision about the choice of president for determination to the sovereign is a guarantee of the successful completion of the electoral process. As a result, universal suffrage, as shown by the experiences of the states of Central and Eastern Europe, is not treated as a component of a particular model of presidency, but is, first and foremost, an expression of constitutional pragmatics.

Having regard to the specificities of competition on the Polish political scene, which is marked by deep divisions, one may consider the universal election as the best guarantee of successful completion of the election process of a republican head of state. In situations where the parties to a political conflict view each other more in terms of an enemy rather than a political opponent, the chances of finding a compromise candidate for president, who would gain the backing of an electoral body (e.g. parliament) seem small. As a result, the maintenance of universal suffrage as a method for the election of a head of state seems to be more beneficial, looking from the perspective of the institutional stability of the system, even if it does not fully correspond with the scope of the powers conferred to the president on the basis of the Constitution of 1997. Of course, such a situation is not in all respects favourable, as the existence of double democratic legitimisation within the political regime of the Third Polish Republic (i.e. the president and the parliament chosen by means of universal suffrage) is one of the sources of conflict between the president and the parliamentary majority (government), which, especially during periods of cohabitation, have demonstrated the potential to thoroughly shake the Polish political scene.

Conclusions

Poland held its first ever popular presidential election at the end of 1990. Since then four such elections have been held i.e. in 1995, 2000, 2005 and 2010. In the meantime the position of the president gradually evolved hence giving rise to the question about which method for the election of the head of state is most “appropriate”. However, this issue was not an object of political deliberation for the major Polish political parties of the last 20 years. Firstly, this resulted from the popularity of the presidential election within society, which was reflected in high turnouts (considering Polish reality), especially when compared with parliamentary or local government elections. Secondly, especially until the enactment of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 2 April 1997, no party wanted to run the risk of being accused of returning to the political transition solutions adopted at the Round Table. Thirdly, until the beginning of 2010, the competition for the office of president was “reserved” for charismatic leaders or party leaders (Lech Wałęsa, Aleksander Kwaśniewski, Lech Kaczyński). It was finally Donald Tusk, who decided not to contend for the presidential election of 2010 thus wanting to change the perception of the institution of president in the system of power and draw attention and emphasize the role and the importance of a government with a strong (normatively and factually) prime minister as the leader. His actions resulted in an unexpected
proposal to move away from presidential elections by direct universal suffrage to a system of indirect and non-universal elections [Tusk ...]. This proposal was, however, of an incidental nature and did not become a key constitutional issue which the Civic Platform party would pursue as part of its long-term strategy. Fourthly, the experiences of Central and Eastern European countries show that universal suffrage, as a method of election of the head of state, is not necessarily regarded by legislators as an element which should correlate with the scope of powers granted to this institution. This leads to the emergence of presidency models which are not always coherent in nature. As a result, it is not the formation of internally coherent institutional structures but rather constitutional pragmatism and the attractiveness of universal suffrage, which play a key role.

References:
Abstract:

The article presents Hungarian electorate’s preferences in the time of transition and democratic consolidation beginning in 1990. The preferences are confronted with results of parliamentary elections held in 1990, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2006 and 2010. Author tries to show how the left and right preference division developed on the basis of socioeconomic cleavages. The evolution of Hungarian electorate preferences has moved toward bidimensional “left – right” structure since the elections in 1998, yet first symptoms appeared in 1994 when post-socialist party MSzP won the elections. Since then only this party and rightist Fidesz were able to succeed and create Hungarian governments.

Key words:
Hungarian electorate, preferences, political parties

Introduction

More than twenty years of democratic consolidation caused great changes in the Hungarian society. Instead of an ideal paradise Hungarians received hard real life conditions. Of course, socialism, especially in the eighties of the XXth century, was slowly deepening in a huge crisis, but at least it guaranteed security. When the socialistic state collapsed eventually, suddenly more independence was given into the people’s hands. Hungarians began to shape the image of their country as well as their own fates. One of the tools, which was used to create a new situation, was the parliamentary election. From 1947 to 1985 all parliamentary elections were falsified. It was done to show social support to the ruling communist party, even though not all Hungarians wanted this party to rule as the only legal party in their country. So, one can say that
Evolution of Preferences at Hungarian Electorate towards Bidimensional “Left – Right”...

parliamentary elections have been revealing real electoral attitudes and preferences only since 1990.

The contemporary situation on the Hungarian political scene is not just a phenomenon, as many foreign journalists and researchers could perceive it. It is a result of previous pretransitional history as for the last twenty years of democratic transformations; consolidation efforts gave an outcome of socially deep-rooted beliefs, attitudes and imaginations about the ideal shape of Hungary. This article tries to present social preferences revealed in six different parliamentary elections in Hungary: 1990, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2006 and 2010. Then it is aimed to analyze the causes of such attitudes and effects of the changes of electoral support. The author tries to explain the problem of popularity of two political camps: the right and left one and shows how and why the Hungarian electorate preferences have been changing for last two decades.

A wider perspective on Hungarian electoral problem

To find an answer to the question of the shape of electoral preferences in Hungary from 1990 to 2013, one has to put this problem to broader sight. It is necessary to see not only the Hungarian reality but as well all Central-East European perspectives. From the past Hungary has been a part of Central Europe with some similar cultural patterns as other countries of the region. In the Habsburg empire dependent nations strengthened the bonds with themselves, even though they were strong before. After the First World War Hungary and other new countries emerged on the map of Europe. But after that only Czechoslovakia was able to guarantee democratic procedures inside its political system. Hungary, Poland and other Eastern European countries decided to receive authoritarian systems. Some experiences from that period are still vivid in the Hungarian society nowadays.

4 June 1920, upon the Treaty of Trianon, Hungary lost two-thirds of historical lands and two-thirds of the people who had lived in Hungary before the war. Many Hungarians were cut off their motherland. The effect of that past event is present today and politicians use the case of Hungarian minority in neighboring Slovakia or Romania as a way to gather more support. In the interwar era Hungary was a rural country and the Catholic Church retained wide power in the education, political parties were small and weak. In such conditions after a short period of democratization, Bela Kun’s forced communist regime in 1919. Yet finally it was replaced by the authoritarian one introduced by Miklós Horthy, which lasted to the end of the Second World War [Crampton 2005: 75-93]. These experiences were slightly defrosted after 1990. Some parties appealed to the interwar period and an idea of a strong-right governed country without political pluralism. But the strongest influence in the Hungarian electorate attitudes came from postwar socialist periods, which were characterized as the radical left. After the Second World War Central and Eastern Europe became soviet sphere of influence. Socialism built a new culture, which is close to some extent even today to some Hungarians. So, if one wants to find the reasons of difference of Hungarian voters attitudes today, it is necessary to remember about the fact of historical genesis of some societal cleavages.

Apart from pretransformation historical background, the analyze of Hungarian electoral attitudes has to take into account more recent mechanisms connected with system change and the new one development. From these points of view position of Hungarian society in contemporary politics can be described by the process of democratization. Democratization is not only law and procedures but as well people who internalized these institutions. But even if we say that the formal prerequisites for democracy are fulfilled in Hungary, it is more difficult to assess how deep patterns of democratic behaviour have been attained by Hungarians. Hungary as other Central-European countries began their race to democracy in 1989/1990. That is why one can try to find similar facts and scenarios in the developing situation from 1989 to contemporary days.

When it was obvious that the totalitarian model of the socialist state cannot survive any more in the realities of the eighties of the XXth century, political elites in Hungary started to implement further changes in economy and politics. Not only Hungary decided to reshape socialism, but as well Poland followed them in a similar way. A distinctive factor between these two countries was the strength of opposition to the ruling party. While in Poland it was a big movement, in Hungary it was just a margin of society. Even Czechs and Slovaks gathered themselves in broad social anticommunist oppositional movements. It showed how deep socialist elites were able to get social support due to their steps in Hungary. But anyway, that what occurred afterwards was the Hungarians acceptance of democracy as well as in other neighboring countries.

There are several theoretical models, which conclude Central and Eastern European efforts to democracy. When socialism collapsed, new emerging powers supported by society decided to shift political systems from socialism to democracy. Not all Central and Eastern European countries succeeded in it. Moreover, the countries that were successful did not follow the same path to it. If we constrain the spectrum of postsocialist countries to the leaders of changes, we can see Hungary in this group. The beginning period of changes in Hungary is classified by different authors as transformation [Huntington 1991: 125] or as a result of negotiations [Wiatr 2006: 72-74]. Although the names are
different, the clue is the same: both elites and opposition decided to negotiate conditions of the changes.

It is worth mentioning that Hungary is the only country in Central Europe that survived a trial of socialist system liberalization before stepping on the way of democratization. But after that, it undertook a similar process to the Polish and Czechoslovak processes of transition, which were burdened with double task of changing the political and economic system. At the same time other public spheres began to change their shape as democratic transformation and consolidation were under way [von Beyme 1996: 6-30]. All the processes were accompanied by social changes. Sudden collapse of the previous system made people lose stability. It led to broad dissatisfaction and heavy costs. The social attitudes were reflected as an outcome in the elections.

Social cleavages as basis for electoral attitudes in Hungary

The contemporary dimension of Hungarian electoral support for different political options originated partly from the period, which proceeded the last two decades. It is obvious that some social attitudes result from social cleavages which are connected with the previous regime. Social cleavages are divisions between political parties and social classes, religion, regions, urban areas and rural ones and interest groups. They are significant because generally they determine party affiliation and show how to appeal to each group. Socialism tried to erase conflicts among groups of interest, yet when it passed it occurred that the conflicts were only hidden behind a so called “social unity”. They existed but could not be revealed during socialism. Generally in Hungary social cleavages after 1989 were not defroze from the interwar period. It means that there were not many conflicts that were important for the society before socialism and they were still so vivid in the transition during and after 1989 [Rivera 1996: 177-195]. But some of them divided Hungarian society and created some social attitudes toward political parties in transition time and later on. One of such cleavages was between Catholic church and the state. Socialist elites thought that they dominated human behaviors. Atheistic morality was to eliminate all Christian values, but it occurred that the Catholic Church survived communism and became a huge support in the civil society building process. In 1990 more than half of the Hungarians said they were Catholics after socialism collapsed. This number is even bigger and equals 74% according to a survey presented by Szanda Balázs [2002: 417]. This situation had to influence politicians’ appeals as well as citizens’ choices. Second cleavage that appeared in new transitional conditions and was present before communism was the conflict between urban – rural areas. Hungarian Democratic Forum (Hungarian: Magyar Demokrata

Evolution of Hungarian electoral attitudes. From scattered positions to bipolar options

The failure of communist elite in 1990 made a new political rivalry appear. Throughout transition and transformation times this rivalry was becoming
more and more structuralized. Chaos of first years was replaced by a new socio-political deal with clear distinction of electorate support. Of course, this model is dynamic and changes, but some general qualities can be described if we take a look back and analyze situation from the very first election in 1990 to the last one in 2010.

Basic stage of the process of electoral preferences aggregation in Hungary began before the collapse of socialism and was connected with deep changes which liberalized previous regime. Behind the Iron Curtain, Hungary was the only country that allowed other organizations than ruling communist party or its supports to exist. In 1989 it was possible to legalize some political organizations that opposed communism. It was an outcome of long discussion and fight between power elites and opposition. The elites agreed to the changes because the more reformist wing won and the more radical one had to step back. Rezső Nyers and Imre Pozsgay were leaders of reformists inside the communist party. From 1989 MDF, SzDSz and Fidesz could act legally. They were the three main oppositional movements that were established in 1987 (MDF) and 1988 (SzDSz, Fidesz). But the wave of 1989 legalization enabled other parties to appear. They were historical parties that vowed for presocialist regime experiences. This group consisted of: FKgP, Christian Democratic People’s Party (Hungarian: Kereszténydemokrata Néppárt, KDNP), Hungarian Social Democratic Party (Hungarian: Magyarországi Szociáldemokrata Párt, MSZDP). Hungarian opposition differed from the Polish or the Czechoslovak ones not only because it was organized in parties and organizations before 1989/1990 and heavily scattered but could not rely on huge social support as Solidarity did in Poland, Civil Forum and Society against Violence in Czechoslovakia. One of the reasons of this situation was the relation between society and the elites in Hungary. After the revolution of 1956 János Kádár decided to gather social support for socialism and not cause great revolt as it happened in 1956. His evolutionary program consisted of economic reforms that aimed at making social life condition more comfortable [Romsics 2007: 70]. During this wave he wanted to receive Hungarians’ loyalty. János Kádár’s reward was social withdrawal from politics to private sphere. He was able to get social support to build socialism. That is why many Hungarians were not interested in oppositional movements as it was in Poland or Czechoslovakia.

To understand the social and political situation in Hungary in liberalization and transition times it is necessary to present the evolution of the communist party itself and its relation with oppositional organizations. Crisis in the economy and politics in the eighties of the XXth century made Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party (Hungarian: Magyar Szocialista Munkáspárt, MSzMP) aware of the necessity of solving the problems with the participation of other than prosocialist forces. But before this MSzMP tried to reorganize themselves inside. June, 1987 after eighteen years prime minister György Lázár was replaced by Karoly Grósz who became General Secretary of the leading party one year later. Then Miklós Németh took position of prime minister. M. Németh belonged to a reformist group. Apart from him, two other prominent party members created the core of reformists: Rezső Nyers and Imre Pozsgay. Reformists vowed for negotiations with opposition while radical wing of MSzMP did not want to allow opposition to present its points of view. Finally reformists won.

Because Hungarian opposition was scattered that is why oppositional activists decided to discuss their opinions before talks with communist elites. Oppositional roundtable took place from 22nd to 30th March 1989 and was inspired by the Polish model. All oppositional groups agreed that they would be in unison and would not talk with communists individually. Then communist – opposition negotiations began. They lasted from June 13th to September 18th, 1989.

The main aim of negotiations was devoted to a peaceful and democratic transition. There were some controversies. The communists wanted to share the burden of managing the economy, but the opposition refused to take on the task. The opposition did not want to be accused of the crisis by the society and was reluctant to talk about economy. Negotiations broke down lots of times. Two most contentious issues were the electoral system and the presidency. Both sides wanted to secure support in following parliamentary and presidential elections. Communists opted for a voting for president in a popular election that would presumably elect its popular reformist leader Imre Pozsgay. They wanted presidential election before parliamentary one. MSzMP was able to bring round MDF to this idea. But other opposition parties like Fidesz or SzDSz pressed for a weak presidency based on the assumption that Pozsgay would be elected. Smaller parties opted for presidential elections made by parliament. Finally Fidesz and SzDSz did not sign the negotiation agreement and initiated a referendum on four issues: on the dissolution of the party militia, the return of party assets, the elimination of the party from the workplace and whether presidential or parliamentary elections should be held first. On the crucial question of the election sequence Fidesz and SzDSz won and parliamentary elections would take place as first one [Ripp 2002: 3-39].

The outcome of negotiations was the division in the oppositional camp. MDF took a dominant position and tried to marginalize SzDSz and Fidesz. But in communist camp division took place as well. In October 1989 party congress dissolved MSzMP. New Hungarian Socialist Party (Hungarian: Magyar Szocialista Párt, MSzP) was made up by reform wing members while Hungarian Communist Workers’ Party (Hungarian: Magyar Kommunista Munkáspárt) was created on December 17th 1989 by radical communist as a successor party of the MSzMP [Bayer 2003: 174-176].
The emergence of a multiparty system made it possible to take different attitudes by the electorate and vote for programs that suited citizens the best. But as it was said before, the first election in 1990 was a plebiscite, which was to answer if Hungarians want to farewell socialism, and introduces changes toward democracy or want to reform socialism itself. Could the first election aggregate electoral preferences in a more aware and solid way? Probably not.

The First decade after the collapse of socialism was a period of clarification of the electorate preferences. New social cleavages began to determine the surface of political rivalry. People found themselves in a new situation with a wide variety of political parties which wanted to represent interests of some group of citizens. Parties had to assign their priorities in order to get support of a specific group of people. Although failure of socialist state, the lefist ideas were still vivid among society. But there were new political options that could be interesting and gather social support. Generally we can state that main surface of rivalry was put on the left and right dimension of political conflict. There was no one clear representative of each option in transition because the socialist camp was divided into MSzP and MKM and on the right side some parties included rightist ideas in political programs.

Initial right – left conflict of interests was influenced by transitional qualities as well as by specific Hungarian ones. Generally the lefist option consists of: social welfare programs, religious freedom and the separation of church and state, higher or more progressive taxes, environmentalism, trade protectionism, expansion of government into new areas, trade unions and industry regulations and social change or social justice, willingness to access to international organizations. While on the right side you can find following options: the reform of government-funded welfare programs, traditional or religious values, allowing private institutions to replace government services, lower or flatter taxation, international free-trade agreements, limiting the scope of government and reducing regulations on industry. This ideal division on right and left problems touches three dimensions that influence electoral choices. There are political, economical and axiological spheres. These types of thinking can aggregate electoral preferences and eventually place parties inside or outside parliament.

If one takes a look on political parties that emerged in liberalization period and in transition, one can easily find lack of consequence of the political parties programs. SzDSz and MDF tried to place themselves on central position on the political scene. SzDSz was a liberal party with a pro European option but in economy it referred to the social market instead of pure liberal one. MDF represented national and conservative opinions but in economical program there were solid socio-liberal ideas of free market. From an economical point of view MDF was even more social than SzDSz, but in politics it was placed on the right position [Szarvasz 1995: 123]. The third of oppositional parties that was created in liberalization time was Fidesz. This party represented the liberal and social option. Parties that represented a rightist programs were: FKgP and KDNP while on the left side there was mainly MSzP. FKgP and KDNP which were both historical parties but in 1989 they had almost an entirely new cast. Their character was reestablished because there were totally new times. They vowed for national character of economy and underlined traditional values. MSzP had to face more difficulties than other parties. It had to cope with the socialist luggage of crisis and its consequences. So the political program must have been not only refreshed but deeply changed. It reflected modern social democratic ideas but MSzP was still perceived by Hungarian electorate as responsible for huge political, social and economical devastation.

Ryszard Herbut states that in transition and early transformation times in Central Europe two main political conflicts dominated political rivalry. They gathered electoral preferences in economical and axiological dimensions. Voters had to answer if they wanted more or less state interference in economy and if they prefer traditional and closed values or open and pro European ones. Such distinction placed main political parties on two crossed axes: first with axiological dimension (bottom represented by traditional values and top by liberal values), second one with economical dimension (left side represented by economic statism and right side by total free market). Ryszard Herbut presents a more complex set of political differences among electorate than a bidimensional distinction between the right and left side. There are four groups of parties that represent four different types of ideas. The groups of parties were: liberal, liberal and traditional, traditional with state interference and liberal with state interference. In Hungary only two groups were represented because they could count on social support. They were liberal and liberal and traditional one. The first group consisted of: MSzP, SzDSz and Fidesz while the second one of: MDF, KDNP and FKgP [Herbut 1998: 146-152].

Anyway, both right – left distinction scheme or the four groups show that in the beginning of transition in Hungary the electorate was polarized and two main surfaces of preferences were dominant. They were liberal or socioliberal and national - conservative ones. Liberal (socioliberal) parties like SzDSz, Fidesz had few common qualities: economy restructurization, lower state participation in economy, foreign capital attraction. MSzP which tried to describe its identity was a bit milder and was not in favour of revolutionary changes but rather opted for an evolution. Yet the main program elements of MSzP were similar with SzDSz ones like the social program introduction of pro European values, the building of a civil society. The national – conservative group opted for traditional values in society and rather liberal ideas in economy.
Past experiences were important for these parties and were treated as a basic cause to divide the Good from the Bad. The Bad were those who participated and supported socialism while the Good were those who cut themselves off from the previous system.

**First stage of polarization of Hungarian electorate preferences on “right and left” segments**

More than twenty years of Hungarian democratic consolidation can show us how politicians’ decisions created social attitudes towards parties and how it was reflected in parliamentary voting. Contemporary Fidesz domination is a simple outcome of these twenty years. From a broader perspective one can state that Fidesz is ruling, but it has to be aware of other parties’ strength. There is one party which was as much strong as Fidesz through last years. I mean MSzP. There are two stages of electorate preferences polarization in Hungary. The first one started in 1990 and ended about ten years after, when MSzP and Fidesz won their first elections: MSzP in 1994 and Fidesz in 1998. The second stage is more mature one and it was opened by second MSzP victory in 2002 and has lasted through consecutive socialists victory in 2006 and second Fidesz victory in 2010.

First free election to parliament took place on the 25th of March and the 8th of April in 1990. The electoral system was formulated in 1989, during the roundtable talks. In Hungary there is one-chamber parliament. The basic principles were regulated by the amendments to the 1949 Constitution and by election law from 1989. The elections should have been held every four years in April or May. The number of members of Parliament was 386. During roundtable talks Hungarians decided to use a mixed-member system with three levels of votes’ allocation: electing 176 representatives from majoritarian single-seat constituencies and 152 representatives from multi-seat regional districts and a state proportional list representation with 58 representatives. There were possible two rounds. If the first round in a single-seat constituency was declared valid, it must have been determined if it was conclusive or not. For the first round to be conclusive, one of the candidates must have had received more than half the votes cast and the turnout must have overcome 50% [Kubas 2010 (1): 117-141].

54 political parties acted legally before 25th March, but only 28 of them were able to register in order to take part in the election. The turnout of 1990 elections was 65% in the first round and 45% in the second one. But in the first round only 5 of 176 single-seat constituencies elected their representatives. MDF had a huge success in the second round. In single-seat constituencies this party got 109 seats. But the mixed system equalized other parties’ worse results due to more seats for them from a state proportional list. The number of invalid votes was on average in two rounds and two types of districts 134 122. If we compare this result to average turnout of two rounds (5 068 639 / more than 55% of overall turnout) it occurs that 2.65% of voters gave invalid votes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source: Own calculations based on: [Czyż, Kubas 2010; Nohlen, Stöver 2010].</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Note that there were four additional parliament members who belonged to party coalitions (SzDSz – Fidesz – KDNP and KDNP - Fidesz).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 1. Results of 1990 election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Single-seat districts</th>
<th>Multi-seat regional districts</th>
<th>State proportional list</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Electoral support (average number of votes / % of votes)</th>
<th>Parliamentary representation %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MDF</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>1 200 305 / 23.7</td>
<td>42.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SzDSz</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>1 066 702 / 21.5</td>
<td>23.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FKgP</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>552 777 / 10.9</td>
<td>11.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSzP</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>519 946 / 10.3</td>
<td>8.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fidesz</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>337 529 / 6.6</td>
<td>5.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KDNP</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>302 398 / 6</td>
<td>5.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>151 199 / 3</td>
<td>1.81</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The strongest conflict was between MDF and SzDSz. These two parties wanted to represent the electorate preferences that opposed postcommunists. In the first round there was no major difference in votes which MDF and SzDSz got. Yet the overwhelming success of MDF in single-seat constituencies in the second round was an effect of the MDF, KDNP and FKgP agreement which stated that if there was no candidate from one of those parties they vowed to vote for a candidate of the one that had its candidate in the second round. Additionally mixed voting system caused the growth of the difference between MDF and SzDSz in parliamentary representation grew to 18.66% although total difference of netto votes between was only 2.2%. Three parties: MSzP, Fidesz and KDNP weren’t successful in single-seat constituencies at all. They could not catch direct support from local electorate. Their position was strengthened by votes from proportional lists: regional and state. It is remarkable that MSzP was ranked fourth with the support of 10.3%. It meant a total failure. Electorate blamed MSzP for crisis caused by communists and new MSzP was unable to cut off from the previous regime. From 1990 to 1994 MDF made a coalition with FKgP and KDNP.

If you want to understand Hungarian electorate preferences in 1990, you need to know that there was a set of different motivations that led to the final outcome of votes and seats in the parliamentary election. The set consisted of
support for democracy, opinion on free market economy, role of state in social and economical life. The New Democracies Barometer from 1991 surveyed Hungarian evaluations of the new regime and the old communist regime and social and demographic characteristics. It was interesting to read that half of the citizens gave positive marks to the communist regime while the other half gave negative ones. This attitude was not reflected in the election of the 1990’s results. And the results showed that there was a correlation between the positive attitude towards the communist regime and statism. Those citizens who preferred democratic values believed they are more responsible for economical security than officials and politicians. About 60% of citizens were in favor of statism to 40% of those who preferred more individualism and freedom [Sula 2005: 80 –81].

The period between two first elections was a very hard time. Chaos and harsh reforms as well as political fights caused growth of negative social opinions towards those who governed. In this situation people believed that the opposition to MDF, FKgP and KDNP coalition could bring security and wealth. The only strong opposition at that time were the socialists. The polls showed that they could regain power after four years. The second election took place on the 8th and the 29th of May 1994.

### Table 2. Results of 1994 elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Single-seat districts</th>
<th>Multi-seat regional districts</th>
<th>State proportional list</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Electoral support (average number of votes/ % of votes)</th>
<th>Parliamentary representation %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MSzP</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>1 735 474 / 31.6</td>
<td>54.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SzDSz</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>1 035 920 / 19</td>
<td>17.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDF</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>641 966 / 11.7</td>
<td>9.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FKgP</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>450 949 / 8.25</td>
<td>6.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KDNP</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>397 719 / 7.26</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fidesz</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>388 730 / 7.1</td>
<td>5.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>160 952 / 3</td>
<td>0.52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own calculations based on: [Czyż, Kubas 2010; Nohlen, Stöver 2010].

Although the number of parties elected to the parliament was the same as in 1990, the layout of received electoral support was deeply different than previously. Dissatisfied electorate did not want to support MDF and its two coalitional partners. Moreover, voters did not support other oppositional movement from transition time: SzDSz. On the contrary voters supported postcommunists. It was not a surprise because the same scenario happened in Poland in the 1993’s election. MSzP received absolute majority. Previous election’s winner MDF ended in a complete failure and received 19% of votes to 23.7% in 1990.

This difference is maybe not so substantial, but if we compare 114 members from single-seat constituencies in 1990 to only 5 in 1994, the difference is clear. So in direct election MDF lost its popularity heavily. Although SzDSz was almost as much popular in 1990 as in 1994, yet mixed voting system made this party loose 25% of seats. What is striking is that MDF result was approached by three smaller parties: Fidesz, KDNP and FKgP in the number of votes and parliamentary representation. Two coalitional parties: KDNP and FKgP received worse results than in 1990 and paid for four years of governance.

The turnout in the first round was 68.9% and in the second one 55.1%. The number of invalid votes was on average in two rounds and two types of districts 79 366 and was lower than in 1990. If we compare this result to the average turnout of two rounds (5 480 685 / about 62%) it occurs that 1.45% of voters gave invalid votes. This result was almost half times lower than in 1990.

MSzP could make one-party cabinet because it had absolute majority in the parliament. But this party wanted to secure social legitimization and show that it can cooperate with oppositional parties. That is why MSzP invited SzDSz to the government coalition. There were several important issues in 1994-1990’s politics, but two of them were the most urgent: economic reforms and accession to European institutions. In 1995 minister of finance Lajos Bokros announced a catalogue of restrictive fiscal policy which was aimed at preventing the threat of national bankruptcy (a mechanism of gradual devaluation of the forint, social benefits were limited, introduction of tuition fees, nominal wages were slowed down). Economic rates were better after Bokros package, but Hungarians did not accept such huge costs of transformation. One could observe social dissatisfaction and loss of social support for ruling coalition. Foreign policy was successful as Hungary joined NATO in 1997.

Inside the party system there were two important moments. Although one of them happened in 1993, its final outcome happened in 1998 and the period from 1994 to 1998 was a preparatory time. I mean the birth and development of the Hungarian Justice and Life Party (Hungarian: Magyar Igazság és Élet Pártja, MIÉP) which was a radical nationalist party. This party gathered extreme right electorate which opted for anti-Semitism, was against the Romani or did not want Hungary to access European institutions.

After worse results in the 1994’s election Fidesz decided to put more effort to make its position better. That is why in 1995 Fidesz joined Hungarian Civic Party (Hungarian: Magyar Polgári Párt, MPP) and was called Fidesz-MPP. But it was not the only change, Fidesz changed its political position from liberal to conservative and started to vow to more rightist electorate [Czyż, Kubas 2011: 71 – 73, 120, 122].

Third parliamentary election was on 10th and 24th May, 1998.
Table 4. “Left” preferences versus “right” preferences by reference to the mode of voting

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Supporters of Left</th>
<th>Supporters of Right</th>
<th>Neutrals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MDF</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SzDSz</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FKgP</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSzP</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fidesz</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KDN</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: [Körösényi 1998: 114].

Voters who preferred leftist option recognized their party the best because 60% of votes given to MSzP originated from people who supported leftist issues. But it is necessary to add that in 1990-1998 period typical rightist party like FKgP or KDN received a small recognition from people with rightist preferences (14% and 20%). Fidesz is not much better although he won election in 1998 (26%). Unfortunately the survey does not indicate MIÉP results which could put more light on the left versus right electorate division. In that period it was MDF which could count on right votes the most often (34%). Yet this research cannot state if left or right electorate preferences influenced voting for left or right parties. Moreover it would be difficult to state if liberal or conservative preferences influenced voting on liberal or conservative parties as well if we analyze the following data (Table 5).

Table 5. “Liberal” preferences versus “conservative” preferences by reference to the mode of voting

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Supporters of liberalism</th>
<th>Supporters of conservatism</th>
<th>Neutrals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MDF</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SzDSz</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FKgP</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSzP</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fidesz</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KDN</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: [Körösényi 1998: 114].

SzDSz as the most liberal party in that time in Hungary was able to gather 46% of support of people who opted for liberalism. Fidesz which was perceived in that time as liberal received 34% of liberal oriented electorate. Social-liberal MSzP was third with 31%. MDF which represented right program could count on 44% votes from conservative electorate. Two other rightist parties: KDN and FKgP had respectively 25% and 23% votes from conservative electorate. It is striking that MSzP was supported by 21% votes from conservative
Sebastian Kubas

oriented electorate. Yet the most amazing data shows that in almost all parties (without SzDSz) the biggest part of support came from the neutral electorate. And it meant that the positive identification of Hungarian electorate towards political parties did not exist in the period of first stage. If not, it must have been a negative identification. Hungarians voted not for but against. Some authors say that negative identification is a basic factor of voting in Central and Eastern Europe after the collapse of socialism [Rose, Mišler 1998: 218]. The same opinion is presented by the fourth survey made by New Democracies Barometer which stated that 39% of Hungarians identified themselves with political parties’ programs and 70% of them said they would never give their vote to one more chosen parties [New Democracies Barometer IV (1995)].

Herbert Kitschelt says that there are three variables that constitute electorate attitudes in Central European countries: education, profession and employment in a specific economic sector. Additionally communist regime made Hungarians be a very homogenized society and after 1990 the process of diversification was slowly growing. H. Kitschelt divided members of Central European societies into seven groups regarding economical and educational status. Yet generally the members could be assigned to the winners and losers of transformation. The first group voted for more liberal and less social parties, yet the losers opted for more social parties [Kitschelt 1999: 229-294].

Second stage of polarization of Hungarian electorate preferences on “right and left” segments

The second stage of polarization of the Hungarian electorate preferences began with the fourth parliamentary election which took place on 7th and 21st April, 2002. Fidesz-MPP made pre-electional coalition with MDF and eventually won the election. It is worth mentioning that MDF without that coalition would be outside the parliament. Main stream of rivalry was between Fidesz-MPP and MSzP and although the latter was second it was MSzP which ruled the country for following four years. After revealing the result of 2002 election it occurred that only four parties entered the parliament and Fidesz-MPP with MDF could not make a cabinet. So it was MSzP with SzDSz which decided to make a coalition and governed Hungary. You could observe concentration of rightist electorate around Fidesz-MPP. Two other rightist parties: FKgP and MIÉP did not enter the parliament partly because some votes were caught by Fidesz-MPP.

The turnout in the first round was 70.53% and in the second one 73.51%. The number of invalid votes was 59 880 and was lower than in 1990. If we compare this result to the average turnout of the two rounds (5 680 545 / about 72%) it occurs that there were 1.05% of invalid votes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Single-seat districts</th>
<th>Multi-seat regional districts</th>
<th>State proportional list</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Electoral support (average number of votes/ % of votes)</th>
<th>Parliamentary representation %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fidesz-MPP</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>2 319 835 / 41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSzP</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>2 262 259 / 39.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SzDSz</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>3 47 033 / 6</td>
<td>4.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSzP-SzDSz</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>41 461 / 0.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


There were several important issues during second MSzP-SzDSz coalitional governance and one of them was vetting. There were two parliamentary committees which investigated vetting problems. One was headed by MDF while the other by SzDSz. Another issue was connected with the USA intervention in Iraq and Hungarian agreement on supporting the Americans. Fidesz-MPP and MDF were against that action. One of brightest successes of governmental coalition was Hungarian access to EU which happened 1st May, 2004. But the June election to the European Union Parliament brought some disappointment to socialist coalition because Fidesz-MPP received about 1 500 000 votes and 12 seats in European Parliament while MSzP about 1 000 000 votes and only 9 seats. The 2004 election affirmed leading position of Fidesz-MPP [Kubas 2010 (2): 40]. Rights of Hungarians who lived outside the country in neighbouring countries were a very hot political issue. The rights guaranteed by previous coalition with Fidesz-MPP were now diminished by social-liberal coalition. All the problems that arose in 2004 made prime minister Péter Medgyessy to resign and Ferenc Gyurcsány was elected on his post.

Fifth parliamentary election took place on 9th and 23rd April, 2006. Electoral campaign was focused on personal rivalry between Fidesz leader Viktor Orbán and MSzP leader Ferenc Gyurcsány. Eventually MSzP was able to repeat a victorious success from 2002 and was the first Hungarian party which could make a government with SzDSz twice in a row. The turnout in the first round was 67.83% and in the second one 64.39%. The number of invalid votes was 49 352 and was lower than in all previous elections from 1990. If we compare this result to the average turnout of two rounds (5 455 214/ 66.11%) it occurs that 0.9% of votes were invalid.
Just after the elections media revealed a speech given by prime minister in a private meeting with socialist politicians in May, 2006. Ferenc Gyurcsány stated that economic rates were low and society was cheated. Otherwise, the Hungarians would not support MSzP in the election and socialists could lose. Despite public outrage, the prime minister refused to resign, and a series of demonstrations started calling for the resignation of F. Gyurcsány. He did not do that. Hungary was in a critical situation and asked international institutions like European Union and International Monetary Fund for support. Then the government proposed a reform package but it was refused in a referendum in 2008. Government reconstruction made SzDSz to leave the coalition and in 2009 Ferenc Gyurcsány was replaced by Gordon Bajnai who became a prime minister after a parliamentary passage of constructive motion of no-confidence against F. Gyurcsány. In 2009 Hungarians elected their representatives to EU Parliament. Fidesz won 14 seats with 1 632 309 votes and it was more than in 2004. While MSzP lost half of votes and received support from only 503 140 voters and it gave 4 seats.

Last parliamentary election was on 11th and 25th April, 2010. Pre-election surveys showed that Fidesz would win, but the real result was a bit surprising because Fidesz received the absolute majority of votes: 52.75%. And it ensured 2/3 of seats on the parliament. It meant that Fidesz formed one-party cabinet. The turnout in the first round was 64.38% and in the second one 46.66%. The number of invalid votes was 59 880 and was lower than in 1990. If we compare this result to the average turnout of two rounds (5 122 501 / about 55.52%) it occurs that 0.79% of votes was invalid.

| Source: Own calculations based on: [Czyż, Kubas 2010; Nohlen, Stöver 2010]. |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Table 7. Results of 2006 elections** |
| **Electoral support** (average number of votes/ % of votes) | Parliamentary representation % |
| **Single-seat districts** | **Multi-seat regional districts** | **State proportional list** | **Total** |
| Fidesz - KDNP | 68 | 69 | 27 | 164 | 2 271 110 / 41.6 | 42.49 |
| MSzP | 98 | 71 | 17 | 186 | 2 256 009 / 41.3 | 48.19 |
| SzDSz | 3 | 4 | 11 | 18 | 346 179 / 6.3 | 4.66 |
| MSzP-SzDSz | 6 | - | - | 6 | 154 619 / 3 | 1.55 |
| MDF | - | 2 | 9 | 11 | 255 698 / 7.5 | 2.85 |
| Others | 1 | - | - | 1 | 18 054 / 0.3 | 0.25 |
| **Evolution of Preferences at Hungarian Electorate towards Bidimensional “Left – Right”...** |
| **Table 8. Results of 2010 elections** |
| **Electoral support** (average number of votes/ % of votes) | Parliamentary representation % |
| **Single-seat districts** | **Multi-seat regional districts** | **State proportional list** | **Total** |
| Fidesz– KDNP* | 173 | 87 | 3 | 262 | 3 335 220 / 53 | 67.88 |
| MSzP | 2 | 28 | 29 | 59 | 1 316 789 / 21 | 15.28 |
| Jobbik | - | 26 | 21 | 47 | 996 851 / 15.8 | 12.18 |
| LMP | - | 5 | 11 | 16 | 427 313 / 6.8 | 4.15 |
| Independent | 1 | - | - | 1 | 12 452 / 0.2 | 0.25 |

* 1 member was elected as a candidate of coalition Fidesz – KDNP – Vállalkozók Pártja. 

Source: Own calculations based on: [Czyż, Kubas 2010; Nohlen, Stöver 2010].

MSzP ended the 2010 election with a huge failure what resulted in taking the 59 oppositional parliamentary seats to 186 in 2006 and 178 in 2002. The reason of such a bad outcome was social criticism of worsening economy. After 2010 election MSzP became just a shadow of the Fidesz growing strength. Yet it was SzDSz which was punished the most severely by the Hungarians because it did not get any parliamentary seat. MDF followed SzDSz example. There was a new party which was able to win some parliamentary seats. It was Politics Can Be Different (Hungarian: Lehet Más a Politika, LMP). LMP is a liberal and green party which was founded in 2009. The party aims are: environmental protection, sustainable development and the fight against corruption in the current political elite. Other new party in the 2010-2014 parliament is Jobbik with its radical right program.

The consolidation of the Hungarian political right side has been seen since the second half of the 90-ties XXth century. Fidesz changed its character and moved from liberal to conservative position. It was able to absorb other small right parties, groups and politicians. FKP and KDN were in dissolution in 2002 which was mainly due to Fidesz strengthening. Then MDF lost its position to Fidesz as well. From the other side Jobbik gathered a more radical right electorate. MSzP which dominated in the last decade, had to lose to Fidesz eventually. But the development of the second stage of polarization of electorate preferences on the right and left segments has been clear since 1998. MSzP and Fidesz have received more than 70% of all parliamentary seats since 1998 (73.6% in 1998; 88.6% in 2002; 91.91% in 2006 and 83.41% in 2010) [Tankó 2011: 199].

The most spectacular achievement of Fidesz was the new constitution passage in April 2010. These new rules strengthened Fidesz and the right option in Hungarian law. Fidesz dominated many social, economical and political spheres of public life what was criticized by internal and foreign society. But public support for main political parties in Hungary shows that Fidesz is
still on the first place among decided voters. This situation has been permanent for almost 80 months. The number of undecided voters is high and equals even 57% in some surveys. Although support for Fidesz has been diminishing, the difference between this party and the second one is MSzP is still undisputable. Then there is Jobbik with support about 5 – 11% and LMP with support of 3 – 11%. The surveys did not include institutions which were not parties like DK or Together 2014. There is a table with percentage support for main Hungarian parties. This table is based on surveys prepared by three main Hungarian polling institutions: Tárki, Medián, Szonda Ipsos.

Table 9. Results of polls: the decided voters support for main Hungarian parties (May 2011 – November 2012)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2011 (May - June)</th>
<th>2011 (August - September)</th>
<th>2012 (January)</th>
<th>2012 (June)</th>
<th>2012 (October - November)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fidesz</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSzP</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jobbik</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LMP</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undec.</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I – Ipsos Szonda; T - Tárki, M – Medián.

Source: [http://uk.reuters.com/article/2012/11/28/uk-hungary-poll-idUKBRE8AR0WX20121128 (28.02.2013)]

Another survey reflects different data on support for parties without division on decided or undecided voters. Among citizens who declared their participation in 2014 parliamentary elections Fidesz is an undisputable leader. Ipsos Szonda stated that if election would take place 23rd May, 2012 between 35 and 40 percent of the asked electorate was inclined to vote. A strong dominance of Fidesz on political scene is reflected by about 40% of Hungarian’s voters support. The second party after the leading Fidesz is MSzP with about 30%, then nationalistic Jobbik with about 15%. The fourth position belongs to LMP with about 5% of support. This survey includes non-parliamentary institutions like DK or Together 2014. Yet DK can count on rather marginal support 1-5% while leftist Together 2014 is too new to state how big its support can be.

Nézőpont survey presents lower results of support for political parties and institutions, but ranks are the same.

Table 10. Results of Ipsos Szonda and Nézőpont polls: the voters support for main Hungarian parties and political organizations among electorate declared to vote (May 2012 – February 2013)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fidesz</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSzP</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jobbik</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LMP</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DK</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Together 2014</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Today’s Fidesz dominance means that right option creates public sphere of social life. Socialists are weak and cannot oppose this situation. MSzP position was weakened by LMP success in 2010 elections. Now we can observe a trial of unifying leftist electorate out of MSzP surveillance. Former leftist prime minister Gordon Bajnai founded a socialist movement Together 2014 (Hungarian: Együtt 2014) which aims at winning 2014 election. But it is too fresh to estimate its final result. Support for individual leaders of political parties affirmed Fidesz’s strength and shows that Viktor Orbán can count on 37%, Attila Mesterházy (MSzP) and Gábor Vona (Jobbik) both 6% while Gordon Bajnai on 15% [Bajnai-Mesterházy csörte].

Let us see the evolution of electorate turnout which reflects support for the main democratic tool - parliamentary elections. Participation in the first round is generally higher without elections in 1998 and 2002. Hungarian turnout is similar to two other countries of Visegrad Group: Czech Republic and Slovakia and is about 60% and it is higher than in Poland [Kubas 2010 (2): 37].

Table 11. Turnout data from parliamentary elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year of parliamentary elections</th>
<th>First round (%)</th>
<th>Second round (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>65.1</td>
<td>45.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>68.9</td>
<td>55.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>56.3</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>70.5</td>
<td>73.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>67.8</td>
<td>64.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>64.4</td>
<td>46.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: [Czyż, Kubas 2010: 94]
The number of invalid votes has been gradually declining since 1990 from 2.65% of total given votes in the very first elections to 0.79% in the last one. The Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance survey from 2003 ranked Hungary 98th regarding percentage of invalid votes given in parliamentary elections which is one of the best results among 110 countries. In the region Poland was 30th, Slovakia 79th and the Republic of Czech 104th [Parliamentary elections - Invalid votes].

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year of parliamentary elections</th>
<th>Number of invalid votes</th>
<th>% of invalid votes in total votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>134,122</td>
<td>2.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>79,366</td>
<td>1.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>56,665</td>
<td>1.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>59,880</td>
<td>1.054</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>49,352</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>50,227</td>
<td>0.79</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: [Nohlen, Stöver 2010].

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polarization made public and political life divided on those attached to traditional values, history of great Hungary, religion and those who support civilization and cultural changes with more tight cooperation with EU.

References:

Abstract:

The aim of the article is to identify cleavages that have been in the Czech and Polish party system located since 1989. These cleavages are compared to determine the hierarchy and degree of their importance. It is also demonstrated the effort to determine the potential future development of the cleavages in these two countries.

In this article as key for the formation of cleavages are considered elections to the lower houses of parliament. Elections to the upper houses of parliament and European elections are not relevant for the purpose of this work, because they are considered as second-order elections, thus they have no direct impact on the formation of cleavages.

Key words:
Czech Republic party system, Poland party system, cleavages
Comparison of the cleavages development in the Czech Republic and Poland after 1989

Karolina Ticha

...if they are strong enough and have sufficient support in civil society (as a potential electorate) may escalate in the formation of political party - one that will be given topics to promote and defend the interests of their voters [Römelle 1999]. Such a political party then in the political system it represents the cleavage. At the same time due to conflict lines can form new relationships between existing parties - between political parties and social segments of the society and between political parties and their voters [Kitschelt, Mansfeldova, Markowski, Tóka 1999]. An example of this development is the adoption of new issues in party programs and further defining the other political parties.

The cleavages theory was since its inception frequently revised and particularly adapted to the new conditions in which the Rokkan's original concept was not enough, such as companies professing postmaterial value or development in post-communist countries etc. In Europe, the 60th 20th century individual political parties began to mobilize in order to take a broader cross-section of voters. Unintended consequence, however, was the weakening of ties with indigenous voters. This situation has to change traditional political preferences of voters [Gallagher, Laver, Mair 2001] and membership in a social group no longer unconditional priority of voter decision making.

Cleavages in post-communist countries

During the rule of the Communist Party was not possible in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe to talk about party systems. And even in the case of a satellite parties. The communist regime brought significant political and social change, and all political structures, including traditional cleavages were destroyed.

In the early 90 years, so it was necessary to go through the difficult process of transformation and consolidation mode, which also brought new conflicts. It is more than obvious that these conflicts did not correspond to the traditional Rokkan's concept, which was based on the research of social structure and identification of people with different social groups. Leaving aside some really solid anchor (eg ethnicity), we the citizens of post-communist countries to find their new nationality and identity. Which was reflected in voting behavior, which is characterized by unstable political entities support from the electorate negative identification with political parties (I know, who do not want to vote, but I'm not sure who to vote for in reality I) and also a different understanding of the concepts of left and right [Hloušek, Kopeček 2004].

Finally, it is also necessary to mention that in the post-communist party systems does not always necessarily lead to the creation of political parties based on existing cleavages (as the process described Rokkan), but rather leads to the formation of cleavages based on shape party spectrum. For the above reasons, some researchers proceeded to their own definition of cleavages, which would be more easily applicable to the post-communist party systems. These cleavages are in the Czech environment called “conflict transformation lines” [Hloušek 2000: 375]. Cleavage are inherently highly variable and unstable, as the “social realities emerging” post-communist societies “cannot show a strong social stratification and individual citizens' groups are quite heterogeneous and the boundaries between them (and these borders is just possible to identify the cleavage of transformation) therefore, the fluid” [Hloušek 2000: 375].

In reference to the theoretical part of the article are for the comparison of Czech and Polish party system considered following relevant cleavages:
- Socio-economic,  
- Nationalist,  
- Materialism/post-materialism,

In their analysis will take into account the specific development of party systems in different countries. Will also be discussed any specific cleavages that have evolved due to specific conditions of countries.

Chronologically, the first line - about the future of the regime between the original Communist Party and the political opposition has established itself at the moment of the fall of the communist regimes (in some cases even a little earlier), played an important role only at the beginning of the transit period and later lost importance. Although we believe that in itself contained a breeding ground for subsequent cleavages (traditional and transformational).

What are the socio-economic cleavage concerns, needless to her in the context of the transformation mode can only see as traditional Rokkanian line owners - working (which is still a part of it), but it contains much more specifically with the transition to democracy-related conflicts: privatization, the form and scope of liberalization economic or personal “result” (profit or loss) economic changes [Hloušek, Kopeček 2004]. It is also necessary to mention the unusual behavior of right-wing and left-wing parties in this context. In the sense that even leftist parties must (if the ruling parties) to promote a change towards a more liberal economy, and conversely right-wing parties are forced to listen to the social requirements of vulnerable citizens.

Nationalistic cleavage of transformation combines mainly regional and ethnic conflict, which is not so connected to the democratic transformation. In the post-communist period occurred mainly because at the time “before” simply did not have the chance. Was based on a sense of identity to the group, which differ in their religious beliefs, ethnic or linguistic affiliation [Hloušek 2000: 379]. Has the ability to exacerbate political conflict and lead to a polarization of the political system. It can be argued that this cleavage had some importance for all the...
countries of the Eastern bloc, in an atmosphere of newfound freedom, some groups begin to establish themselves again and radicalized in the desire to create its own peculiar state, or trying to acquire the rights arising from the fact that they are ethnic groups living in the territory of another state.

Another important line of cleavage is materialism/post-materialism, which gives rise to such ecological parties. Green Party may be relevant to the major parties. It should however be noted that this line are isolated and therefore in its program also takes themes that lead to higher electoral gains, but not post-material. The question also remains as to what extent the post-communist countries post-materialist.

**Czech Republic**

Czech Republic has undergone since its inception complicated history, which is largely different from that of the V4 countries. Right in the middle of the nineties began to establish a strong socio-economic cleavage of transformation, while the other line began to weaken, and the voters identify themselves to the left-right axis [Hloušek, Kopeček 2008].

Whether we are talking about parties located on the left or right side of the political spectrum, it was necessary for all the broad concept of political issues so as to hit the largest group of potential voters. In the Czech Republic is not (and even till today) the place for parties that are profiled on just one topic. Such was the fate of political parties such as the Association for the Republic - Republican Party of Czechoslovakia (SPR-RSČ). Besides, it was a populist party based primarily on personality of chairman Miroslav Sládek, acting as a radical opposition group to the situation in the state and used colorful and against other anti-minority rhetoric. As a side issue so had no chance to succeed later, lost its importance. As a theme in the election, however, played a major role in post-communist countries.

After the elections to the Chamber of Deputies in 2002, perhaps the most important show topics relating to the planned accession of the Czech Republic into the European Union. This “European” cleavage is not mentioned in the theoretical introduction, because it established presence as important whether the revisions Rokkan’s original theory or as one of the cleavages described transformation in post-communist countries, and after the Czech Republic joined the EU in fact has lost its importance. As a theme in the election, however, played a major role. Later, the nationalistic cleavage was not in its pure form is represented by any political party that would succeed in the elections to the Chamber of Deputies, although the electoral programs of some pages can be traced back some nationalistic tendencies. For example, the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM) performed in 1999 rather vigorously against the Czech Republic’s entry into NATO. And then promote the strategic concept of NATO refusal to conflict with the principles of international law, while emphasizing that its long-term goal is to contribute to the dissolution of NATO as a relic block division of the world [KSČM 2002]. KSČM pronounced even against the Czech Republic joined the European Union in 2002. In nationalist rhetoric in this case can be considered by emphasizing the importance of state sovereignty and independence in relation to the two mentioned inputs.

Nationalist features according to some authors, we found even in ODS. And in the sense that the ODS conceives his “nationalism in Anglo-Saxon style, as a state nation” [Pšeja 1999: 74], which coincides with the state within its borders and does not therefore nationalism in the ethno sense. Similarly to the issues mentioned above and builds Communists.

Some authors in connection with conflicting lines in the Czech Republic even mention the so-called value-oriented “axiological cleavage” [Hloušek, Kopeček 2008: 531]. This line, which began to appear as early as the second half of the nineties and beyond gained some importance, is a kind of axis between liberal and statist approach. There is, however, well established enough to be able to compete with the socio-economic cleavage of transformation for dominance in the Czech party-political system [Hloušek, Kopeček 2004].

The other examined cleavages (the form of the regime, church-state, city-countryside) had its importance especially in the nineties during the formation of the party system in the Czech Republic. Cleavage of the form of the regime had its importance especially at the Civic Forum. Church-state and city-country were to some extent represented KDU-ČSL (founded in 1992), but later began to focus on a wider range of topics and related to rural churches and pushed into the background. I still, however, the party draws its electorate mainly from rural Catholic oriented.

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**Moravia**

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role, and it is appropriate to mention it. If we take into account relevant political parties, can be seen as euro-sceptic ODS and KSČM, although in the case of ODS euroscepticism is considerably milder. ODS has chosen to approach the EU rather realistic, although voting in the referendum on the accession of the Czech Republic to the EU in June 2003 asked his voters to vote for entry, stop by to many issues rather negatively. Was (and is) against any attempt to lead the EU towards the federal arrangement, whether political, social or economic areas [ODS 2003]. Another criticism was directed primarily to ODS conditions of entry for the Czech Republic negotiated the then government led by the ČSSD.

ČSSD acted as a staunch defender of the Czech Republic to the EU, even this entry identified as a major national interest of the Czech Republic. “The European Union guarantees the preservation and development of the European social model, which is a great result of policies of social democratic and other progressive movements and parties Europe in the 20th century. And just so this can become a normative model of global justice that is the target of social democratic project for the 21st century” [ČSSD 2007].

The European cleavage after 2003, however, considerably weakened (even if not disappeared), and even in relation to the European elections held in 2004, which are in the Czech environment considered to be a secondary. In the Czech Republic, not EU-related topics to the core of a political party and take them rather as complementary. The European Union is often also becomes an alibiing excuse for unpopular actions of governments, or the possibility of opposition parties criticize the current government. Problems of European cleavage can be summed up by the fact that while in their signs exist, the Czech Republic, but its importance is not too relevant.

Last conflicting line will be discussed in the case of the Czech Republic lines materialism-post-materialism. In surveys of party preference before the elections to the Chamber of Deputies in 2002 showed growth with some preference (not significant) hopes to join the Green Party (SZ). Even though the election ended in failure, there can be traced the beginning of the formation of cleavage – post-materialism/materialism.

The Czech Republic became the first of the V4 countries in which they manage to get political entity emphasizing post-material topics. Before the elections to the Chamber of Deputies, and immediately after them, it seemed that SZ has the potential to position itself in the cleavage materialism-post-materialism and affect Czech politics until “tied” dominating socio-economic cleavage of transformation. But it turned out that the Czech Republic is not to “post-material policy” ready. This was partly due to the fact that the SZ was not a priori chosen because of its programmatic focus, but rather as an expression of protest votes of voters who were current Czech political scene tired and wanted something new. As a result, SZ failed to enforce its “green” program and after the elections, has found its place in the socio-economic cleavage of transformation.

**Poland**

In Poland, as in the Slovak Republic rather than in the Czech Republic showed the party system in the nineties considerable disorder and fragmented. Throughout the nineties led to a consolidation of Polish political parties, which resulted in significant changes in cleavages. It should be noted that this fragmentation of the Polish political system was mainly due to the right side of the political spectrum wired “post solidarity formations”, which in the nineties did not find the way to true unity. An exception may be considered only Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS), which one could term the right hand channel. Conversely tents were left fairly quickly after the transition to democracy fastened. Even at the beginning of 2002 could not be Polish system of political parties mark as a consolidated system [Kopeček 2005]. The proof of this statement is the fact that after the 2001 elections to the Sejm came seven relevant subjects, four of which got there first.

The whole nineties were marked by extreme fragmentation of the party system. For example, in 1991, when the first fully competitive election to the Sejm received a whopping total twenty-nine political groupings. This figure was mainly due to the extremely proportional electoral system that worked with the closing clause. For the first time there showed fragmentation “post solidarity” camp. And then fragmented right has become a major feature of the Polish party system after the nineties.

As it was noted above, nonconsolidate of party system has made it to the Sejm in 2001, had only a fraction of political bodies, which had sat in the previous term. Already outlined center-fragmentation “post solidarity” camp has proven its strength in this period. The ruins of the winner of the election in 1997 of Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS) created two major political parties, in the following period, significantly shaped the Polish politics. These were the Civic Platform (PO), which broke away from AWS as its liberal wing a few months before the elections in 2001 and Law and Justice (PiS) Kaczynski brothers, who built primarily on the popularity of the former Justice Minister Lech Kaczynski, who (somewhat populist) promised especially hard fighting crime. The last party of the right of the political spectrum, then the League of Polish Families (LPR), populist oriented political party that draws its voters mainly from orthodox conservative Catholic circles and has also been linked to the
Comparison of the cleavages development in the Czech Republic and Poland after 1989

In other respects, were targeted as well: from the socio-economic point of view it was the left-wing formation, preferred facing churches and more urban, liberal pro-market access than rural protectionism.

Elections in 2005 brought an innovation - to the Sejm joined the same political parties that it had been present in the previous period. There has therefore been no change in terms of its cast, but based on the balance of power. Coalition government in the past formed the leftist SLD and PSL rather centrist, which, however, recorded in the fall elections. This was due to many factors, some of which the most significant was the failure to fulfill election promises and to ensure that economic reforms did not affect negatively the underprivileged population. Certainly played a role and participation in the affair Rywingate SLD2 [Kubát 2005].

On the contrary, the huge growth of the vote received two post solidarity right-wing formation - a populist PiS and the second in the order PO (PiS lagged behind only minimally). Both sides of the further development of cleavages in Poland proved pivotal. PiS is already before the election itself as a traditionalist National Party, which put emphasis on the fight against crime, who should start first in government and political circles. This populist proclamation recorded the fact that at that time was part of the ruling SLD several bribery scandals. PiS was aimed at a kind of cleansing, she wanted to be achieved primarily through the introduction of equity returns for people working in government. Furthermore PiS criticism continued growing crime in Poland, which wanted to prevent with the new stricter Criminal Code. This policy is defined as a conservative PiS party, which supports a strong role for the state and order. In foreign policy, recognize NATO as a guarantor of international security and the European Union is built rather pragmatically, i.e. She was aware of its importance and its voters promised to strive for a Europe of Nations, where Poland will be a strong player. For this reason, and then subsequently rejected in its election program 2005 forthcoming European Constitution and joined the so-called “Prague Declaration”, which was initiated by Czech ODS [Palovský 2004].

Civic Platform (PO) has stood for election in 2005 (like PiS) due to bribery scandals in the SLD. Unlike PiS but did not use populist rhetoric, but rather tried to take a clear and pragmatic attitude, which is reflected in the pre-election program to revive the economy and bring economic development of Poland.

PO and PiS coincided with the anticommunist rhetoric as. that their members must have a negative vetting, and those who have a communist past, not to the side to enter. And also in international politics stops after pro-European

AWS. On the contrary to the Sejm after the 2002 election did not receive the Freedom Union (UW), which was in the previous term with AWS part of the government coalition. Party suffered mainly due to unpopular reform steps and through the creation of PO, which pulled most of its liberal-minded voters.

The left part of the Polish political spectrum, in contrast to the right in the nineties characterized by a relatively high stability. A major player was primarily the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD), which was based on the former communist party as an electoral coalition for the elections to the Sejm in 1991. In 1999, the SLD has established itself as a full-fledged political party, which also engulfed smaller left-wing parties and has secured its position as the left-wing hegemony. In the election of 2001, she ran for election coalition with “post solidarity” Labour Union (UP). Besides the SLD stable position also acquired Polish People’s Party (PSL). Like SLD has a Communist past. Its modern history to try and restore the foundations of agrarian groupings 19th century [Mlejnek 2000]. Relatively consolidated left side of the Polish political spectrum disrupted in 2001, Self-Defence of the Republic of Poland (SRP). Self-defense is primarily a populist radical formation, which seeks to promote the interests of agrarian peasant population. This party ran like PO, PiS and LPR in 2001 to the Sejm for the first time.

If this is the concept of cleavages, we have observed that its appearance is not so complex and uncertain, such as confused appearance Polish party system. Polish cleavage from the restoration of democracy in the early 90’s until 2004, characterized by a crossing [Mlejnek 2000]. Some authors as the main cleavage 90 years, but refers to “the conflict between the symbolic and the symbolic left-right” [Hloušek, Kopeček 2004: 180], which was based on cultural-historical-ideological dispute. This cleavage is seen in Poland as the classic socio-economic conflict, but rather on the intersecting cleavage of anti-communism and the state church. Although at this time was not a conflict between the symbolic and the symbolic left-right direction for Polish policy determining, still retain some significance.

After the elections to the Sejm in 2001 came a certain dulling residue cleavage communism-anticommunism. Guarantor of that shift was UP which went into the election as part of an electoral coalition with the SLD. It was for many still party with the communist past, which some parties provide space to define this axis. Conversely SLD tried to show that the past is not what we should constantly refer Poland and tried to position itself as a rather side with a clear vision for the future. UP as in socio-economic understanding of the leftist “post solidarity” SLD political party gave some legitimacy and electoral coalition has brought the voices from “post solidarity”, but left-minded voters. The origin of these two parties was actually the only fact that is distributed.

2 Rywingate Affair was established in 2002 when the famous film producer Lew Rywin offered the editor of Gazeta wyborcza possible benefits of prepared media law. Agora Publishing (which publishes “Gazeta Wyborcza”) had conveniently get waves on the televishe court failed SLD blame on the bribery case, saying SLD was largely damaged [Szczerbiak 2007].
course. Since its inception, the very positive comment on the possibility of Poland’s entry into the European Union and emphasized the positives that this may bring. Entry into the EU saw this as an excellent opportunity to modernize Poland, raising the standard of living and no opportunity to actively participate in the future direction of Europe. PO has also a positive attitude towards NATO (Szczerbiak 2007).

The two strongest parties arising from the elections to the Polish Sejm is profiled at the center of the political spectrum and their programs was common ground. Potential harmonious cooperation undermined presidential election: through polarized presidential campaign and the participation of both Lech Kaczyński (PiS) and Donald Tusk (PO) in the second round of the presidential elections, has been cooperation between the two tent at the governmental level possible. PiS coalition government therefore to invite LPR and Self-defense, which put together a majority government. PO became the main opposition party [Szczerbiak 2007]. This conflict between PiS and PO strengthened the emerging cleavage between national conservative PiS traditionalist and modernist liberal oriented Mon Future political developments only confirmed the existence of this cleavage, which also came in the shadow of the other lines that were in the Polish party system still present in the early 90’s. Their residues remained as additional topics by which they can against each PO and PiS define. For example, European cleavage, although earlier showed a tendency in Poland to enforce, although they were relegated to the background (mainly due to the fact that the two main critics of the EU in 2007 to get the Sejm), a certain relevance, however, retained. So do i line of state-church, as both the leading political parties “its” themes emphasize - in PiS can be seen in the context of this axis advocate the interests of the Church, PO supporters in the state.

Regarding the conflicting lines between urban liberal-market and rural-protectionist approach that also retreated into the background. The two dominant parties are not defined primarily on her.

Summary

Cleavages occur under long-term contradictions in society and elections bring the dispute to the center of interest, thereby giving people a better way to navigate. This leads either to strengthen the relationship voter and the party that represents his interest, or contrary to the reorientation of voters to another political entity.

Each of the countries has undergone during nearly two decades of democratic regimes to various developments, which correspond to the different cleavage that party systems of these countries contain.

Comparison of the cleavage development in the Czech Republic and Poland after 1989

It turned out that the socio-economic cleavage of transformation has played the most significant role in the development of the Czech party system (as well as the entire V4). Analysis cleavage party system in the Czech Republic shows that over the last six years have seen the significant changes since their establishment in the late nineties, when it became the socioeconomic cleavage the dominant of professing transformation that maintain this position today. You can now hardly be expected to be carried on its status in the near future could make a difference. But it is necessary to assess whether this cleavage transformation will be closer to the original owners Rokkanian-line workers, from which it is based or not. There remains a problematic aspect of the already mentioned fact sociological base Rokkan’s theory. Social groups as Rokkan’s theory assumes in the Czech Republic do not occur, and I dare say that in the future will not occur. Development of the company led to the fact that there has been a blurring of the differences between owners and workers - now it is difficult to distinguish who is the owner and who is working. Socio-economic cleavage of transformation in the Czech environment and political rather refers to the differences between “poor” and “rich” in a purely neutral direction. In other words - rich in this sense can be a hard working.

In Poland, socio-economic line was not so much dominant and is not (both local major parties are considered to be right). The conflict between left and right took the form of a conflict between the symbolic and the symbolic left-right, which was based not only on the social and economic dimension, but its scope was deeper - the roots touch the cultural-historical-ideological dispute. This line (dominant in the election of 2005), but was replaced by another and that is the one under which define the two against each other since the strongest Polish political parties - traditionalist, conservative national approach of PiS and modernist, liberal-oriented approach of PO.

Thus, in Poland classic left-right axis accentuated the cultural, historical and ideological aspects, a platform for rapid formation and subsequent integration cleavage state-church, which is compared to the V4 countries in Poland most entrenched. In the Czech Republic, the church-state line weakest. KDU-CSL accented topics related to this line more in 90 years, but the additional effect compared to a dominant socio-economic cleavage of transformation almost noticeable.

In terms of overall stability in comparison V4 is stable party system just system of the Czech Republic, which has de facto already stabilized in the second half of the 90 years, where the dominance of strong socio-economic cleavage of transformation was not affected by any of the potential new cleavages. Since the end of the 90 years but there is still a axiological value line between liberal and authoritarian approach. It does not seem, however, that this line had the potential.
in the future socio-economic status cleavage of transformation risk.

Polish party system is then relatively less stable, which is mainly caused by the fact that the most powerful local political parties are relatively new parties (PO and PiS formed a detachment of AWS in 2001, and dominance as the two major Polish political parties before the elections amounted to 2005).

Both of these countries have gone through in the nineties a dramatic development of party systems and shows that even in the last approximately ten years occurred in these countries in the cleavages some changes. A similar trend is expected to take place in the future and therefore it is not possible to speak with certainty, what is waiting for further developments.

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INDIVIDUALISM AND CIVIC PARTICIPATION – AN ESSAY ON A CERTAIN WAY OF THINKING ABOUT CITIZENSHIP

Abstract:

Individualism, although inherently contrary to the spirit of collectivism, is the basis for the development of modern civic attitudes. For the most part, individualism determines the degree of interest in politics and the quality of democracy. Individualism is also the basis for the development of civil society, as the unique characteristics of each individual impact the civil society dynamics, quality and impact on those in power.

Key words: individualism, civil society, democracy, participations

Individualism is a concept that not only is the foundation of the liberal way of thinking and acting, but also defines all varieties of liberalism[1] Bartyzel 2004: 23-57, Chmielewski 2001: 122, Szacki 1993; 40-41, Karnowska 2005: 13-25. It means faith in the greatest value for the Liberals – in the human being endowed with autonomy, ability to make rational choices, and to define what is good for them individually, independently from the common good [Chmielewski 2001: 133] According to the message of individualism, „every adult should be able to make - sine ira et studio - all decisions concerning many aspects of their own life, as long as they are compatible with the freedoms of other people. This belief is the original and the only defensible meaning of liberalism” [Pietrzyk-Reevs 2012: 21].

The matter, however, is not for individualistic preferences of individuals to be turned into selfish attitudes. In fact, in the modern meaning of the concept, its core is seen primarily through the prism of reconciling individualistic

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[1] It is widely known that there are numerous schools of liberal thinking. One can state even that we are living in the veritable thicket of liberalisms – this has been remarked upon by such authors as Jacek Bartyzel, Jerzy Szacki, Adam Chmielewski, Danuta Karnowska.
tendencies with the person’s social presence. It is recognised that in any society those very individuals are „the only source of energy and initiative” [Szczyki 1993: 42]. Philosophers have sought to overcome this dichotomy of community versus individualism, to reconcile the individual with both their freedom of choice and living within a society. Therefore, the accepted principle should be that contemporary thinking about individualism is significantly different from its interpretation in earlier periods when liberalisms were being shaped.

Nowadays the concepts of individualism and social nature of man have been redefined, though it does not mean total disappearance of disputes concerning the status of individuals and their relationship to society - only the force of their impact has lessened. The reason for this lies in the evolution of thinking about individualism not only among the critics of the idea, but also among liberals. It is recognized that "the concept of the human person, located entirely outside society, not connected to anyone by any ties of obligations and duty, not subjected to any determining and shaping external factors, endowed with its own autonomous morality is meaningless. (...) – as one cannot give any sense to the notion of a human being who has not been shaped in any community; a being that, in other words, would resemble humans from the pre-social contract time” [Chmielewski 2001: 127-128].

Thus, society ceases to be a collection of atomized individuals, and becomes a mass of individuals who have the power to exercise their individualistic preferences, making the community of which they are members gaining their energy and commitment. This mechanism lies at the heart of reconciliation of the individual and of the social. The condition for stability of the resulting consensus is that both the individual and the community are not unchangeable entities, prone to stagnation, but are constantly on the move, subject to constant change processes and renegotiation. Therefore, their mutual relations are in fact continuous negotiations, deliberations and repeated conclusion of agreements. This process results, on the one hand, in creation of commitment to others, but most of all it manifests itself in freedom - with all its anxieties and responsibility for one’s decisions, both to oneself and for the benefit of society of which an individual is a member.

The formation of the balanced relationship of an individualistic being with the community forces not only compromises, but also adoption of certain attitudes towards participation in social life. In discussions on the types of civic participation, two models permanently inscribed in the behavior of individuals are the leading ones: the liberal and the republican model. They are widely regarded as contradictory, but it is easy to notice that they also can complement each other. In fact, they were developed on the basis of a similar canon of values, and aspire to determine the best model of involved society. Both in the...
From the different understanding of the idea of freedom in liberal and republican positions also grows a contrasting perception of the relationship between the individual and the community. While the „liberalisms of fear” recognize the absolute primacy of the individual, understood as an individual being, over any manifestation of communalism, in the Republican and „liberalism of courage” concepts and positions the relationships are significantly more complicated. They offer no clear opposition between a rational individual, having the right to individual happiness and autonomous decision-making and the community life style. It is recognized even that without individualism the community would lose its opportunity to participate in the achievement of the common good [Weryński 2010: 52]. Of course, individualism and the community are not seen as equal in the „Athenian” Republicanism, as its supporters stipulate the need for primacy of the community over the individual.

This is where the issue of differing interpretations of the problem of civic morality stems from. In this case, the dividing line is drawn between the mutual commitment of citizens in republicanism, and „the value of individual achievement in the private sphere” in liberalism [Weryński 2010: 52]. This translates naturally also to the approach to the state. While in liberal thinking, civil society exists prior to the state, and state is only an instrument of pursuing individual interests, for contemporary Republicans the state is an emanation of the common good. That is why society cannot be fully realized beyond the control of the state. Indirectly, these opposing liberal and republican attitudes towards the state also affect the concept of civil society. As noted by Edmund Wnuk-Lipinski [2008: 154], „according to the communitarian concepts, civil society creates citizens; on the other hand according to the liberal current - citizens make up the civil society, but for them to be able to create it they must be equipped with, firstly, a suitable social capital, which allows individuals to act together; and secondly, have a minimum of civil culture that allows one to see among the objectives of collective action not only their own particular interest, but also the value of the common good”.

According to the researchers, none of the types/models of participation, however, occurs in pure form. Undoubtedly, what should be very strongly emphasized, individualism has a significant impact on the accepted patterns of participation, especially in the liberal models. It is also worth noting that the level of individualism has bearing on the degree of knowledge about politics and interest in it. In the modern world, knowledge about politics is often the passport to strengthened civil control. Acknowledgment that the nation-state is having increasingly less of an impact on the lives of its citizens is associated with the problem of „outflow” of significant decisions to the global level [Wnuk-Lipinski 2004: 102]. As rightly noted by E. Wnuk-Lipinski [2004], „from the individual perspective, of fundamental importance are the economy, security (internal and external), and ecology. And these very areas are more and more slipping away from democratic control at the level of a national state, and increasingly (...) are shaped by decisions made in the corporate mode by transnational military and economic structures”. A citizen may therefore feel no need to raise their awareness about politics, which is undoubtedly related to wariness resulting from the lack of belief in their ability to influence reality.

On the other hand, it is difficult not to notice a certain paradox. An increasingly complicated world with remote center of power (affected by globalization) needs more and more educated citizens. The reason for this is primarily the belief that „citizens’ ignorance is the enemy of democracy, and a breeding ground for demagogues, as well as the potential social base for possible authoritarian solutions” [Bobbio 1987: 35]. Lack of knowledge also promotes social apathy, which adds to the superficiality of democratic institutions. This weakening of local citizenship (on the nation-state level) favours the withdrawal of individuals from the public sphere of activity into the private sphere. And this process in turn promotes decision-making in democratic procedures (elections, referenda) by only a minority of citizens. Proof of this thesis may be the declining electoral participation in Poland.

This problem is reflected in both theory and empirical research. In a democratic culture, as emphasized by Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, involved individuals must duly recognize objects of the political system and have knowledge of the political and administrative processes [Almond, Verba 1963: 67]. Of course, gaining knowledge is subject to being interested in politics, and these two elements have a positive impact not only on the consolidation of democracy, but also on its quality. This principle applies not only to so-called new democracies, but also those that are widely regarded as permanent and unwavering. Particular attention to this issue was paid by Robert Dahl, and Jacek Raciborski indicates that „polyarchy is not a set of institutions imposed on the society. They would not exist if citizens did not take complex actions, for example not want to get to know their options during elections and would not want to make that choice.” Thus, the „civic knowledge is important from the point of view of the key systemic imperative - the continuation of democracy.” [Raciborski 2011: 198].

The postulate and condition of universality of knowledge about politics as a determinant of development of civic participation is not always accepted. The liberal concept of democracy advocates individualistic nature of citizens and the knowledge they possess [Lalman, Oppenhaimer, Świstak 1994; 124].
assumption recognizes the absolute rationality of individuals and the possibility of its use for the realization of individual interests. Thus, the knowledge possessed by an individual - determining the possible choices - serves only that individual, and not the public, and therefore can be seen as part of liberal, not republican, postulates of action for the common good [Raciborski 2011: 199].

Slightly different, but still visibly related position is represented by the proponents of deliberative democracy and the elitist concepts. They point out that “expectations regarding citizens’ cognitive skills are so high that even the authors behind them recognize that in the mass democracies such competences are not widespread” [Raciborski 2011]. Since civic participation is not a universal phenomenon, a question emerges: on what basis does democracy actually function? David Held, answering this very question indicates that democracy meets its formal standards above all by its particular brand of elitism, and applying relevant procedures for working out the respective positions [Held 2010: 301-312]. The main advantage of these procedures is not so much their wide reach, but openness, inclusiveness, equality of differing views [Habermas 2005: 521-547].

Views on the importance of knowledge about politics for citizen participation in the deliberative democracy systems are complemented by concepts of elitism, that ever since the Antiquity emphasize that knowledge, including that concerning politics, is necessary first of all for individuals holding power. In modern times, the elitism theory was further developed by Joseph Schumpeter, who indicated that civic competencies do not always apply to society as a whole, and do not have the ability to spread. The condition of their being used for the common good is the belief that those who are actually interested in politics do possess sufficient knowledge about it. We are thus faced again with the issue already mentioned in the present article: that in this case the minority decides the fate of the majority, so the question is whether we are still dealing with a democracy? Schumpeter emphasizes the need to discontinue treating the democratic regime in the utopian categories - and as such he considers the notion that democracy is authority exercised by the people. In reality, the system is limited only to people’s choice of representatives, who should not be disturbed later in the exercise of power [Schumpeter 2009: 327].

The problem that needs to be highlighted at this point focuses on the criteria to be applied to allow periodic elections, and possible sources of motivating the citizens to participate in them. Elitists propose that it is enough to create conditions of equality and accessibility of the election, while refraining from any form of persuading the citizens to participate in them. They argue that there will always be a group of citizens interested in politics, having knowledge about it, who will participate in the election procedures as a result of the civic competencies they possess [Schumpeter 2009: 327].

Theories explaining the reasons for civic participation or deficit thereof, often feature those which indicate that a high level of knowledge about politics has no effect on political participation and absenteeism [Godlewski 2008: 101]. It is the inevitable consequence of the replacement of a well-informed citizen by one that compensates the lack of knowledge with other mechanisms, such as using cognitive heuristics, thus making decisions without having a thorough knowledge of the facts, and usually only basing them on specific decision-making patterns that allow for quick decisions made at low cost.

The perception of both the place and role of the individual in society, as well as the standards to be met in order to become (or not) an active, involved citizen participating in the creation of reality, is undoubtedly important for the vision of civil society. For the purposes of this discussion, we should focus primarily on the liberal tradition of civil society, which clearly separates the public from the state, so that the public is no longer equated with the political community the ways it is viewed in the Republican civil society tradition. What to the fullest embodies the liberal thinking about civil society is the fact that the individual is no longer identified with the community, and remains beyond its jurisdiction. This does not mean arbitrary nature of individual actions, but only the right to freedom (often perceived in a negative sense), they can benefit from thanks to their rationalism. However, freedom replaces the civic virtues, thus increasing the individual’s rights while at the same time reducing their obligations towards others. This results in the individualization of the concept of a good life and exclusion of the common good principle. What then causes the formation of civil society? First of all, it is the tendency of individuals to live in a society, a consequence of human need for security. Thus, the state becomes only an abstract legal entity, a guardian of individual freedoms and protector of citizens’ sense of security, especially in the economic dimension. An expression of the liberal tradition of civil society is both its diversity and separation, „not only because of the differentiation between the civil society and the state, but also due to the recognition of the individuals and their objectives, and the concept of the good life as a fundamental” [Pietrzyk-Reeves 2012: 116].

3 Researchers differentiate three kinds of cognitive heuristics: accessibility (when an event that easily springs to mind seems more likely to happen), representation (when we compare a given situation to a typical one), anchoring (formulating an opinion on a given subject we often operate using the opinion of others we had heard before).

4 Similarly as in the Republican tradition, also the Liberal current of thought about civil society show two trends: „liberalism of fear” and „liberalism of courage”. In the case of „liberalism of fear”, an individual clearly takes advantage of their right to be free from any coercion of the community or the state. In the „Liberalism of courage,” while also benefiting from the „freedom from”, individuals are also inclined to cooperate with others, thus showing their support for the „freedom to”.

5 It is limited to the sum of individual goods.
Civil society thus becomes a space for individual choice-making, self-determination, what in turn may contribute to the emergence of conflicts.

For liberals, civil society is also a space free from state interference, a sphere in which the process of self-organization of society occurs, finally also a self-government, „forming a dam for the excessive concentration of power” [Pietrzyk-Reeves 2012: 116]. It is, therefore, constituted by everything that is outside the state, including both private and public associations, as well as various forms of cooperation, which contribute to building a culture of public trust, public opinion and finally political parties.

The political dimension of civil society is supplemented by economic reasons. It is in the sphere of economy that, according to liberals, most activities of a community nature take place: production, sales and consumption require the appearance of spontaneous relationships that are as natural in the political sphere as they are in the economic one. Only community relations rooted in the economic dimension may determine the existence of civil society in the political sense. The economic sphere became the prototype for the liberal public sphere: initially all alternatives to the state were appearing in the economic stratum. It was a place where the seeds of the „public opinion” first appeared, what in time caused the emergence of the public sphere intended to develop as a result of a debate in which citizens express their collective judgment on matters, impacting also the elite [Habermas 2007: 25-27].

Public sphere in the liberal tradition is an integral part of shaping and strengthening civil society. While the private sphere is limited to the individual efforts in favour of one’s family, in the case of the public sphere one has to “leave the house” in order to discuss local and nationa politics, etc., what largely shapes one’s opinion. It translates directly into the realm of politics, for example by the distribution of votes in parliamentary elections. However, what is happening in the public sphere is largely independent of the political sphere, because it operates outside its current goings-on. At the same time the public sphere is clearly separated from the private sphere, as the dilemmas being resolved in it relate to matters “relevant to the community” [Koczanowicz, Włodarczyk 2011: 14-25].

In the liberal tradition of thinking about the citizens and their participation in the life of society and the state places them outside the state. The above does not mean hostility of the citizen towards the institutions of the state, but only the perception of the citizen, “not so much in their direct relationship to the state, but a citizen with associations outside the state, independently of it.” [Raciborski 2011: 38]. Thus a citizen retains his or her individuality, by which he or she may affect the quality of civil society - however, becoming a citizen depends more on interaction with other citizens. As indicated by Jacek Raciborski [2011: 39-41], this cooperation can take place in two ways: in a civil society understood as (1) “constituted by people communicating and associating in order to influence the state towards a favorable allocation of some goods (...), or defending some of their freedom, their goods from the state” or (2) “an autonomous civil society civil treated as a sphere of private interests, in their very broad sense, including economic; selfish and conflict-prone by nature.”

But regardless of how civil society is viewed, to talk about it at all it must be recognized that its basic, key element is a citizen. It is difficult at the same time not to indicate the citizen’s individualistic attributes that influence the shape and quality of civil society. The examples worth mentioning in this context, are the sense of being represented, the sense of being able to influence policy, and – last but not least - the sense of possessing knowledge [Gliński 2006: 62-74]. These examples of “feelings/convictions” constitute the individual perceptions of both the politics and one’s personal influence over it. Moreover, they point to the need for an individual perception of the role of civil society and citizens that make it up. Therefore they should not only be indentified using the sociological dimensions [Raciborski 2011: 44].

Of course, the most desirable type of citizenship is citizenship that is involved, engaged. Through participation a citizen legitimizes political power not only during the democratic elections, but also at times between them. The importance of civic competencies should again be emphasized - particularly knowledge and interest in politics, as in today’s world a decline in various forms of civic participation is clearly noticeable. This applies above all to conventional forms of participation (elections, participation in associations and protests). At the same time, however, we are witnessing an increase in participation in unconventional forms of influencing the policy, such as being active on the Internet. Undoubtedly, Internet as a medium facilitates individualization of citizenship, but on the other hand it also requires collective action to impact policy choices. It is also an instrument of communication, for which the researchers of citizenship and civil society have great hopes - first of all because the Internet allows one to cross borders, and thus facilitates formation of civil society at the global level [Barber 2008: 446-521].

Individualism, although inherently contrary to the spirit of collectivism, is the basis for the development of modern civic attitudes. For the most part, individualism determines the degree of interest in politics and the quality of democracy. Individualism is also the basis for the development of civil society, as the unique characteristics of each individual impact the civil society dynamics, quality and impact on those in power.
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Personal values, perceptions of unfairness in social exchange and happiness among young voters and non-voters in Poland

Abstract:

In recent years, there has been increasing interest in phenomenon of poor political activity among young adults, manifested in large percentage of non-voters and politically non-engaged individuals. The aim of this study was to examine the relationships between voting behaviour and political preferences of young adults and their hierarchy of basic personal values, global subjective happiness and evaluations of fair and unfair treatment in social exchange.

The results of the study indicate firstly, that the most important values were power, conformity and tradition, secondly, that the non-voters evaluated hedonism lower and security higher than the voters and thirdly, that value profiles for five groups of voters differed in preferences of conformity, tradition, security and hedonism. There were no significant differences between voters and non-voters in respect of global subjective happiness and evaluations of fair and unfair treatment. However, significant differences in these variables occurred between electorates of specified political parties. The findings of the current research provide a psychological characteristic of young adults in terms of basic values, subjective happiness and perception of unfairness, allowing also to identify some of the possible indicators of poor political activity in this group.

Key words:
personal values, young voters, non-voters
Introduction

Poor political activity, problems with political identity and low turnout in election of Poles are the phenomena frequently commented on by observers of the political scene. The main source of anxiety is broadly understood poor political activity among the youngest voters. In the age group between 18 to 25 years, the lowest turnout percentage has been regularly observed [Cześniki 2009: 17; Cześniki 2002; Raciborski 1991]. The Social Diagnosis 2011 report shows that age is one of the factors connected with political identity or its lack. Almost 70 percent of the subjects in the 16-24 age group do not identify with any political party and it is the highest percentage compared with the other age groups [Czapinski, Panek 2011: 294]. This phenomenon should be viewed as definitely negative since party identification promotes election participation and plays an important role in taking voting decisions [Skarzynska 2005: 234-5]. Summarising her research on political activity of the youth Agnieszka Turska-Kawa writes: “In reference to the youngest citizens entitled to vote, the diagnoses seem to confirm that compared with other social groups, the youth display a more negative image of politics, lesser interest in it and a less intensive participation in co-decision making in terms of electing the most important national authorities” [Turska-Kawa 2012: 17].

A large percentage of non-voters and politically non-engaged individuals among the youth are not unique to Poland. The youngest group of voters has become of high interest in the last few years since the phenomenon of political alienation of the youth is becoming a problem for both European democracies as well as for the USA, inducing researchers to search for new ways of engaging the youth in political processes [Esser, deVreese 2007, Henn, Weinstein, Wring 2002; Phelps 2004].

One of the reasons of the low political activity of the young pointed out by researchers is the specificity of the value system of the group in question. They do not consider social or political engagement to be significant [Skarzynska 2005: 214]. On the one hand, affiliative values (good family life, friendship, personal happiness) shared by young Poles and values related to professional career (interesting job) [Szafraniec 2011: 39], which orient them towards personal matters may not be conducive to undertaking political activity. On the other hand, the very same values may be one of the major determinants of the party identification and voting decisions. In other words, the youth will search for such a political party that in their opinion represents their preferred values to the greatest extent. The comparative analysis of the value systems of non-voters and supporters of particular political parties allows the description of the differences in this area. The Shalom Schwartz concept covering ten universal basic values (power, achievement, hedonism, stimulation, self-direction, universalism, benevolence, tradition, conformity and security) displayed in a circle is a good means of the description of the variety of this kind [Schwartz 1992; 2006]. The structure of values can be shown as two orthogonal dimensions i.e. self-enhancement versus self-transcendence and openness to change versus conservatism. The Schwartz concept was applied in analyses of the voters’ value systems in many countries [Davidov, Schmidt, Schwartz 2008; Caprara, Vecchione, Schwartz 2009; Leimgruber 2011; Pilch 2012].

According to the equity theory, social relations are based on the exchange of material and non-material goods, with the exchange being viewed as fair if the inputs and outcomes of each of the engaged persons remain in balance [Walster, Walster, Berscheid 1978]. Inequity exists when the outcome/input ratios of the individual and the other person or a group are perceived as unequal. Individuals who perceive themselves as under-rewarded or over-rewarded will experience distress. Such an individual will aim for restoration of justice in the exchange. Many equity restoration techniques have been described, including terminating the relationship. Estimating the extent of gratification “due” to the individual in a given situation, people take various factors into consideration, such as the effort taken, conscientiousness, diligence, contribution to work, the level of responsibility or education and those judgements remain under the influence of egocentric motives [Skarzynska 2005]. The sense of being unfairly treated may also result from the application of different rules of fair distribution of goods i.e. not so much “according to the contribution to everyone” as “according to the needs” or “even distribution”. The preference for the defined rule depends on many social, cultural and ideological factors as well as the personal characteristics of the individual [ibidem]. The perception of unfair treatment is accompanied by attributing responsibility to a person or a group that in the subject’s opinion has violated the norm of the equitable exchange. The generation of young Poles currently entering the adult life has reasons to evaluate the conditions in which they begin their independent lives as inferior to those of their older colleagues. Young people are the group most heavily affected by the economic crisis and changes in the job market related to the crisis in question (high unemployment, unfavourable forms of employment which do not promote stabilisation, low salary for labour market entrants). This situation may cause the sense of injustice among young people and the responsibility for the unfair distribution of goods may be ascribed to the ruling elites or the political class in general. Earlier studies on Polish population showed that injustice was accompanied by lower life satisfaction, negative opinions on the social reality and people, moralising about judgements as well as social passivity and demanding attitude (conviction of being “entitled” to compensation) [Wojciszke, Grzelak...
Positive psychology is a branch of psychology focusing on the positive aspects of human functioning. It forms the basis of research on positive experiences, life satisfaction and happiness. Many studies have been dedicated to the search of the conditions and consequences of personal happiness, most widely understood as affective and/or cognitive component of subjective well-being [Lyubomirsky, Lepper 1999]. One of the examined issues is the relation between individual happiness and political participation. Researchers are of the opinion that political participation provides psychological benefits to the individual, influencing their sense of efficacy, political power and sense of empowerment [Frey, Stutzer 2000]. The reverse could also be true - happier individuals may be more inclined towards participation in elections [Klandermans 1989], as life satisfaction promotes engaging in different kinds of activity [Lyubomirsky, King, Diener 2005]. Although, deliberation on causality between happiness and political participation is debatable, the correlation between these variables does not raise any doubt as it was observed in research in many countries [Tavits 2008; Weitz-Shapiro, Winters 2011].

The objective of the presented research was diagnosing the following variables, described on the basis of declarations of subjects in a group of young Poles aged 18-24: basic personal values, evaluations of fair or unfair treatment in social exchange and global subjective happiness. A comparison was made between the evaluation of voters, non-voters, and people declaring support for separate political parties.

An attempt to answer the following questions was made:

1. What are the differences in preferences for personal values between voters and non-voters and between electorates of individual political parties?
2. What are the differences in evaluations of fair or unfair treatment in different kinds of social interactions between voters and non-voters and between electorates of individual political parties?
3. What are the differences in global subjective happiness between voters and non-voters and between electorates of individual political parties?

**METHOD**

**Subjects and procedure**

A total of 562 young adults from Poland (311 females and 251 males), the residents of the Silesian Province, aged 18-24 years, participated in the study. A group of 263 subjects were recruited for the study with the use of the “snow ball” technique in October and November 2011. A group of 249 subjects participated in a web-based online survey in February 2012. The majority of participants reached the site through a given website address. The groups were selected by purposive sampling by the criteria related to age and the place of residence (Silesian Province). Research participation was voluntary and anonymous.

The sample varied in terms of education (4.3% primary education, 2.8% vocational education, 60.9% secondary education, 32% higher education), work situation (19.95% full-time job, 8.9% temporary job, 3.7% unemployed, 64.8% studying), place of residence (15.3% village, 8.2% city up to 20 thousand inhabitants, 22.2% city with 20 to 100 thousand inhabitants, 21.2% city with 100 to 200 thousand inhabitants, 32.2% city over 200 thousand inhabitants), current financial situation (1.4% very bad, 8.4% bad, 51.8% average, 31.7% good, 6% very good) and marital status (94.5% single, 5.5% married).

Voting status and party preferences were measured by asking participants which party they had voted for in the last national election (September 2011). The non-voters constituted 22.8% of all (128) respondents, the voters 74% (416 respondents) and 3.2% participants (18 respondents) did not report their vote. The most preferred political parties were the following: Civic Platform (CP) (32.9%, 185 respondents), Palikot’s Movement (PM) (15.3%, 86 respondents) and Law and Justice (LaJ) (12.5%, 70 respondents). The rest of the voters chose Democratic Left Alliance (DLA) (6%, 34 respondents), Poland Comes First (2.1%, 12 respondents), Polish People’s Party (1.8%, 10 respondents), and other parties (3.4%, 19 respondents).

**Measures**

Short Portrait Values Questionnaire [PVQ-21] was used for the evaluation of the basic values [Schwartz 2003]. The questionnaire consisted of 21 short verbal portraits of different people (e.g. “Being very successful is important to her. She likes to impress other people”, “It is important to him to make his own decisions about what he does. He likes to be free and not depend on others”). The respondents answered the question: “How much is this person...
like you?” by choosing one of the six possible answers (very much like me, like me, somewhat like me, a little like me, not like me, not like me at all). There were two items for each value type (three for universalism). The score for each value type was calculated as a mean of the items. The answers were corrected for response tendencies by centering each respondents’ responses around his or her mean response to all 21 items [Schwartz 2003: 275]. The Polish version of the questionnaire was prepared for the European Social Survey (www.europeansocialsurvey.org). Polish translation of the original 40-item version of PVQ presented Cieciuch and Zaleski [2011].

The respondents’ evaluations of their relations with individuals, groups, and institutions perceived as fair or unfair were collected with the use of two short author’s questionnaires. The Inputs/Outcomes Ratio is a six-question questionnaire in which the respondent is asked to specify if they view social relations as equivalent, and therefore fair (answer 3: “I usually get as much as I deserve”) or as unfair i.e. unjust to themselves (answer 1: “I get much less than I deserve”, answer 2: “I get slightly less than I deserve”) or unfair to other people (answer 4: “I get slightly more than I deserve”, answer 5: “I get much more than I deserve”). The questions concerned the exchange relation with people in general (“Compared with what I give to others, I receive... from them”), with friends, family, and with public institutions (“I think that as a young person entering adult life what I receive from the state is...”) and their employer or school. The last question concerned life balance in general understood as the inputs/outcomes ratio (“Generally I perceive myself as a person who receives... from life”). A single composite score for inputs/outcomes ratio was computed by averaging responses to the six items.

The Sense of Injustice Scale consisted of six statements describing the sense of being treated unfairly (by people in general, friends, family, national institutions, and supervisors or teachers, as well as “by life”: “I think life is not fair to me”). The respondent takes a stance on the statements by specifying how often they experience such feelings by choosing from five possible answers (from “never” - 1 point to “very often” - 5 points). A single composite score for sense of injustice was computed by averaging responses to the six items.

Global subjective happiness was measured with the use of the Subjective Happiness Scale, a 4-item self-report measure developed by Lyubomirsky and Lepper [1999] (“In general, I consider myself not a very happy person - a very happy person”; “Some people are generally very happy. They enjoy life regardless of what is going on, getting the most out of everything. To what extent does this characterisation describe you? Not at all - a great deal”). The respondents answered the questions using a seven- point scale. A single composite score was computed by averaging responses to the four items. The possible range of scores is from 1 to 7. Higher scores reflects greater happiness. Descriptive statistics and reliability coefficients are presented in Table 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>Cronbach’s α</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Basic values</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conformity</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tradition</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td>0.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benevolence</td>
<td>-0.57</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>0.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Universalism</td>
<td>-0.35</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-direction</td>
<td>-0.59</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stimulation</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td>0.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hedonism</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>0.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Achievement</td>
<td>-0.23</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>0.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>1.05</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>0.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher-order values</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-transcendence</td>
<td>-0.46</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-enhancement</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservation</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>0.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Openness to change</td>
<td>-0.20</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other variables</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inputs/outcomes ratio</td>
<td>2.81</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sense of justice</td>
<td>2.48</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Happiness</td>
<td>4.82</td>
<td>1.21</td>
<td>0.84</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Statistical analyses. Many of the distributions were not normal and the examined groups were of unequal size therefore non-parametric data analysis methods (Kruskall-Wallis H test and Mann-Whitney U test) were used. Statistics were computed using IBM SPSS version 21.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Value priorities among young adults

The results of the current study showed that young adults rated the following as the most important: power, conformity and tradition, respectively (Figure 1). Participants attributed the intermediate levels of importance to stimulation, hedonism and security. Four the least important values were achievement, universalism, benevolence and self-direction (placed in order). Participants preferred values constituting dimension of self-enhancement (power and achievement). This finding is inconsistent with the results of previous studies, showing distinct tendency to give priority to values constituting dimension of self-transcendence (benevolence and universalism) [Cieciuch 2010,
However, participants’ rates of two other higher-order values remain consistent with the results of value systems studies conducted in Europe i.e. conservation (conformity, tradition and security) was rated higher compared to openness to change (self-direction, stimulation and hedonism) [Schwartz, Sagie 2000; Ramos 2006]. It is interesting to note that self-direction was the least important value in the participants’ hierarchy.

Figure 1. Hierarchy of basic values in a group of young adults (N=562).

Value hierarchy based on young adults’ rates was similar to right-wing voter profile, with the exception of security, which is usually described as a key value for this type of voters [Caprara et al., 2009]. The respondents’ hierarchy of the higher-order values is also characteristic for right-wing voters, with high rates of self-enhancement and conservation [Kilburn 2009: 874]. In addition, basic values shared by left-wing voters (universalism, benevolence and self-direction) [Caprara, Schwartz, Capanna et al. 2006; Caprara, Schwartz, Vecchione, Barbaranelli 2008] are the last three in the participants’ hierarchy. Considering the Schwartz [1994: 39] analysis of relations between preferred basic values and political orientations, it is possible to hypothesise that people who share the value system emerging from the current study will not support political parties which stress civil liberties (in view of the fact that self-direction is the last of the values in hierarchy) or the ones which promote economic egalitarianism and redistributing resources (in view of universalism and benevolence low rates).

Table 2. Means for five groups of voters and the results of non-parametric ANOVA (Kruskal-Wallis test) and pair-wise comparisons between the groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Means</th>
<th>Kruskal-Wallis H test (df=4)</th>
<th>Pair-wise comparisons*²</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Basic values</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conformity</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0.30 0.92 0.52 21392</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tradition</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>0.22 0.90 0.76 18534</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benevolence</td>
<td>-0.53</td>
<td>-0.62</td>
<td>-0.61 -0.48 -0.48 1691</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Universalism</td>
<td>-0.45</td>
<td>-0.34</td>
<td>-0.20 -0.39 -0.50 6568</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-direction</td>
<td>-0.72</td>
<td>-0.52</td>
<td>-0.53 -0.67 -0.54 6324</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stimulation</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.07 -0.18 0.18 8139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hedonism</td>
<td>-0.23</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>0.27 -0.33 -0.03 20883</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Achievement</td>
<td>-0.20</td>
<td>-0.30</td>
<td>-0.07 -0.32 -0.24 3097</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>1.07</td>
<td>0.92 0.67 0.77 8878</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>-0.22</td>
<td>-0.27 0.08 -0.18 11592</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Hierarchy of values obtained from the current study is not consistent with value preferences expressed by the representative sample of Polish population (N=1099), obtained from the research on attitudes and voting behaviour, conducted after the 2011 election [Pilch 2012]. Power, which was the most important in the value hierarchy of young adults, was the least important to the group that varied according to age. Similarly, self-direction, benevolence and universalism, which received the lowest rates in the current study, were considered to be highly important by the representative group of Polish voters. However, the above-mentioned differences did not appear when the results of the current study were compared to the results of the group of young adults (aged 18-24) separated from the representative Polish sample [Pilch 2011]. This subgroup (N=137) presented the hierarchy of values completely different from the rest of the sample, but similar to the hierarchy obtained in the current study. Power, conformity and tradition were placed from the 2nd to the 4th position, whereas benevolence and self-direction were the least preferred values. Also, self-enhancement (higher-order value) was more important to respondents than higher-order value self-transcendence.
Table 2 shows, there were significant differences between the groups in preferences for four basic values i.e. conformity, tradition, security and hedonism. Three of these values (conformity, tradition, security) constitute higher-order value conservation. The evaluations of conformity differed significantly between PM and LaJ voters and also between PM and CP voters. The attachment to conformity was the highest in the group of PM supporters and the lowest in LaJ supporters. The preference for tradition was significantly different between LaJ and PM voters and also between LaJ and DLA voters. PM voters had the strongest and LaJ supporters the weakest preference for tradition. The ratings of hedonism differed significantly between LaJ voters (highest score) and PM voters (lowest score), between LaJ voters and non-voters and also between LaJ voters and CP supporters. Finally, significant differences in preferences of security were observed between LaJ voters (the lowest score) and PM voters (highest score) and also between PM voters and CP supporters.

There were significant differences in preferences for the two higher-order values i.e. conservation and openness to change (for the results of pair-wise comparisons see Table 2). Surprisingly, no differences were found in preferences for values constituting higher-level dimensions i.e. self-enhancement versus self-transcendence.

Based on the foregoing analysis, it is possible to underline the most important differences in value preferences between the analysed groups of voters. The strongest preference of conservation values (conformity, tradition and security) and the weakest preference of openness to change distinguished PM supporters from other groups. It was also the only group of party supporters that did not value power the most. The first in the value hierarchy of this group was conformity followed by tradition. Moreover, their evaluations of hedonism were the lowest compared to other groups. According to the Schwartz theory, these young people are motivated to live within the bounds of a traditional culture and to conform to traditional social norms.

A number of similarities between non-voters and PM supporters were observed. Non-voters’ value profile also showed the dominance of conservation values over openness to change values, relatively high evaluations of security, and relatively low evaluations of hedonism. However, the value profile of LaJ supporters was different. This group, similarly to other young voters in this study, also preferred conservation to openness to change, but the difference between evaluations of these two higher-order values was slight. Their preference for security was the lowest compared to other groups. On the other hand, the ratings of hedonism were the highest. It is possible therefore that contrary to the other groups of voters in the group of LaJ supporters egocentric motivation is not accompanied by tendency to respect social norms, but rather by the need for

### Voting behaviour and value preferences

For the purpose of the analysis, the participants were divided into two groups (voters and non-voters) based on their voting participation. The voters were additionally divided into subgroups based on their choice in the 2011 national election. The subgroups of party supporters consisting of fewer than 30 respondents had been excluded from the analysis. In order to illustrate the differences between the groups, the means attributed to ten basic values and four high-order values for groups of non-voters as well as for four groups of party supporters (Civil Platform, Law and Justice, Palikot’s Movement, Democratic Left Alliance) were calculated. However, the analysis was performed using non-parametric tests. The results obtained from the analysis are presented in Table 2.

Firstly, value priorities of voters and non-voters were compared. There were two significant differences between the groups i.e. in hedonism (U=2.001, p=0.045) and security (U=2.185, p=0.029). Non-voters evaluated hedonism lower and security higher compared to voters.

Secondly, the comparisons between five groups of voters were made. As

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Higher-order values</th>
<th>Self-enhancement</th>
<th>Self-transcendence</th>
<th>Conservation</th>
<th>Openness to change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PM-CP</td>
<td>-0.49</td>
<td>-0.48</td>
<td>-0.40</td>
<td>-0.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PM-LaJ</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP-PM</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>4.43</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP-LaJ</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>30279</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LaJ-NV</td>
<td>-0.40</td>
<td>-0.25</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LaJ-PM</td>
<td>-0.40</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>18567</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP-PM</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
<td>-0.33</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP-LaJ</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>15440</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Other variables</th>
<th>Happiness 4.73</th>
<th>4.92</th>
<th>4.79</th>
<th>4.58</th>
<th>4.84</th>
<th>10716</th>
<th>0.03</th>
<th>PM-CP</th>
<th>PM-LaJ</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Received less than</td>
<td>2.76</td>
<td>2.89</td>
<td>2.77</td>
<td>2.79</td>
<td>2.69</td>
<td>7873</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
<td>no differences</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>inputs/outcomes</td>
<td>1.78</td>
<td>1.89</td>
<td>1.76</td>
<td>1.56</td>
<td>1.62</td>
<td>15440</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>PM-CP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ratio</td>
<td>1.78</td>
<td>1.89</td>
<td>1.76</td>
<td>1.56</td>
<td>1.62</td>
<td>15440</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>PM-CP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sense of injustice</td>
<td>2.52</td>
<td>2.39</td>
<td>2.60</td>
<td>2.53</td>
<td>2.42</td>
<td>1038</td>
<td>0.034</td>
<td>CP-PM</td>
<td>CP-LaJ</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*corrected for multiple comparisons two-tailed p<0.05

Note. Means presented to highlight the differences between the groups. CP=Civic Platform, LaJ=Law and Justice, PM=Palikot’s Movement, DLA=Democratic Left Alliance, NV=non-voters
The evaluations of CP supporters regarding conservation and openness to change were in-between PM voters and LaJ voters’ results. The ratings of security (low) and power (high) were similar to LaJ supporters’ evaluations.

**Inputs/outcomes ratio, sense of injustice and global subjective happiness**

**Happiness.** The mean score for global subjective happiness was 4.8 (for a 7-point scale where 1 = low happiness and 7 = high happiness). Lyubomirsky and Lepper [1999] reported the mean scores from 4.63 to 5.07 for 8 samples of young Americans. No significant difference between voters and non-voters was observed for the Subjective Happiness Scale (U=21518.5, p=0.212). This finding did not confirm that political participation might influence happiness or might be a consequence of being happy [Weitz-Shapiro, Winters, 2011]. The comparisons show significant differences in happiness between CP and PM voters and also between LaJ and PM voters (Table 2). PM supporters showed significantly lower global subjective happiness compared to CP and LaJ supporters.

**Inputs/outcomes ratio.** The mean for the overall inputs/outputs ratio was 2.81 (SD=0.51), which means that the majority of participants felt that they “usually get as much as (they) deserve”. The only exception was the question regarding an exchange with the state (M=1.7, SD=0.8). Most of the respondents (81.7%) chose the answer suggesting that they felt they received less than they expected from the state. Only 11 respondents (2.2%) had an opposite opinion i.e. they thought they received more than they had expected from the state. No significant differences in the overall inputs/outcomes ratio were found between five groups of voters (Table 2). When answers to six questions comprising the overall inputs/outputs ratio were analysed separately, only one significant difference between groups of voters was found. PM supporters perceived their exchange with the state as less equivalent compared to CP supporters. The group of PM supporters described their relations with the state as the most unfair and unjust to themselves.

**Sense of injustice.** The mean score for sense of injustice was 2.48 (SD=0.58). This result indicates that the participants experienced feelings of being treated unfairly either “rarely” or “from time to time”. There were significant differences between five groups of voters (Table 2). CP supporters showed the lowest sense of injustice compared to other groups of young people and the difference between the responses of CP voters and PM voters was significant.
can be described as typical for right-wing voters (high security, low universalism) [Caprara et al. 2006]. These voters will probably choose political parties that support different forms of control and may display a tendency to right-wing authoritarianism (high tradition and power, low self-direction) [Kilburn 2009]. The values important to left-wing voters (universalism, benevolence, self-direction) were the least preferred.  

Global subjective happiness and evaluations of fair or unfair treatment (inputs/outcomes ratio and sense of injustice) were not related to political participation of young people. The groups of young voters and non-voters in the 2011 parliamentary election did not differ in this respect.  

The differences in happiness and sense of injustice between electorates of political parties (CP, LaJ, PM and DLA) were significant, but weak. Relatively lower happiness reflecting the judgments of well-being and satisfaction with life distinguished young PM supporters from the other groups of voters. Young voters of LaJ more frequently felt treated unfairly and it can reflect a relatively higher attitude of entitlement in this group.

Although respondents generally described their social relations as equivalent (“I usually get as much as I deserve”), the relations with the state were evaluated as unjust. The most common answer was the following: “I think that as a young person entering adult life what I receive from the state is less than I deserve”. This conviction may result in unwillingness to participate in elections in the future.

**References:**


Schwartz Sh. H., Sagie Galit (2000), *Value consensus and importance: a cross-national study,*
Abstract:

We live in the twenty-first century, which witnessed by far the most intensive marketing of politics, and traditional approaches (The Great Man Theory, situational, relational) to the process of emergence of political leadership are simply not enough. Cooperation between leaders and their followers is determined by cultural and social context, specific political situation of the time, patterns of social behavior. Development of new information technologies and dissemination of the means of mass communication have introduced another factor to the analyzed process, forced by civilizational changes. These changes initiated the processes shaping the emergence of a fourth approach to political leadership, which we may call reactive. Reactivity is an active process of management of the changing image of the leader, responding to the evolving social preferences, and subsequently disseminated through the media.

Key words:
political leadership, reactive leadership

Traditional approaches to the process of emergence of political leadership have been recognized to fit along three main models [Turska-Kawa 2013]. The first of these – subjective, dominated in the first half of the twentieth century; it focused the attention of researchers on the person of the political leader – and leader’s personal qualities, motivation and other psychological characteristics that determine the effectiveness of the function exercised. This approach is known commonly as the The Great Man Theory. According to its major assumptions, presented for the first time by Thomas Carlyle [1907], the flow of history can be explained by the influence of great individuals with extraordinary qualities. In his works, the author claimed that the history of the world is...
Determinants of changes in the process of emergence of political leadership

Media play a key role in communicating and have – for good - become fixtures of our daily life. Jerzy Mikulowski Pomorski [2008: 21-22] notes that as part of the human environment, media can be seen two-way. Firstly, as part of the physical and social environment: a newspaper, a radio, television set, computer (additions by A.T-K.), and secondly - in their institutional and symbolic form, as part of the environment, acting as carriers of customs, opinions, values and languages or - in the case of identification by the receiver of the symbolic form, as part of the environment, acting as carriers of customs, opinions, values and languages or - in the case of identification by the receiver of the media.

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2 Model of decision-making [White, Lippitt 1960], leadership style [Lasswell 2001]

characteristics. Joseph Klapper [1960: 456-457] list the following categories: conversion (change of opinion or belief according to the intention of the message sender), small change (change of form or scale of knowledge, belief or behavior) and reinforcement (strengthening of the receiver’s opinion, belief or pattern of behavior). Kurt and Gladys Lang [1981. After: McQuail 2008: 457] draw attention to other types of media impact: mutual interactions (effects of being the subject of media communication, interaction between the media and the subject of their interest), the boomerang effect (resulting in changes contrary to the desired ones) and the third party effect (referring to the common belief of individuals that the media may affect others, but not them). Hilde Himmelweit [After: Mikulowski Pomorski 2008: 17-18] indicates two types of effects: the effect of displacement (the amount of time consumed by media use during a week, or year) and the stimulus effect (related to the impact of the content on the life and behavior of the receiver).

It is impossible to deny the significant role of the media in the life of societies – it is equally difficult, however, to categorically determine the nature of this impact. Recalling the achievements of functionalist analysts [see more in: Turska-Kawa 2011], it should be noted that most of the media functions mentioned by researchers are conducive to social inclusion. Social integration is an important value. It does not signify the unification of views and beliefs; elimination of what is different from the dominant model. It does, certainly, assume universalization of certain socially recognized standards, beliefs and values, however, it stresses the importance of simultaneously maintaining individual identities of religious, local, cultural groups. Universality means social approval and acceptance of the standards, beliefs and values, and cooperation to maintain and protect them. Integration can be defined as unity in diversity and variety. Stanisław Michalczyk [2008: 330-341] points out, however, that nowadays we should not overestimate the integration function of the media. As arguments he employs the widening of the media offer, growing number of TV and radio channels, increased variety of newspapers, and the more and more intense communication online – all these phenomena contribute to fragmentation of the media audience. On the other hand, there are studies which indicate that the media can even cause degradation of social capital, discourage social activity and weaken interpersonal relations [Wojtasik 2011: 29]. Analyzing the causes of decline of the social capital in American society, Robert Putnam [2008] points out that the systematic lengthening of the time devoted to watching TV has blocked other changes in the way the Americans spend their time. Technological advances allow the individual to obtain satisfaction, but they do so at the expense of external social bonds, thus hurting the interests of not only individuals but also the community.

Marshall McLuhan [2004] notes that characteristics of each media type makes cause the medium itself to become the message. Each media has its own rules, thus the message transmitted by them is reinforced by their specific form. Some media are used without the need for individuals to fully focus on them; the message can be received while the audience are simultaneously performing other tasks. It is somewhat dangerous as this process partially displaces rational processing of the communications received. Radio is an obvious example, but television also belongs to this group. In the case of the Internet, we must consider the time commitment required by its use, but also certain competencies necessary for its use. Internet also has the greatest degree of content dynamics, as well as attractiveness, based largely on the variety of forms. Reading the press does not require this type of competence. However, it should be stressed, more and more periodicals transfer their activities also to the Internet in order to reach the largest possible public – consequently, impact of the press content is intensified.

According to one of the fundamental assumptions of the theory of uses and gratifications, media are only one of the sources meeting the needs of the individual, and whether and how they attract the attention of customers and successfully compete with other sources depends on the media themselves. The public, aware of their needs, sees sources that most satisfactorily will meet their desires. Therefore the transmitted message must take on the form that to the fullest extent answers these identified needs. As a consequence, the message is required to have specific characteristics, which will make its content and form attractive for the receivers. Since the final content of communications transmitted is decided by journalists, they may significantly – through content management - influence the opinions and beliefs prevailing in society. The content presented in the media should be created in accordance with the principles of reliability, diversity and quality of information. In reality, however, different kinds of ”approaches” and transformations used when constructing the content make the journalists the true creators of the desired social and political reality. Media bias is most often seen in three areas: selection of content, presentation method and allocation of media time to a given message.

Selection of materials for distribution is mainly associated with the decision regarding the specific information to be included and elimination of that which will not enter into public circulation. It is difficult to estimate the determinants of the mechanisms associated with selection, and to estimate with reliability its function and scale, as this activity is largely done at the editing stage. Dan Berkowitz [1990 (A): 55-68. After: Cwala, Falkowski 2006: 276-27] attempted to assess the factors influencing the selection of information, stated that the main aspects taken into account by the gatekeepers were: freshness
of information \( (r = 0.36) \) and its predicted importance to the public \( (r = 0.22) \). In other studies by the same author, the most important selection criterion was found to be the assessment of the news attractiveness \( (r = 0.46) \) [Berkowitz 1990 (B): 245-251]. Another phenomenon associated with the selection of materials in the media is the development of an interpretation framework. It is a way of presenting content that is associated with establishing a certain interpretation axis, specific approach to particular issues, showing the problem from a defined perspective. Wojciech Cwalina and Andrzej Falkowski [2006: 273] quote the opinion of Holli Semetko and Patti Valkenburg that adoption of a particular perspective results in changes in opinion about a problem, caused by subtle differences in its definition. In other words, as a consequence some of the attributes of the object or event are more emphasized in the message, giving rise to a certain way of their interpretation, and their being taken into consideration when forming opinions.

Presentation of material concerns the external features of the news disseminated to the public by the media. Some distortions in this area may include the tendency to present the candidates favoured by editors or journalists of a given medium in a more favorable light, allotting them more “screen” time, placing the relevant content in key areas in the medium. These activities are grounded in the psychological phenomenon called the exposure effect, described by Robert B. Zajonc. The effect described is that the more an object is exposed, present, the more popular it becomes⁴. A study by Agnieszka Turska-Kawa [2010: 120-135], in which the author employed content analysis of three platforms of information on the Internet in the period before the European Parliament elections in 2009, shows the significance of these factors. The above study has shown that Internet journalists not only perpetuate the system division into two major parties, but also presents their completely different images. From the analyzed material emerged a much more favorable image of the Civic Platform (PO) party than that of the Law and Justice (PiS). One cannot also talk about pluralism of information – quantity of content focused on PiS in much higher, while quality-wise PO comes out the winner. These materials are quite different in content, indicating the preferences of Internet users are favourable to PO (maintaining a positive image of the party), while the the opposition, PiS, is characterized in negative terms. The level of the indicator disturbing the quantitative balance is another factor important from the point of view of reliability of the media - the need to ensure pluralism of information, opportunity for all political actors to present their views and positions (taken into account is whether an equivalent amount of time for expression of opinion was provided within a given period, and duration of exposure of a given politician in news programs, as well as the size of the publication).

Another important factor affecting the changes in the process of emergence of political leadership is the growing importance and development of public opinion polling. Surveys aimed at exploring the opinions and attitudes of society concerning a given phenomenon, diagnosis of expectations and needs of the citizens have a significant impact primarily in two areas. Primo, polls carried out on behalf of political parties may serve to initiate specific actions expected by society, to modify actions already taken, to change the image of the object to better respond to the needs of voters or to adapt a new image of the diagnosed needs of the electorate. The results of most of these polls are not made public, and serve only those who commissioned them to plan practical measures. As indicated by Philip Kotler [1975], the priority goal of political parties competing in the pre-election period is to accurately diagnose the needs, interests and values of potential voters, and - in response to the results of this diagnosis - to present themselves in a manner best suited to the social demand. Systematic extensive polling enables this process. Election polls are nowadays the key element and starting point for all decisions made and actions undertaken by the candidates during the campaign. In view of the objectives of these poll results, researchers differentiate several types of polls:

- **a) benchmark polls**, implemented at the beginning of the campaign and serving as information sources for the planning process. These polls can reveal, for example, to what extent the voters recognize the candidate’s name or how she or he is perceived among potential voters.

- **b) follow-up polls**, focusing on a few specific issues which should immediately be addressed, directed at monitoring of opinion on issues touched upon and actions taken during the campaign.

- **c) tracking polls**, carried out regularly during the campaign; their aim is to evaluate the effectiveness of strategies and tactics employed during the campaign, diagnosis of its dynamics and direction.

At the same time, the introduction of a completely new entity onto the political scene is also done following multi-level polls and surveys that diagnose the needs of the electorate – those undecided and those that, if appropriately encouraged, may change the direction of their vote. If we assume, after

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⁴ Explanation of this phenomenon is based on the thesis that liking a given object is rooted in one’s recognition of it. The exposure effect, however, is not the main determinant of individual beliefs, and occurs only in specific circumstances. The object needs to be initially neutral, or at least not averse (repeated exposure to an object we dislike usually only strengthens this reaction); the object cannot be exposed too often, as it may lead to boredom. Furthermore, increased exposure is more beneficial to complex objects; with simple ones the effect of boredom is much more significant as well. The exposure effect is further strengthened when the object is little known. [For more see: Strelau, Doliński 2008: 339-340].
Wojciech Cwalina and Andrzej Falkowski [2006: 153], that the political image is a particular kind of designed representation that intends, by providing the object with certain association, to add value and enrich it with additional characteristics, the logical consequence is that polls provide the most complete answer to the question of what values and additional characteristics these should be.

Secondly, the reach of dissemination of results of opinion polls should be noted, as they not only will serve as information source, but also modify the prevailing social attitudes and beliefs. Elizabeth Noelle-Neumann [1984] by presenting foundations of the spiral of silence theory shows how the media can influence public opinion, helping to marginalize certain positions that are not consistent with views postulated by the mass media content senders. The means of mass communication, through presentation of public opinion polls disseminate the dominant point of view, and thus deter people from either taking the opposite stance, or voicing this opinion. If the process takes place in a smaller social group, it can be a manifestation of the collapse of the system of values and norms of that group. Depending on whether this crisis is temporary or permanent, it may lead to re-integration of the group or its total collapse, when members begin to look for new social affiliations. Regardless of the type of crisis, however, the media act as a catalyst for the above processes. Where the outlined phenomenon occurs on a social larger scale, and includes a variety of groups and communities, we are dealing with the mechanism of the spiral of silence, which pulls individuals into a paradox of sorts: to ensure social acceptance, he or she resigns from forming own thoughts and views on certain topics, withdrawing from discussion. On the one hand, the phenomenon protects the individual’s relationships with the surrounding environment, on the other hand, however, these very relationships are built on silence and misconceptions, which certainly has an impact on their quality and level of social trust.

Both the development of transmission technology and dissemination of information, increased strength and importance of the media in society, as well as the increasing possibility of using extensive opinion polls in the race for power are one of the key determinants of the process of the emergence of a reactive political leader. These factors translate into a new kind of leadership and new methods of reaching potential voters.

Features of reactive political leadership

Traditional models of political leadership - subjective, situational and relational - are objectively different approaches, hypothetical constructs that by a certain simplification of a relevant part of reality through elimination of certain of its elements (attributes, relationships) allow researchers to focus their attention on another selected aspect. The aim of this approach is the greater penetration of the factor under analysis, what is an important contribution to the broader studies. The changing circumstances, in particular appearance of new factors described above, makes these models too simplistic for the modern times, as they do not adequately describe the process of emergence of political leadership. Taking this into account, one must acknowledge there is a need to build a new model that takes into account the aforementioned changes.

The presented model takes into account both the characteristics of the subject, the situation and the specific relationship between the potential voters and the leader – yet each of these elements takes a new shape. Reactivity in the described approach is associated with impulsivity of the parties to the relationship – the political leaders and her or his potential supporters - regarding their own needs, desires that shape the behavior of the other party. The fundamental task of the leader is to match the expectations of the audience, what in turn determines the leader’s behavior. This adjustment is done based on the results of professional polling of expectations and social preferences, which are an important part of the evolution of a relational leadership towards a reactive model, and therefore one more quickly adapting to the changing reality.

Political needs focused on the acquisition and retention of power became so dominant that the actual characteristics of the subject are overshadowed by those expected by potential voters. It should be noted that this is not a completely fluid, 100% adjustment – the leader needs to build the socially expected image on the foundation of specific competencies and core traits. This accommodation is not an act, but a process, fitted around the change dynamics of the needs and expectations of the voters. This process implies constant interactions between parties of the leadership relationship, and measuring of their effectiveness in the context of development of political leadership. The process specified above is dynamic, and an important factor is its duration, which translates into consistency of the perceived image.

If the behavior and characteristics of the leader are consistent over time, then the image is validated and allows voters to freely predict the leader’s

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5 Majority of researchers nowadays agree that while defining political leadership one must consider many elements, each with a separate significance. Among the key ones should be names: personality and traits of the leader, personalities and traits of the voters and other people whom the leader confronts, social and organizational context of the above confrontations, current problems and issues the leader must face, interpretation of the law by the leader, methods of reaching the planned – and socially relevant – goals, effects of the leader’s actions. [Masciulli, Molchanov, Knight 2009: 5-6].

6 Waldemar Wojtasik, while analyzing factors that determine the success of a new political grouping on the political scene emphasizes for example ma king references to socially significant issues, important for the voters and capable of influencing their electoral behavior and decision [Wojtasik 2012A: 160 and following].
behavior. At the same time, this very predictability gives voters some sense of security, as they can deduce freely the leader’s other qualities – this need is rooted in the human drive to understand the causes of behavior, predict it and control the events. The more consistent the environment (as least on the level of perception), the more it offers individuals the sense of security and stability. An observer captures the reality, and can predict and control it only by referencing transitional and variable behavior and events to some other, relatively unchanged conditions that lie at its core [Heider 1958: 79 After: McGraw 2008: 364]. The need to preserve a stable and coherent system of representation of experience is also one of four needs active in the human experiential system, to which Seymour Epstein assigns fundamental importance [Epstein 2003 (A): 51, Epstein 2003 (B): 162-163].

In the presented approach, an integral part of the process of emergence of political leadership are mass communication means, which play an important role as an intermediary between the potential and actual leader and the society, modifying and re-orienting the scope of interactions of the parties to the relationship. On the one hand, therefore, the media have an important function in the process of crystallization of political leaders, constituting the political arena of the struggle for the support of voters and, on the other hand, provide reactive interactions between the factual political leaders and their followers. It is the increasing speed of information and development of new information technologies, giving the media the opportunity to influence society, that largely influenced the changes in the quality of political leadership. Access to the mass media gave interested parties the ability to track the actions of leaders and at the same time to form their own opinions on his or her person and the actions undertaken. The immediate effect of this change is the greater attention paid to the art of image creation. [Lilleker 2006:30 and subsequent].

The process of formation of the relationship between the politician and his or her supporters, as a result of which the politician gains their support and thus receives a mandate of trust once the election comes, is not mandatory for either party [Wojtasik 2012B: 67]. Politicians are increasingly aware, however, that exposure in the media is often an integral part of the struggle for power. They play a certain kind of spectacle in front of the audience - the voters - to gain their support, which is equivalent to the gaining of power [Cwalina, Falkowski 2006: 147]. The activity of the viewer-voter is their own autonomous decision – they have the freedom to choose the medium that they find most reliable, have the right to regulate to what extent the message penetrates, and can also completely withdraw from following the actions of a given politician. Policy of the media focused on gaining interest of as many viewers as possible enforces specific content and form of the message - therefore as an intermediary between the leaders and potential receivers, the media not only play the role of the transmitter, but they act as a kind of gatekeeper, rejecting all information that is ordinary, boring and not affecting. Thus the attention paid by politicians seeking leadership to having an „appropriate“ image is not focused solely on the needs of voters, but also on the needs of receivers of specific media messages [Turska-Kawa, Wojtasik 2013: 42].

Intermediary of the media in the process of building a relationship between the political leader and the followers assumes the message will be simplified and shortened. The need for simplification is dictated primarily by the duration of transmission, and the need to reach the widest possible audience. The consequence thereof are two main issues. Firstly, the selectivity of information. As noted by Sławomir Sierakowski, the media need a certain type of politicians - those who shine on television, and are willing to participate in discussions on ritual topics with experts-columnists. The aim is to create a show that will help sell advertising time [S. Sierakowski and P. Najsztub... 2009: 23]. Thus, the competencies that can broadly be described as “media skills” are required more than the typical leadership ones. Leaders are aware of this situation, and their actions are adequately market-oriented. It is worth noting that nowadays one can even indicate a specific breed of politicians aspiring to gain more and more followers - the so-called “media darlings,” who put self-promotion and image building first. Actions directed at achieving these goals focus primarily on the study of polls and giving interviews [Zukiewicz 2007: 419]. Second comes the matter of “staging” the information. The manner of presenting information in the media is aimed at getting the public interested, thus it requires a specific form. The viewer receives not only the “information”, but also the key to their understanding and interpretation. The criterion for information selection is not their objective relevance, but their appeal and show-stopper potential. More and more often also, real information is being replaced by the fictional “media facts” (so-called factoids), created in their entirety by the media and not being in any way a reflection of real events. They obtain a semblance of reality in their dissemination though, and very often have tangible consequences in the world outside the media. [Michalak 2010: 139]. After the (media) facts are revealed, the leader in question is forced to provide explanations and demonstrate the falsehood of the information, trying to stop it from affecting his or her image in the eyes of the viewer-voter.

Politicians who are not present in the media, are also virtually non-existent in public consciousness - and thus their chances of attaining a leadership role are minimal. A politician seen speaking in the media, commenting on current events, invited to participate in discussions, is much more often socially perceived as an expert, given a mandate of confidence by the party, what
power has to go through the media [Dybel, Wróbel 2008: 67].

... change can be summarized paraphrasing the words of Manuel Castells – every pact on voting behaviour of viewers in the desired direction. This direction of speaking skills) and ability to influence the media, in order to orient their im...

... which determine a positive relationship of a given politician with the dominant mass media: personal attractiveness to the media (physical accessibility, public speaking skills) and ability to influence the media, in order to orient their impact on voting behaviour of viewers in the desired direction. This direction of change can be summarized paraphrasing the words of Manuel Castells - every power has to go through the media [Dybel, Wróbel 2008: 67].

Illustration 1 shows the fundamental interactions in the new model of emergence of political leadership. The main change concerns the relationship between the political leader and potential voters. Its foundation are the needs, expectations and preferences of citizens with the right to vote, and for whose votes political actors compete in the election campaigns. These needs, expectations and preferences give direction to the activities of political leaders. Specialist polls of opinions and social attitudes enable their diagnosis, and allow one to adapt to them to the fullest both the public image and the activities of a given political actor. These actions are intended to form a specific message, shaped on the basis of polls and research, that will in turn reach specific groups of voters who – potentially – eagerly await exactly such a message. By consequence, it is more likely their reaction to the message will take the desired direction – support given to a particular candidate, most accurately meeting to their expectations, thus giving her or him a chance to obtain a leadership position.

Reaching the potential voters is not a direct action, but is done through the mass media. In this context, two issues should be stressed. First, the broad public access to the media, which gives the possibility of tracking the activity of political leaders. Politicians are increasingly aware that the media provide them with an opportunity to appear in the public consciousness, and commentary on current events in the media, presenting themselves as experts or participants in popular television programs is an important element in the process of reaching out to potential voters. Therefore, without such participation in this process it would be difficult for them to gain exposure as a leader. Second, one should keep in mind that neither the politicians aspiring to leadership nor leaders themselves decide on the content and form of the message which is passed to the public – all this is done by journalists. Political actors wanting to create and maintain their place in the media must therefore comply with the policies of the mass media, based primarily on the desire to garner the greatest possible interest in the message. From this perspective, a politician will be of potential interest to journalists if he or she has specific competencies, not relevant to the leadership role, but that will be attractive to the public. Hence, politicians in their activity must adapt not only to the needs of potential voters, but also to the needs of the media, among which the most prominent ones are the sensational nature of the content and availability of the politician.

Model approach

...
The politics presented in the media, the shape of which is dictated by their specific needs, is a platform with particular characteristics, wherein the actions of politicians within the framework of their professional duties are increasingly repressed in favour of the unconventional and sensational. The message presented in that manner certainly shapes the overall image of politics, and moderates the needs of receivers-voters formulated with respect to politicians. The politics presented superficially and reduced to news, schemas and scandals may cause in the electorate the expectation of integrity, reliability, conscientiousness from their potential political leaders. But do duty, incorruptibility, honesty have a chance to break through the journalist gatekeepers? Is politics today only that which takes place in the media, a spectacle? Where, if at all, exists a place for politicians who, preoccupied with work responsibilities, simply do not have time to appear in the media? And finally, what determines political leadership nowadays – are those the political competencies of given individuals, or the media ones? The author leaves unanswered the question of consequences of the reactive model of leadership for the quality of political leadership.

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Abstract:

The present paper presents various social influence techniques – practices aimed at increasing the likelihood that people will comply with requests, persuasion and suggestion they are addressed with. It describes sequential techniques (foot-in-the-door, door-in-the-face, foot-in-the-face, low ball) as well as techniques based on cognitive mechanisms (that’s not all, even a penny helps, dialogue involvement) or on emotional mechanisms (induction of guilt, embarrassment, fear-then-relief). The paper also presents examples of using the above mentioned techniques with special focus on some which were taken from political life.

Key words:
social influence, compliance, emotion, sequential techniques, political engagement

Introduction

People can take a range of actions to increase the likelihood of effectively persuading us to act according to their wishes. As indicated by Robert Cialdini (2001), most of the various techniques used by practitioners of social influence can be classified into six main principles: reciprocation, consistency, 1
social proof, liking, authority and scarcity. The proposal by Cialdini has some undeniable advantages. However, one problem is that it is not always clear which of these six rules a given trick or technique used by a social influence practitioner is based on, and sometimes the psychological explanation of the effectiveness of a particular technique is beyond the limited list of these six principles. Therefore, in this article, the reader will be successively presented the different social influence techniques, and following each one will be offered a discussion of the psychological mechanisms that underlie their effectiveness. This presentation will be accompanied, in turn, by illustration of using the technique by politicians.

Of course, the individual techniques are grouped into certain categories, but the basis of such an arrangement is not the psychological mechanism underlying their effectiveness, but rather the mere formal similarities between the different techniques.

**Sequential techniques**

Several well-documented interpersonal influence strategies use sequential-request scripts. Depending on the particular technique, the initial request may be easier or harder to fulfill than the target request. Let us start the presentation of this group of techniques from the earliest one described in the psychological literature.

**Foot-in-the-door**

The foot-in-the-door technique [Freedman, Fraser 1966], involves a persuasion technique in which an initial (rather easy) request is followed by a subsequent larger request. Compliance with the first request increases the chances of compliance with the second (the target) request.

In an attempt to see whether the foot-in-the-door technique or a more straightforward request would be more successful in obtaining compliance, Freedman and Fraser [1966] conducted a study among residents of California. They were interested in seeing how many residents would comply with a request to place a large “Drive Carefully” billboard in their front yard. In the control condition, an experimenter who identified himself as representing a citizens’ organization for safe driving approached the participants at their homes and asked them whether they would allow the large billboard to be installed in their front yards. In one of experimental group an experimenter asked the participants to place a small sign that read “Be a Safe Driver” in a window of their homes or cars. In another, the experimenter asked participants to sign a petition promoting safe driving. Two weeks after the participants were approached by the first experimenter, a second experimenter came to their homes and asked them to place large “Drive Carefully” billboard in their yards. The results showed that the foot-in-the-door technique was successful in influencing others. Participants were more likely to agree to a large request if they had already agreed to comply with a smaller request than if they had not.

So, Freedman and Fraser demonstrated that the trick “first a small request and then the big, critical one” is an effective technique of social influence. Pondering the psychological mechanism of the rule they observed in their study, the researchers adopted the assumption that people who agree to meet the first request without any apparent pressure (threats, blackmail, proposals of financial rewards, etc.) begin to perceive themselves as “the kind of people who do this sort of thing” [Freedman, Fraser 1966: 201]. As the subsequent main request is consistent with their newly formed self-image, they comply with it. Thus the authors suggested the presence of a mechanism that was fully described in the following years by Daryl Bem [1967, 1972] and is known today as the self-perception theory.

A couple of decades have passed since the publication of Freedman and Fraser’s experiments. During this time there have been many studies showing that the technique is effective in marketing and charity [see: Burger 1999 for review]. Kraut and McConahay [1973] have shown its effectiveness in the domain of politics. They randomly assigned lists of American registered voters to experimental and control conditions. Participants in the experimental conditions were contacted as part of an opinion survey two weeks prior to a 1970 Democratic primary election in May. In the control group different contacts or none at all occurred. It has been found that the experimental group voted at significantly higher rates not only in May, but also in the following August. Gerber, Green and Shachar [2003] have obtained a similar pattern of results in their field experiment. Vierasu, Hertanu, Talpau and Balasescu [2011] in turn, suggest that the foot-in-the-door technique is used very often by politicians when they want to manipulate people.

It is obvious, foot-in-the-door technique salesman often use. If you can persuade the customer to buy a small gift, there is a chance that if it comes to the house might be able to persuade his/her client to buy something then you can earn. Similarly, it can be assumed that this type of technique used by canvassers during the election campaigning (especially the local ones) as classical traditional technique of encouraging voters at their sites.

In principle, one can point to a common share of this technique in the political rivalry, both during the election as well as in general sense – during political activity of leaders, party activists in long-time period. This is a problem
of generating pro-political behaviour of commitment and implementation of planned strategic outcomes. We are thinking of producing electoral support among the citizens, and because not only for one unique election and attitudes of classified group of citizens’ addictive to party alignments. For example, during election campaigns each political candidate (including the members of his/her election party team) use techniques foot-in-the-door, the same as trying to get to the psychological nature of people by sending messages of an escalating political requests directly addressed to customer’s (voter) to strive to achieve multiple support (in long-term) on the basis of the “hidden” intent to obtain the best possible result in the election. Of course, this technique of multi-stage and manipulative sense is not the only exclusive solution for building political support, as it is based on the often deceptive and uncertain solutions to the end. Generally speaking, the postulate of “penetration” into the psyche of the “payee” to the next level and meets increasingly diverse binding and involving requests. The question about the limits of their feasibility, as each human behaviour should be viewed through the prism of unquestioned profit and loss calculations and so. You can, therefore, treat this technique in politics as a support, but not prior. There are examples of when during the election campaign, the party leader asks citizens to promote the idea of democratic freedoms, the same would then ask for a vote on each other during the election. But there are doubts about the uniqueness of this technique in political life, especially if you change the formula of direct contacts with party leaders to contact voters via the mass media. The restoration of the primary role of this technique, which is expected to become more important in a situation of political activity, will be re-developed at the level of Web 2.0 communication.

**Door-in-the-face**

A reversal of the foot-in-the-door technique has also been suggested. Cialdini, Vincent, Lewis, Catalan, Wheeler, Darby [1975] suggested that one way to get an individual to agree to perform a moderately large task is by first asking her or him to perform a difficult task. Ones he or she refuses to carry out the large task then ask him or her to comply with the smaller request. In one of their studies, the experimenter presented himself as an employee of an institution for juvenile offenders and asked the participants to join the institution as volunteers. The control group was asked to go for a two-hour trip to the zoo with a group of young people who had come into conflict with the law. This request was complied with by fewer than 17% of the respondents. In the experimental group, a very difficult initial request was formulated: to take up the role of a tutor of juvenile offenders. This would require two hours of activity per week over the following two years. The vast majority of respondents refused to comply with this request. When, however, they were then asked to perform a one-time activity – to take some juvenile delinquents to the zoo - as many as 50% of them expressed their consent.

The authors suggest that the possible mechanisms that could be responsible for the effectiveness of the technique of the door in the face technique: is the principle of reciprocation of concessions. This principle is a particular variant of a broader and more general norm of reciprocity, according to which one should reciprocate the good things received from others [Uehara 1995]. In the case of door-in-the-face, the principle of mutual concessions is present in the fact that when someone poses a request difficult to fulfill, then reduces the scope of the request upon hearing an initial refusal to comply - thus reducing own expectations towards the subject - they in fact make a concession of a specific kind. A series of empirical studies have confirmed that such a mechanism underlies the effectiveness of the door-in-the-face technique [see O’Keefe, Hale 2001; Cialdini, Goldstein 2004].

The mutual concessions are forcing us to a sense of responsibility. They produce sets of chances to keep the promise. In addition, it’s associated with achieving a pleasant satisfaction which is greater even when such technique is implementing.

This technique is particularly useful in its time when discussions about changes in laws or relates to unreasonable political demands, such as the opposition party. It is quite often to meet the leader of the opposition claims that the reforms carried out do not meet the highest standards; they are not ambitious, and thus less effective or inefficient from a social point of view. Adequate example is the call to strike with maximum demands even while assuming minimal success. Trade unions often assume that strike activity is not intended to meet all the demands, but rather to achieve a satisfactory solution, or open public debate. Today’s strikes in Greece, Portugal, Spain (as a consequence of the economic crisis) proves this thesis.

The door-in-the-face technique is also commonly used in the international negotiations. Following this strategy, an international negotiator may make an extreme demand, than claim compensation for withdrawing the unrealistic proposal. Recognizing that the principle of reciprocity may be used for manipulation, states may not feel under any obligation to reciprocate. For example, in the 1950s, the Eisenhower declined to respond to Khrushchev’s unilateral troop reductions because the Soviet army was bloated and the troops could be put better use in civilian pursuits [Larson 1988, 1998].
Foot-in-the-face

In the case of the foot-in-the-door technique, an easier first request is used to increase the chances the subject will fulfill the subsequent, more difficult critical request. In the case of the door-in-the-face technique, the principle is reversed — first, a clearly difficult request is formulated in the hope that its rejection will make the subject more compliant with the easier request.

However, this observation can lead to the question of what happens when we apply a sequence of two requests of completely different character, but of similar degrees of difficulty.

In three experimental studies [Dolinski 2011], participants were sequentially given two requests that were different in content but similar in their level of difficulty. In one of the studies, half of the students living in residence halls were asked to complete a questionnaire, and the other half to tape-record the contents of a book to help a blind student in preparing for an exam. Regardless of the subject’s decision of whether to satisfy the first request, another request was then formulated (students who had been initially invited to complete the questionnaire were now asked to make the recording and those first asked to record the book were now asked to complete the questionnaire). It turned out that the technique worked well. The request which appeared second in the sequence was fulfilled more frequently than in control conditions where it was posed directly.

At the highest political levels observed strong commitment to the process of exchange of goods and services. Sometimes, the MPs vote contrary to the provisions of his/her own party, which at first glance seems to be incomprehensible. In practice, it is a principle of re-paying liabilities incurred in the voters’ mind. You can not ignore that there is a relationship difficult to grasp for the average voter from politics to business. From the extra point of view, there are some interesting facts on how to cast additional votes by the so-called sphere of election promises, but it can be rooted in the mentality that the so-called sphere of election promises, but it can be rooted in the mentality and patterns of political behaviours, because the sum of the implemented policies are sometimes carefully calculated for future recommendations and estimations. For example, parliamentarians sometimes underline their opposition made even against own party in order to emphasize independence, integrity and potential position — even deliberately violating party discipline, thereby realizing liabilities incurred before the election.

Low-ball

In a manoeuvre that is similar to the foot-in-the-door, another persuasion technique is to establish commitment by “throwing a low ball”. This technique induces a person to make an active decision to engage in a particular action such as making a purchase. When the consumer agrees to pay the cost, she or he is told that the cost has actually risen. However, the consumer is so committed to the decision that he or she is likely to bear the increased cost.

The low-ball technique is often used in the sale of new cars. Imagine you are buying a car and you have just made the decision to purchase it for the stated price. Right at the moment the seller tells you that the price does not include devices, which you really want to have but which suddenly turn out to be an extra cost. It is still likely that you will buy the car for the higher price, but if you had known its final price before taking the decision to buy, you might have tried to find something cheaper.

Cialdini, Cacioppo, Basset and Miller [1978] demonstrated the low-ball effect experimentally. Participants were asked if they wished to take part in the study concerning thinking processes. In the control condition, participants were informed that the experiment would require them to arrive at the laboratory early morning. It was the obvious cost that the student had to incur to participate in the study: it was put to the control participants in a straightforward fashion. The participants in the low-ball condition were initially asked if they wished to participate. If the participant said “yes”, the experimenter then revealed the true cost — the experiment would begin early morning. Much more participants who had been low-balled came to the laboratory...

The situation in which politicians intentionally outstand the promise with spectacular advantage is mostly used in a long-term standing commitment (e.g. politicians highly motivated during the pre-election party alliances/games, for example the case of LiD2 or within the construction of coalitional government, such as unforgettable “marriage”: PiS - LPR, and Self-Defence3).

2 Left and Democrats (Lewica i Demokraci, LiD) was a centre-left electoral alliance which was created on 3 September 2006, before the municipal Polish election of 2006. The coalition’s aim was to provide an alternative for both the national-liberal party, Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, PiS) and the liberal-conservative Civic Platform (Platforma Obywatelska, PO). LiD contested their first national election in parliamentary elections held on October, 2007, and finally won 53 seats to the Sejm (lower chamber of Polish parliament). In fact, the LiD alliance was dissolved in April 2008, following a rift between the member parties.

3 A coalitional government was formed on May 5, 2006, and practically dissolved until August 2007. Leaders of allied parties have signed a coalition agreement together. It was not a secret that the representatives of the Polish Self-Defence hoped for lucrative political position. The reality was different, and in September 2006 inside the coalition was a crisis.
The technique relies on the fact that luring large benefits, nevertheless in the last moment it appears that the real “costs” will be much higher than promised benefits. However, due to the existing commitment to withdraw from “common” project is not possible consequently. Although the “pay-off” is drastically, it can lead to retreat even greater adverse consequences – “losing face”.

Social influence techniques based on cognitive mechanisms

Another group of social influence techniques to which psychologists have devoted much attention are those based on cognitive mechanisms – primarily the rules of functioning of our memory and attention, as well as decision-making. Subtle differences in the formulation of requests, suggestions, or proposals make the difference.

That’s-not-all

The that’s-not-all technique is the tactic consists of offering a product at a high price, not allowing the customer to respond for a two or three seconds, and then offering a better deal by adding another product or lowering the price. The sweetening of the deal invokes a feeling of indebtedness that increases compliance.

In the study to test the effectiveness of the that’s-not-all technique, the participants were people who approached a stand selling cookies and asked about their price. They were randomly assigned to one of two groups. In control conditions, the participants were informed that the cookies were sold in sets consisting of two packets, at the price of 75 cents. In experimental conditions, the seller said that the cookies cost 75 cents, and after a while he added that this was the price for a set consisting of two packets. Burger found nearly double the sale of cookies using the that’s-not-all technique.

Obvious examples are used in commerce but also in politics, this technique has its place particularly during the election campaign. An example is the widely used free trials (small gifts). It was the fact that the sample is free, makes it born in us a sense of obligation. Often it is in the election rallies where voters handed to various free gifts, hoping that this will increase the likelihood that the recipient desires to repay the “debt” and give your vote.

The that’s-not-all technique is used especially during the election campaign. Political candidates and their campaigning staff outdo each other in inventing the next great gadgets (small gifts) that are meant to give the impression that it has been more than expected. Currently, you must also pay attention to the opportunities of receiving online gadgets (such as wallpaper patterns or musical sounds). Advertising, promoting basically are the sort of the business or industry today. The websites of shops with products of American presidential candidates in 2012, there are more than 100 products with prices ranging from 1 up to about $50. These are t-shirts, stickers, collars for dogs, but also gold cufflinks and jewellery. This is of course one of the way to raise funds for the campaign, while building relationships with political candidate based on a common identification (usually visual images) [see http://www.store.barackobama.com, http://www.store.mittromney.com].

Yet another example, but the same applies to the current American presidential campaign. Singer Beyoncé Knowles held at the NYC 40/40 Club the collection of funds for the encouraged his fans to campaign contributions; she said that anyone who gives money for the campaign has a chance to win tickets to this event [http://www.facebook.com/beyonce].

Even a penny helps

One of the most intriguing technique of social influence is based on the assumption that the phrase “even a penny will help” added to the standard request for charity donation considerably increases the probability of carrying it out without decreasing the average sum of money offered by the benefactor [Cialdini, Schroeder 1976]. What is the mechanism underlying the effectiveness of this technique? It is commonly assumed that a typical person asked for a donation must resolve a specific dilemma. On the one hand, he or she knows that the charity is worthy of support; on the other hand, he or she does not want to waste money. As a result, a person confronted by such a dilemma typically resolves it by adopting a solution that allows him or her to preserve a positive self-image and create a good impression on others, despite offering no support to charity. Such a person adopts the following thinking: “I would be glad to do it, but I can’t afford it”. What may block such an excuse is legitimization of paltry contribution. Yet, it is important that the requester does not indicate that he or she means precisely “one penny”. As a result, people requested to donate the symbolic single penny usually give much more.

In the original experiment that tested the effectiveness of this technique, an experimenter knocked on a participant’s door and asked for a donation for the American Association for Cancer Research. In the experimental group, the phrase “even a penny will help” was added to the standard message. It turned out that this simple extra statement increased the frequency of donation while maintaining the average amount of donation.

In the first election of Barack Obama (2008) for the office of President of the United States, small donor (whose contributions do not exceed $200)
Foot-in-the-mouth, or a question about one’s well-being

Howard [1990] assumed that if you ask someone how they feel before asking them to donate to charity, and that person declares to be well, he or she will be more willing to engage in helping people who feel much worse. A person publicly telling someone that he or she is feeling wonderful will feel committed to engage in improving the well-being of those who do not feel so well.

In the Howard’s experiment, a person presenting himself as an employee of a committee to combat hunger telephoned randomly-selected residents of Dallas. In the control group, the interviewees were informed that in the near future cakes at the price of 25 cents were to be sold in their neighbourhood, and the income thus obtained would be used to hold a festive meal for the hungry (the study was conducted before Thanksgiving). Each respondent was asked whether they agreed to the vendor visiting their home. In the experimental group, after the introduction, the researcher first asked the respondent about their well-being, and then – depending on the response – stated that it was either nice or sad to hear, and only then explained that a charity sale of cakes was being organized and asked the interlocutor if they would agree to purchase one. It turned out that people in the experimental group bought the cakes much more often than those in the control group. A similar result, indicating the crucial role of the very act of asking people how they are, was obtained by Fointiat [2000].

This technique is particularly justified in direct contact with the individual voter, because asking him/her about the mood to give a positive response within emotional connection. Atmosphere of well-being requires a way to want to help at the very beginning of the conversation. And public declaration increases the level of self-esteem. The condition for the effectiveness of this technique is necessary to question the well-being, which means courtesy asking the question, au caller raises a sense of obligation and increases the need for reciprocation.

Politicians, especially when direct contact with voters captures various forms of verbal and non-verbal behaviour are using the featured technique.

Techniques of social influence with reference to political life

Probably, the handshake with a smile on politicians face is a useful introduction to electioneering. It is the evidence of openness, but also it generates the interest, or even positive emotions. This type of technique is commonly used (of course, taking into account cultural factors). In Prague, under the President Vaclav Havel are not rare situations where he can be found in the traditional beer halls in the centre of the old town, sitting modestly with a glass of beer. He asked people — what’s new and how are they feel - often to the strangers. In such situations, you could see as it is important for people - enjoyed his company and appreciated all the more aware that the President is interested in order of people ordinary life. This type of behaviour fosters the relationship between the politician and the citizen, and often provides social support.

Dialogue involvement

The effectiveness of the foot-in-the-mouth technique, described earlier obviously depends on whether people asked how they are give a positive response. In American culture, this kind of response is very common. However, it would be interesting whether a similar effect would be noted in a culture where the norm is a negative declaration of feeling bad. One of the few countries with such a cultural norm is Poland [Dolinski 1996]. It turned out that although in Poland people asked about their well-being usually answered that they did not feel fine, they still more often engaged in charity work than those who were directly asked for financial support [Dolinski, Nawrat, Rudak 2001]! We can thus conclude that, although the question about one’s well-being is a good technique of social influence, the psychological mechanism underlying its effectiveness must be different than Howard assumed. One should take into account that while in control conditions in Howard’s studies, where the charity request is formulated directly, we are dealing with a monologue from the experimenter, in the foot-in-the-mouth situation there is a dialogue between the experimenter and the subject.

Dialogue and monologue are the basic modes of interpersonal communication. While monologue is characteristic in interactions with strangers, dialogue is typical mode in interactions with persons we know personally. Social psychology is full of empirical evidence demonstrating that in interactions with other people we often react automatically to certain stimuli, and also automatically trigger some, often complex, behavioural scripts [e.g., Langer, Blank, Chanowitz 1978; Slugoski, 1995; Bargh 1994]. Because people are more willing to meet requests made by friends rather than strangers [e.g., Argyle, Henderson 1984; Roloff, 1987], taken by a stranger who involves us in a dialogue, we automatically activate “dealing with an acquaintance script”. It leads us
to agree with a request directed toward us in a polite manner, particularly when it is not a costly one.

Dolinski, Nawrat, Rudak [2001] showed that if the request was preceded with casual dialogue between the requester and the respondent, then it was fulfilled more frequently than in condition in which the requester approached the participant with a monologue type of interaction. This outcome held true for a charity request (i.e., collecting money for an orphanage), a social one (i.e., a request for a interview conducted by opinion research organization), and a marketing appeal (i.e., street sales of Indian pastilles).

A similar effect, indicating the role that dialogue plays in processes of social influence, was noted in studies by Burger, Soroka, Gonzago, Murphy and Somervell [2001], who showed that a short, 2-minutes talk with the experimenter nearly doubled the rate of compliance with the request than did a mere request (not preceded by a short talk).

Numerous representative studies have shown that people are more likely to be a subject to requests of friends and acquaintances than the requests formulated by unknown persons. Including the communication process on the other hand increases the range of customer submission, which can be used in direct contact with the politician to the voter.

The traditional form of contact in order to exchange opinions and listening different views is meetings with voters, both the smaller, as well as those with more attendants. Generally, in each of these cases is being creating a direct relationship with the individual voter in the convention of mutual conversation (dialogue). In line with this reasoning, Han [2009] presents results of experiments suggesting that political appeals that include some self-disclosure about the person making the request triggers a liking heuristic that causes subjects to be more likely to comply with a request for action.

Avoiding confrontation and dialogue with voters can greatly weaken the electoral chances of a political candidate, and engage in a dialogue with voters more likely to vote. This type of action is of course difficult for a politician because in fact, they often facing extreme behaviours, statements of persons encountered. It must, therefore, in many cases, improvise. In 2011, in Poland, during the parliamentary campaign Donald Tusk used “the Tusk-Bus” to meet voters; despite these meetings were often difficult and turbulent character. Currently an important role in the disclosure and use of this technique, play online media. Increasingly, websites of politicians, party leaders can activate the public online debate to form own judgments or opinions and get answers. Currently, popular form of communication is two-way share of the candidates on social networking sites.

**Techniques of social influence with reference to political life**

**Techniques that appeal to emotional mechanisms**

Another group of social influence techniques is associated with one’s experience of particular emotional states. Particularly in the literature on attitude change, much space is devoted to the role of mood [e.g. Dillard, Pfau 2002], and among discrete emotions – to fear [e.g. Boster, Mongeau 1984]. Researchers on behavioural compliance, however, have focused on other emotional states - guilt, embarrassment and the experience of relief.

**Inspiring a sense of guilt**

Guilt is an aversive feeling, associated with the unpleasant tension and arousal, together with the experience of regret and repentance [Baumesiter, Reis, Delespaul 1995]. Very often, a sense of guilt coexists with the experience of shame [Izard 1977; Tangney 1995]. A common feature of the emotions of shame and guilt is the subject’s sense of violating the standards or rules that he or she professes to hold and a feeling of responsibility for some wrongdoing or transgression.

While experiencing the emotions of guilt or shame, the subject is usually unable for a long time to break free from negative thoughts about him or herself, and these threaten the subject’s self-esteem. However, guilt and shame induces a desire to make restitution and to repair a self-image. Meeting requests made by other people can sometimes become a means to recover one’s conviction of being a positive, valuable social entity [e.g. Koneske, Staple, Graf 1979]. In an experiment by Carlsmith and Gross [1969] students were induced to believe that they had given a series of painful shocks to another person as part of learning experiment. These shamed and guilty students were more likely to comply to subsequent request to make phone calls when asked either by a person they supposed shocked or another person, then students who were in an neutral emotional state.

Similar results, indicating a link between the experienced emotions of shame and guilt and compliance to requests, were recorded in other experiments [Wallace, Sadalla 1966; Freedman, Wallington, Bless 1967; Darlington, Macker 1966].

Public blaming of politician by journalist even for little faults can be the basis for calling the actual guilt. Then remorse may lead to an unexpected return behaviour - in line with the expectations of manipulating. It is always unexpected to implement fully such a technique, without unpredictable consequences, especially in political temper life.
Emarrassment

Emarrassment is an emotion that we experience relatively seldom, but has no doubt been experienced by almost all of us by the time we became adults. This state is typically produced when someone finds herself or himself in a predicament or committing an act that may result in a poor social evaluation. Most studies concerning the consequences of experiencing an emarrassment aimed at demonstrating that it generates the tendency to avoid others and become isolated [see: Niedenthal, Krauth-Gruber, Ric 2006]. The question of whether the state of emarrassment increases compliance with requests, suggestions or orders has rarely been the subject of empirical research. The few exceptions in this respect are experiments by Apsler [1975] who had students perform a set of embarrassing acts (like sing a silly song or imitate a 5-year-old throwing a temper tantrum) in front of another student. Compared to control participants, emarrassed students were more likely to consent to help another students with a class projects regardless of whether the requester was the person who observed them or someone who knew nothing about their acts.

Of course, the question arises why a sense of emarrassment should promote compliance. Apsler [1975] refers to an intrapsychological mechanism. Involvement in helping another person who not only needs support but is directly asking for help, can be a means of regaining one’s positive mood or positive self-esteem. Both of these phenomena (i.e., mood and self-esteem) suffered while the subject was "making a fool of themselves" during the experiment.

According to Suhay [2006] emarrassment, as a self-conscious emotion, plays an important role in motivating individuals to internalize the political values of their social groups. Politicians may more easily motivate emarrassed than non-emarrassed citizens to engage in different common activities to support their in-group members, to vote for/in group leaders, etc. Guilt and shame tend to submission. These emotional states evoke a sense of danger areas of their own values, integrity and self-control. Self-esteem can be recovered by doing something good, socially acceptable, for example, by actively supporting a political candidate in the election. Such activity can be a form of compensation (penance); can be an escape from negative thinking about themselves and their actions. Preparation of voters’ guilt can be a source of very specific and sometimes effective motivation (i.e. voter stigma).

Fear-then-relief

Fans of action films are acquainted with the specific type of police interrogation scene where the brutal policeman is suddenly and unexpectedly replaced by a gentle and compassionate cop. The subject of the interrogation, who has refused to answer questions at gun point, now, when treated with a cup of coffee, all of a sudden starts confessing everything he or she knows. Dolinski and Nawrat [1998] have conducted a program of research to demonstrate that when people experience an emotion that is then removed, they are more likely to comply with a request. For example in one of the study experimenters placed under the car wipers small leaflets that looked like police tickets. When the drivers returned and read the leaflets, it turned out these were ads for a hair-growth stimulating shampoo, or appeals for a blood donation. When the drivers were about to drive off, they were approached by a student gathering material for his master thesis and asked whether the driver would fill out a questionnaire on how to optimize the city traffic. It turned out that drivers under “fear then relief condition” were considerably more likely to fill out the questionnaire than the other drivers (control participants).

How can the mechanism of compliance in the fear-then-relief state be explained? Fear alerts the body, focuses our attention on the source of fear [e.g. Tomkins 1991], and triggers an action program specific for the given type of emotion [Frijda 1986; Lazarus 1991; Dolinski 2001]. Whilst such a reaction seems perfectly adequate and adaptive for threatening conditions, it stops being adequate when the circumstances suddenly and unexpectedly reverse, as in the bad cop-good cop interrogation procedure, or in the studies by Dolinski and Nawrat (1998). In this state of confusion and disorientation, the person is more likely to comply with a request.

The technique of bad cop-good cop is probably the most well-known technique of negotiating and handling, also often used by journalists, commentators to confront directly the politicians. Manipulation technique of such rules is quite simple. Conversation leads two journalists (“bad” and “good” one). This scheme was used in a popular Polish political talk-show "Now we do!" by Tomasz Sekielski and Andrzej Morozowski⁴. Using this technique fostered their guests to confusion and, consequently compromising the views behind the scenes of political life. Removal from the state of equilibrium and the introduction of a state of confusion increases the chance that the politician will reveal the mystery, that is to say something important, you should not say, weakening his political position.

⁴ “Now we do!” – a talk-show which was broadcasted from 13 September 2005 to 5 July 2010 on Polish TVN which is led by Tomasz Sekielski and Andrzej Morozowski. To the tv studio were invited famous politicians, artists, experts in the various fields. During the program, presented a short film materials and the latest news and was recorded in the presence of the audience. Taking were often accused of being intransigent behaviour towards invited guests.
Psychological mechanism of social impact within suggestion of taking some other positions are well known from the very beginning of mankind, except that changes are conditioned by permanent development process. Manipulating the individuals or groups due to the lots of many circumstances are contextual and they also have evidence in a situation of political actors increasing competition. That is it obvious, who does not use psychological techniques does not exist. However, the diagnosis of electoral behaviour is not always confirmed the primacy of psychological approach. It turns out that we have to deal with additional environmental conditions to make final decision. In confirmation of such opinion must cite the concept of classic researcher on the theory of public choice by Downs [1957], who wrote: “As long as to retain the assumption of perfect knowledge, no citizen can possibly influence another’s vote. Each knows what would benefit him most, what the government is doing, and what other parties would do if they were in power. Therefore, the citizen’s political taste structure, which I assume to be fixed, leads him directly to an unambiguous decision about how should he vote. If he remains rational, no persuasion can change his mind” [Downs 1957: 139].

In line with this reasoning Fiorina [1981] suggests: “Citizens are not fools. Having often observed political equivocation, if not outright lying, should they listen carefully to campaign promises? Having heard the economic, educational, sociological, defence, and foreign policy expert advisors disagree on both the effects of past policies and the prospect on future ones, should they pay close attention to policy debates? Even if concerned and competent citizens appear to have little solid basis on which to cast their votes, save on those rare occasions when candidates take clear and differing positions on salient specific issues (e.g., abusing, abortion, the Equal Rights Amendment)” [Fiorina 1981: 5].

These are clear indications, but rather the controversy surrounding the behaviour of individuals in fact today is reflected in the rich literature on the subject [Niemi, Weisberg 1993]. Lewis-Beeck in 1990 published a famous work under the crucial title: “Economics and Elections” in which he states that pocketbook voting has determined voters, especially in a position to direct or in-direct financial statements. Of course, the above-mentioned count the utility of persuasion and manipulation techniques do not deny them, but rather expose their actual functions. In particular, we have to deal with that when we depart from the classic game of election to the wider sense of political life.

Of course, the overview of the social influence techniques presented in this article does not exhaust the arsenal of all possible psychological methods of encouraging people to meet the requests or suggestions addressed to them by politicians and reversal. Actually, it seems unreasonable to expect that such a complete list of social influence techniques will ever be compiled. Human ingenuity in inventing new ways to make others perform a variety of activities seems virtually limitless.

**Final remarks**

**References:**


Abstract:

The article is focused on analysis the manner of presentation of data considering the electoral campaign in major information services during parliamentary campaign in Poland in 2011. This concerns the kinds of the subjects presented, the choice of context, politicians’ statements and the comment. An important question is whether we deal with a uniform image of the campaign or whether this image is different for particular stations. For that reason, what was investigated were the evening emissions of news bulletins of the most popular television stations, that is TVN („Fakty”), Polsat („Wydarzenia”) as a private television and TVP 1 („Wiadomości”) as public television.

The article consist of five most important parts: subjects, where author analyze key issues of particular campaign; pictures where are presented images accompanying main issues; faces, which are focused on main actors of campaign; and finally role of journalists who present information.

Key words:
electoral campaign in Poland, news bulletin

Introduction

An electoral campaign constitutes an interesting phenomenon for political scientists, sociologists and marketing communication specialists, who investigate the manners of presentations of a political offer and its influence on electoral preferences. Also the scientists specializing in the area of the media may find this particular period fascinating. The research of journalistic attitudes
and behaviour of the media during the rivalry in question is possible to provide valuable information on the impact of the mass media on the candidates and affect the result of the election, since a rivalry-based electoral campaign inscribes into a news paradigm, described by Liz Fawcett [2011: 245, 253] or Stuart Allan [2006: 81-102].

A news bulletin, defined as a television programme presenting the events that occurred on a certain day, possessing a clear identity as well as measured and diverse materials [Boyd 2006: 183] may be considered as one of the most important sources of information. An interesting definition is provided by Ivan Cury [2011: 205], according to whom „if most of the stories presented are current, then the program is a news program”. What plays an important role here is television, and in consequence the information programmes presented by this particular medium, which uses image and sound to achieve a great effect, which was mentioned by Giovanni Sartorii [2007] or Pierre Bourdieu [2011]. Another important fact is that the news bulletins create the importance of words and expressions on a large scale [Pisarek 2000: 13]. This makes it possible to easily and quickly shape the opinions of the electors, which is valued by the committees. According to Nielsen Audience Measurement research conducted for Media2.pl, in Poland television information programmes can boast a substantial audience. In September 2011, that is in the period of the campaign under investigation, „Wiadomości” TVP (3 811 985 viewers), „Fakty” TVN (3 703 154), „Teleexpress” TVP (2 864 075), „Wydarzenia” Polsat (2 093 092) i „Panorama” TVP (1 346 401) had the biggest audience [Szewczyk 2011].

What is worth highlighting, the two initial programmes are listed in the top ten of the television shows with the largest number of viewers.

The aim of this article is to analyze the manner of presentation of data concerning the electoral campaign in major information services. This concerns the kinds of the subjects presented, the choice of context, politicians’ statements and the comment. An important question is whether we deal with a uniform image of the campaign or whether this image is different for particular statements. For that reason, what was investigated were the evening emissions2 of news bulletins of the most popular television stations, that is TVN („Fakt’y”), Polsat („Wydarzenia”) as a private television and TVP 1 („Wiadomości”) as public television from the period of the final five weeks of the campaign (September, 1st – October, 7th). In total, more than 100 issues3 of news bulletins were analyzed. Their choice was motivated by the intensified activity of electoral committees in this period as well as the increased interest of the mass media in politicians’ actions.

2 Evening editions last about 25 minutes, excluding weekend when they are 5 minutes shorter.
3 News bulletins in the author’s private collection.

The subjects of the campaign

In the analysis in question it was important to specify the subjects that became the news of the campaign. First of all, however, it is worth defining this concept, which is not an easy task. This results from the fact that every researcher interested in the media defines news through the specification of the characteristic features of materials that are broadcast in news bulletins. That is why it seems relevant to present the definition proposed by the former NBC and ABC presenter, Davida Brinkley, adopted also by B. William Silcock, Don Hider, Mary T. Rogus [2007: 1-2]. According to them, „News is what I say it is”. That means that journalists themselves decide of the rank of a certain event and that they do it by means of preparing and presenting particular pieces of news and by arranging the news in a particular order. Despite that fact, in the programmes analyzed it is not easy to find any differences among the news presented in specific days, and if such differenced appear, they concern the presentation of the subject in a different context. Similarities, in turn, are not difficult to be observed. The tendency is to present identical subjects and to place them at the beginning of the programme, with the exception of ludicrous elements, such as funny spots and unusual politicians’ behaviour, which are typically presented at the end in a satirical manner.

The subject-matter of the presented news was related to the issues mentioned by the candidates during party conventions, electoral meetings, television debates, interviews and numerous polemics between party leaders that

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The subjects that were most frequently mentioned during the campaign were divided into six categories, according to the classification proposed by John Langer [2011]. This is reflected in the proportion of hard news (serious information) and soft news (amusing information). Although the former still dominated, the longer the campaign lasted the more of the latter, presented in a satirical manner and commented on by journalists, could be observed. The first soft news appeared in “Fakty” on September, 7th and concerned the language used by Polish politicians in electoral rivalry. What is worth highlighting, this particular programme kept presenting its material in such a form, which resided in showing candidates’ personal relations and unusual behaviour rather than programme thesis. This can be exemplified by a material of September, 14th concerning the “youth” campaign of Law and Justice, conducted by showing attractive female candidates and using juvenile language. The character of such materials was usually ironic, which was visible in the reporter’s summary: „aby naprawdę było cool nie wystarczy często i głośno mówić jazzy, co kuma przecież każdy ziom. Niestety tak to już zawsze jest z pomysłem na kampanię młodzieżową, albo się nie ma”. The journalists’ attitude is also reflected in the titles. For instance, the material on a new clip broadcast in Polsat on September, 14th was titled “Untypically of a campaign”. It ought to be remembered that this interest in such subject-matter is partially caused by the current activity of political subjects. That includes the material concerning the hit parade of campaign spots (“Fakty”, September, 15th) or the travels of party leaders (“Wiadomości”, September 19th; “Fakty”, September, 6th). Another exemplification of this are similar materials about the most amusing elements of the campaign broadcast on the last day of the rivalry (October, 7th), prepared by “Fakty” and “Wiadomości”. However, what needs to be highlighted is that the latter bulletin presented less soft news, which was related to the fact that the materials broadcast in the public media usually concerned the politic programmes of all the national electoral committees. For that reason, it is worth mentioning that only this channel presented the activity of the Polish Labour Party that was not visible in other media.

The subjects that were most frequently mentioned during the campaign took place in television. The closer to the elections the more insubstantial issues, based on personal attacks, appeared.

Such tactics fulfilled the medial desire for interesting and controversial information that can attract the recipient’s attention, which is elaborated on by John Langer [2011]. This is reflected in the proportion of hard news (serious information) and soft news (amusing information). Although the former still dominated, the longer the campaign lasted the more of the latter, presented in a satirical manner and commented on by journalists, could be observed. The first soft news appeared in “Fakty” on September, 7th and concerned the language used by Polish politicians in electoral rivalry. What is worth highlighting, this particular programme kept presenting its material in such a form, which resided in showing candidates’ personal relations and unusual behaviour rather than programme thesis. This can be exemplified by a material of September, 14th concerning the “youth” campaign of Law and Justice, conducted by showing attractive female candidates and using juvenile language. The character of such materials was usually ironic, which was visible in the reporter’s summary: „aby naprawdę było cool nie wystarczy często i głośno mówić jazzy, co kuma przecież każdy ziom. Niestety tak to już zawsze jest z pomysłem na kampanię młodzieżową, albo się nie ma”. The journalists’ attitude is also reflected in the titles. For instance, the material on a new clip broadcast in Polsat on September, 14th was titled “Untypically of a campaign”. It ought to be remembered that this interest in such subject-matter is partially caused by the current activity of political subjects. That includes the material concerning the hit parade of campaign spots (“Fakty”, September, 15th) or the travels of party leaders (“Wiadomości”, September 19th; “Fakty”, September, 6th). Another exemplification of this are similar materials about the most amusing elements of the campaign broadcast on the last day of the rivalry (October, 7th), prepared by “Fakty” and “Wiadomości”. However, what needs to be highlighted is that the latter bulletin presented less soft news, which was related to the fact that the materials broadcast in the public media usually concerned the politic programmes of all the national electoral committees. For that reason, it is worth mentioning that only this channel presented the activity of the Polish Labour Party that was not visible in other media.

The Stefan Batory Foundation [The Stefan Batory Foundation Report 2011]. The categories are general information, information on programme proposals, the course of the campaign in the field, violations of law and morals, polls and others. What could be observed was that “Wiadomości” focused on technical aspect of the campaign, including the rules of voting (voting abroad, correspondence voting of the disabled) and the election calendar (e.g. the permission to vote beyond the place of living). What can be listed in this category are also the questions concerning the interpretation of regulations relating to the refusal to register Janusz Korwin-Mikke’s New Right committee and a candidate for Senate, Anna Kalata, in all the electoral districts.

A large space was also devoted to the materials concerning the campaign activity in the field. The most famous element here is “tuskobus”, that is a bus used by the Prime Minister and his team to travel around the country. On September, 19th, the day that the travel began, ale the services devoted at least 3 minutes to this subject. Therefore, it is not surprising that the media started to be interested in means of transport of other party leaders and the facts that the Law and Justice leader took a train travel from Warsaw to Gdansk and SLD (Democratic Left Alliance) leaders were met in a commuter line were commented on as well.

Electoral meetings posed an occasion to discuss programme issues. On September, 1st, the politicians’ ideas for better education were presented and the biggest news here was that Grzegorz Napieralski’s (the leader of Democratic Left Alliance) speech was disturbed by the youth organization related to PO (Civic Platform). This information, although accompanied by other campaign motives, constituted the opening news in all the bulletins. However, the main source of information on the political plans were parties conventions, whose fragments were broadcast in all the programmes analysed. On September, 10th, when PO and SLD conventions took place, each station paid attention to the programme thesis of the rivaling parties. On several occasions the main point of interest were economical and financial issues (also due to the Economic Forum in Krynica, organized in September), the problem of increasing charges for preschools (the consequence of a new act of law), the role of women (the Congress of Women took place on September, 17th) and the necessity to fight unemployment.

The debates concerning specific issues were focused on programme aspects. These were organized by television channels as well as the committees (e.g. Napieralski – Rostowski). These events constituted an important element of the agenda both before and after the meeting, which can be illustrated with the heralds of the debates in Polsat (September, 1st; October, 3rd and 6th), TVN (September, 5th) or TVP (September, 28th, October, 7th). In the last of the cases mentioned it was the refusal of Law and Justice members that posed the most interesting news. However, one of the most symbolic events of the campaign

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1 “To be really cool it’s not enough to often and loudly use words like „jazzy”, which all the mates know. Sadly, to make a youth campaign, you either have ideas or you don’t”. The Polish word “siema” is a colloquial form of greeting and can be translated as “howdy”. If written separately, as “się ma”, is a form of the verb “have”. Therefore, in the summary under consideration one can observe an interesting play of words, which increases the irony of message.
under consideration was “the debate of the debate”, which took place in early September and considered the planned discussion between the two specialists in financial policy deriving from the two biggest political parties. The Civic Platform pointed the minister of finance, Jacek Rostowski, while the Law and Justice Zyta Gilowska, the member of the Monetary Policy Council. Numerous politicians, political scientists and journalists interpreted this choice as a violation of the independence of the institution member. Therefore, the governing party disagreed to run such a debate. Nonetheless, it is worth noticing that the discussion in question was kept alive thanks to the interest of the media that tried to strengthen the antagonisms between the two sides of the conflict.

The composition of the future government constituted the subject of a plethora of discussions, which is related to the declarations of certain committees concerning potential ministers. The most reserved party in this aspect was Law and Justice. Due to that fact, the party was being accused of having no political background and encouraged to reveal a portion of names. This can be illustrated by the material broadcast in “Wydarzenia” on September, 5th, in which the journalists tried to predict the names of Law and Justice and Civic Platform ministers. What ought to be mentioned here is Grzegorz Napieralski’s proposal for Donald Tusk to create the government together unless Tusk’s party would win the election (the news of September, 16th; in all the bulletins of that day occupied the first position). By constantly discussing the candidates for a potential coalition member, the journalists made their audience sure that, despite various polls, neither of the parties would manage to create the government by itself. Jarosław Kaczyński tried to frighten the electors with the vision of “tuskopalikot’s coalition” (Fakty; October, 3rd). Last but not least, the “German motif”, which dominated the final part of the campaign (October, 4th, is worth mentioning. This was related to the publication of Kaczyński’s book “Polska naszych marzeń” (“The Poland of our Dreams”), whose author suggested that the election of Angela Merkel for Germany would be governed by people using “Smolensk rhetoric” and the second one in “Fakty” on October, 3rd). What was analysed here was the role of fear as a tool of influencing the electors. The spots, however, were most of all considered as infotainment. Moreover, the journalists presented themselves as specialists on visual communication and the filming effects as trivial. However, one ought to admit that the goal of certain clips, in particular those found on the Internet, was to shock the viewers with controversial behaviour rather than to present any content relevant for the electors. The spot that was relatively often commented on was that of Civic Platform, in which the party threatened Poles that if the election was won by Law and Justice Poland would be governed by people using “Smolensk rhetoric” and the policy of fear of the years 2005-2007 (the opening news in “Wydarzenia” on September, 24th (presented at the end of the programme and described as “embarrassing commercials”), on September, 1st (presented as the second information and titled “the war of spots”), on September, 2nd (“odd spots”; the second news concerning unusual spots), and the material broadcast in “Fakty” on October, 5th, dealing with controversial spots and in “Wiadomości” on October, 7th, presenting the most amusing elements of the campaign. The above-mentioned titles suggest that the reporters’ attention was attracted by controversial films, which may encourage politicians to use such a category of image in future. The spot that was relatively often commented on was that of Civic Platform, in which the party threatened Poles that if the election was won by Law and Justice Poland would be governed by people using “Smolensk rhetoric” and the policy of fear of the years 2005-2007 (the opening news in “Wydarzenia” and the second one in “Fakty” on October, 3rd). What was analysed here was the role of fear as a tool of influencing the electors. The spots, however, were most of all considered as infotainment. Moreover, the journalists presented themselves as specialists on visual communication and the filming effects as trivial. However, one ought to admit that the goal of certain clips, in particular those found on the Internet, was to shock the viewers with controversial behaviour rather than to present any content relevant for the electors.

The polls, ordered by particular television stations, provided their recipients with entertainment as well as information. What was especially important here, apart from the information concerning the support for a given party, the graphic elements appearing on the television screen that were to strongly influence the viewers. It ought to be highlighted that the closer to the election day
the more polls were presented. This confirms the results of the study conducted by the Stefan Batory Foundation [2011: 14]. In the final week nearly each news bulletin contained a presentation of the potential result. Such a presentation could make a separate news (“Fakty”; September, 20th) or be an integral part of a larger material (“Wydarzenia”, September, 14th, in the material titled “the fight for cities”; “Wiadomości”, September, 19th in the material dealing with parties’ tax proposals; “Fakty”, September, 29, the material on the Prime Minister’s tight schedule). Furthermore, on October, 7th “Wiadomości” journalists presented a virtual simulation on the distribution of seats in the Parliament based on the results of two polls.

In order to attract the attention of both the voters and the media, politicians run their campaign in such a way to be close to people. The Prime Minister was taking trip around Poland in his “tuskobus” and meeting the citizens of towns and villages, followed by the journalists of different television stations. This was presented in “Wiadomości” on October, 3rd, when they spent the whole day traveling with Civic Platform and Law and Justice leaders. Three day later similar material was broadcast by TVN and Polsat.

The aforesaid strategy was also used by Democratic Left Alliance, whose members Grzegorz Napieralski and Leszek Miller visited the coast of Poland to accompany fishermen in the sea at dawn and to show the hardship of the campaign (news form October, 1st). A similar motivation is visible in the activity of Poland Comes First, a party that was created in 2011 and for that reason was provided with any financial means. In the last day of the rivalry, to attract the attention of both voters and journalists, the major members of the party brought a dark horse to the streets, claiming that their party would be the dark horse of the campaign (despite its law support). The day before they decided to climb Kasprywi Wierch. PSL (Polish People’s Party) tried to grasp attention with a song “Man comes first”, a dynamic clip and spots (the leader Waldemar Pawlak with Funky Polak’s background music and “Let’s go quickly behind the barn”). At the end of the campaign Pawlak decided to challenge Paweł Nastula, a famous judoist and a candidate of Polish People’s Party, spectacularly throwing him over his shoulder. Therefore, it should not be surprising that Donald Tusk, together with local leaders, took part in a run a around the Błonia Park (news from October, 3rd) and Jarosław Kaczyński visited a traditional Polish family for dinner.

The faces of the campaign

The aim of every electoral campaign is the present the candidates that are popular and can boast the greatest public support. Most frequently they are party leaders and major politicians that have already been known for their activity. Political scientists more and more frequently mention the phenomenon of personalization or prezidencialization of Parliamentary campaigns [Poguntke, Webb 2009: 1-25; Peszyński 2012: 102-156]. It cannot be questioned that the faces of the campaign were the leaders of particular committees. Other candidates could be observed in context of their controversial statements or in the leader’s background. This is also reflected in the manner in which the campaign is conducted, that is in presenting the rivalry from the perspective of travels and commentaries.

The image of Civic Platform is strongly connected to the Prime Minister and his government’s activity. For that reason, the materials concerning this party dominated the agenda of the media. On the one hand it was a positive aspect enabling a wider speech in the mainstream media. On the other, all the mistakes of the ministers were commented on and included in the discourse of the campaign. This can be exemplified with the speech of minister Rostkowski given in the European Parliament, during which he threatened the audience with the vision of collapsing Europe. Radosław Sikorski (foreign affairs’ minister) was a frequent speaker as well, which is confirmed by the Stefan Batory Foundation [2011: 13]. Nonetheless, it was Donald Tusk that constituted an unquestionable face of the Civic Platform.

A lot of medial space was devoted to the leader of Law and Justice, who is the fiercest critic of Tusk’s cabinet, known for his objections is such key issues as taxes, public finances, health care system or schooling. Another frequently presented person was Adam Hoffman (press officer), which was due to his function as the party spokesperson. Ryszard Czarnecki, famous for his vivid language, was also particularly willing to speak to the reporters.

The campaign of Democratic Left Alliance was commented on from the perspective of its leader’s activity. Another politicians present in the media were Leszek Miller, Ryszard Kalisz, Katarzyna Piekarska, and more seldom Piotr Gadzinowski. Aleksander Kwaśniewski met Miller in Gdańsk on September, 10th, to give his support to the party, which was widely presented in information programmes. Another leader, Janusz Palikot (Palikot’s Movement), also attracted attention, mostly due to increasing support for his party. This interest was not only due to his radical statements (the legalization of soft drugs, reckoning of the Catholic Church) as well as the lack of political background. The candidates of Palikot’s Movement were anonymous in the public eye, which attracted special attention. This can be illustrated with separate materials

\[6\] This can be exemplified with his comments for „Fakty” on September, 16th („The mouse roared just to have its five minutes in the media (…) Mister Grzegorz, take a cold shower”) or „Wydarzenia” on September, 17th („A politician without the Internet is a politician who has weaker wind in shallower sail” or „the Prime Minister Tusk won’t go anywhere on that horse, on that anti-Law and Justice jade”).
concerning “Palikot’s team” broadcast in “Wiadomości” on September, 4th, and in “Wydarzenia” on September, 29th.

Poland Comes First was presented as a party of several candidates (Paweł Kowal, Paweł Ponciuliusz, Elżbieta Jakubiak, Marek Migalski), which was visible in the committee’s strategy. Polish People’s Party focused on its leader, Waldemar Pawlak, and minister Sawicki. Sporadically, Stanisław Żelichowski or Ewa Kierzkowska appeared in the bulletins. Polish Labour Party was visible in public television only, where the leader and candidates were presented during press conferences.

Certain candidates, who had not been well-known before, due to their Internet activity attracted the attention of the mainstream media, including Karol Pilecki (Civic Platform), who performed a parachute jump, or Tadeusz Aziewicz’s spot that depicted young people being thrown at with herrings. However, the candidates of Democratic Left Alliance were the most creative ones here – Łukasz Wabic saved a girl from rape, Jędrzej Wijas shouted his postulates out accompanied by metal music and Katarzyna Lenart in her spot was taking her clothes off. Such messages, although well-remembered, had little impact on the campaign.

What was not shown in the media was the Senate campaign, which, according to “Wydarzenia” (September, 7th), was due to the negligence of the committees. Regional campaign, which can be illustrated with the material “The fight for cities” (Polsat, September 14th) was also rarely presented. What grasped the media attention, however, was the presence of celebrities on electoral lists („Wydarzenia” September, 18th, October, 3rd and 5th).

The presentation of the faces of the campaign cannot lack ordinary people who became famous thanks to the media. The first such person in Stanisław Kowalczyk, by journalists described as a “paprikas”, who before the campaign began, had asked Prime Minister the question “how to live?”, which was frequently repeated in the rivalry under consideration. Later, Kowalczyk was a guest in the convention of Law and Justice. Another person that is worth mentioning here is Teresa Milczarek from Kutno, who being in a difficult financial situation asked the Prime Minister for help. Donald Tusk promised to give her the help she asked for and the next day the woman was contacted with by the voivodeship and social services. The aforesaid situations are the examples of symbolic policy, that is activities aiming at the satisfaction of the media and publicity rather than problem-solving [Kepplinger 2006: 132; Peszyński 2012 (2): 195]. Also Czesław Dolecki from Katowice should be remembered about. The man was invited for dinner by the Prime Minister but changed his plans escaping from hooligans. The hooligans

7 Paprikas is a kind of canned goulash made of pepper. Media used this word in this context as Kowalczycy is a pepper grower.

Taking into consideration the statement presented at the beginning of this article, that news is everything that is considered as news, one needs to admit that the role of journalists is particularly important. This seems even more true if we agree with Mariusz Kołczyński’s opinion that television blocks the ability to think logically [2007: 344], which means that the recipients can be easily influenced by the suggestions presented by the media. The analysis of the reporters and presenters’ role in the presentation of the campaign shows that they constitute an important link between the voters and the offer of particular committees. Nowadays, the campaigns cannot be run without the participation of the mass media. Therefore, it is essential that the mainstream media, which reach the largest number of potential electors, present various political parties, different commentaries and vague concepts in a multicontextual manner.

According to the Stefan Batory Foundation report, “Wiadomości” took particular care of the preservation of evenness and fairness, which was reflected in the lack of judgment. When any partial statements and commentaries appeared, they were balanced with ones of the opposite meaning. The journalists of “Fakty” and “Wydarzenia” were more eager to judge, due to which their relations were described as more varied, emotional and opinion-forming, providing voters with wider knowledge concerning the parties and candidates [Raport FB 2011: 15]. However, such a manner of presentation caused certain antagonisms between the rivaling subjects, and evoked strong emotions of the candidates, who concentrated on personal attacks. This can be observed in the aforesaid “debate on debates”, when politicians talked to one another mainly through the mass media. They also tried to attract attention by means of unusual behaviour and situations, including Napieralski on a fishing boat, Kaczyński in a bakery, Pawlak in fight with a judoist.

The creator or reporters of the campaign?

The analysis of the medial discourse from the perspective if the language used by the journalists shows that they frequently use figurative language, including elaborated phrases and expressions to strengthen the emotional effect, make the message more picturesque and attract the attention of the recipients. It partially results from the political discourse itself, as it is full of metaphors, neologisms or euphemisms, which was noticed by the journalists of “Fakty” (September, 7th and October, 4th). On the one hand journalists commented on the politicians’ statements; on the other, they themselves used numerous figures of speech.
One of such figures is metaphor, which describes a subject by asserting that it is, on some point of comparison, the same as another otherwise unrelated object. Due to their cultural specificity, metaphors ought to be analyzed from the perspective of a particular culture and language. Metaphors can be observed in the commentaries of the reporters of “Fakty” (“to debate under the eye of the reporter”), “Wydarzenia” (“The leader of Democratic Left Alliance throws down the gauntlet to the minister of finances and promises a fierce debate. The campaign is running but the turnout is at stake as well”) or “Wiadomości” (“Law and Justice picked up the gauntlet”). Another illustration of this phenomenon is the title of a material broadcast by TVN, “The colours of the campaign”. The presence of metaphors in the media partially results from the fact that politicians use it frequently. This can be exemplified with “the Mount Everest of irresponsibility”, the statements of Jarosław Kaczyński, being his reaction to the minister Rostkowski’s speech, or “the letters of shame”, uttered by Ryszard Kalisz in the context of the electoral lists of Law and Justice.

Another figure of speech is neologism, that is a newly coined term, word, or phrase, that may be in the process of entering common use, but has not yet been accepted into mainstream language. Certain neologisms can take a form of collocations, which can be illustrated with “debate on debates”, “I-can-do-nothing-bus” or “Donald-I-can-do-nothing-Tusk” used by Jarosław Kaczyński. Both the politicians and journalists use semantic neologisms, that is the ones that give another meaning to the already existing word, like in the case of “paprikas” relating to a pepper grower. However, the greatest creativity is visible in word-formation neologisms, that is forming new words on the basis of already existing ones by means of word-formation forms. This process can be exemplified by such forms as “tuskobus” (a means of transport used by the Prime Minister) or “toskopalikot” (the word used to name a potential coalition of Civic Platform and Palikot’s Movement). These expressions became an important part of the campaign discourse mainly due to the fact they were frequently repeated by the mass media.

Another figure is euphemism, an innocuous word or expression used in place of one that may be found offensive or suggest something unpleasant. This can be illustrated by the words of politicians, Marek Balicki of Democratic Left Alliance (“let’s not spoil democracy”) or Radosław Sikorski (“Jarosław Kaczyński hang a flag of truce”) as well as a reporter of “Fakty” (“Ryszard Kalisz excelled himself”). The aforesaid figures cause the hyperbole of statements (e.g. “obvious untruth”) and lead to the increase in the number of used colloquialisms.

The lists included people, who according to the politicians of different parties, should have not candidates they were former prosecutors of agents of secret services.

The pepper grower asked the famous „how to live?” question to the Prime Minister and later attended the Law and Justice convention.

This was visible in the words of the presenters of “Wiadomości” (“the two biggest parties are neck to neck”) and “Fakty” (“Kaczyński soots in his old style”). What could be observed is war rhetoric (“electoral duel of emotions and arguments”, “the vision of leaders’ duel”, “party offensive”, “great mobilization”, “Civic Platform spurs on to battle”) and sports terminology (“Ewa Kopacz will clash with Marek Balicki”, “closer to finish”, “Tusk’s team”, “Palikot’s team”, “the last stretch of the campaign”). The reason for the use of such figures of speech is to distinguish one’s message and make the viewers interested. It may happen that by means of allusion journalists want to show us their attitude towards a given issue. The commentary of the reporter of “Wydarzenia” exemplifies this trend: “The leaders of the biggest parties decided not to chase one another and maybe they will finally start to chase their voters”. Although such direct an unequivocal statement did not happen often, it should be highlighted that numerous news in “Fakty” or “Wydarzenia” had a satirical undertone; politicians’ spots were laughed at, their achievements were trivialized and controversial statement were taken out of context. In that a way viewers’ (and voters’) opinion of politicians and their programmes was shaped. However, in “Wiadomości” this phenomenon was hardly observed, as here the reporting tone was dominant, not deprived of personal comments, however.

**Conclusions**

The subject of the elections usually went first in the news bulletins. However, the level of interest was different according to the programme. The commercial station devoted much more place to the subject-matter under consideration than public television, and “Fakty” TVN was the leader [Raport FB 2011: 13]. Nevertheless, the mission of the public media resides in giving space not only to political subjects, but also to various social groups and presenting wide range of topics. For that reason, in the final day of the rivalry, TVP, unlike other stations, did not devoted the whole time to the issue of election but concentrated on different matters as well, including the Nobel Peace Prize.

Another discrepancy was related to the number of hard and soft news. “Wiadomości” presented the activity of all the registered committees, but focused on the strongest parties. What dominated were serious pieces of information and satirical materials were scarcely presented. However, the final news of the bulletin broadcast on October, 7th, concerned the most amusing elements of the campaign. Commercial televisions concentrated on showing emotions. It is also worth noticing that the number of soft news was increasing in the final stage of the campaign.
The journalistic relations showed that politicians, in particular the leaders, like to travel and meet ordinary people. However, they could be frequently encountered in television studios during debates. Interestingly, the symbols of the campaign in question were the electors who were brave enough to stand out in the crowd and present their problems to the Prime Minister. In that way the became the elements of symbolic policy realized in front of television cameras and not directed at solving real problems. Nonetheless, this tactic proved to be efficient for it increased the attention of the mass media, which can be repeated in future campaigns.

The journalists consolidated the emotions that were caused by the politicians themselves. Their quarrels and criticism concerning opponents’ actions and programmes was exposed, as such subject-matter fulfills the requirements of the news. Journalists used specific language, full of colloquialisms, metaphors and neologisms, trying to follow politicians’ style and attract the viewers’ attention. On the one hand, such a tactic shallow the message. On the other, it makes it clearer for the audience. Another important factor is the appropriate image.

In conclusion, the 2011 Parliamentary campaign constituted an important event and the subject of interest for the mass media, although the journalists considered it as boring. Taking into consideration the ambiguity of the title of this article (picture or pictures of the campaign), it is worth noticing that manner of presentation was equivocal, despite certain differences in the attitude of “Wiadomości”, for in the bulletins analysed identical subjects, politicians and statements were presented.

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Abstract:

The study primarily deals with the influence of media on perception of political subject agendas by the media audience. It will concentrate on the strategy of political subjects whose utmost objective is to provoke the specific effect – to draw attention of media and recipients and to force them to pay attention to their agendas. It underlines the practices of political subjects in gaining influence on media as well as on the public by offering their own agendas. It also deals with the role and procedures of media in interpreting political scandals and creating atmosphere in the framework of receiving the events by the target audience.

Key words: media, political subjects, political agenda, political programs, media filters.

Introduction

There are no doubts that the notion “democracy” is generally understood mainly as the method of obtaining votes of voters who confer mandates to decide on public matters to political parties. In a democratic country it should be normal and binding for decision-making to adopt a social consensus on the basis of a discussion [Kapr 1991: 63]. R. Scurton underlines that the notion “democracy” means mainly and literally the government carried out by the majority of a nation or a certain community. From this point of view, democracy cannot be substituted by the will of a certain group – a class or interested parties. Also for this reason, the western world characterizes the democratic states as the states in which it is possible to assign each decision to the will of people in a certain way. However, democracy can have its limitations and risks,
as well. According to R. Scurton, these limitations and risks lie in the first place in the contrast between the interests of people and the interests of politicians. “Democratically elected government can promote such a political line during its electoral period which is in the obvious contrast with the interests of people” [Scurton 1989: 21-22].

Hence, in the centre of attention there are issues of the public interest in confrontation with the private interest, as well as the increasing social and wealth inequalities within the social stratification of a society and the resulting advantaged position of financial elites in the battle for power. Furthermore, there are topics related to the absence of political power control, deformation of democratic postulates by the role of money, topics resulting from the high level of corruption and political clientelism and the influence of propagandistic machinery by means of electoral campaigns and mass media and new media on the thinking and decision-making of voters. The aim of this study is to underline the influence of media on the perception of political subject agendas, on the system of media filter functioning, on the principles of creation of political programs, political agendas and on the practices of interpretation of events by journalists.

**Media and agendas of political subjects**

The research of M. E. Mc Combs and D. L. Shaw confirmed assumptions existing up to that day concerning the capacity of media to form the attitudes of recipients. On the basis of empiric research it was proved that mass media put forward the agenda in a political campaign in a way that they intentionally influence the attitudes of voters to the issues raised by them. Media have the capacity to determine the preferential framework of topics, i.e. to decide which issues, in what form and in what responses and evaluations are more important and which are less important [McCombs, Shaw 1972]. Journalists have knowledge of media grammar and they know how to influence criteria according to which the recipients judge representatives of political parties. They have knowledge of the procedures of topic processing – coding of messages by means of choice and interpretation of an event in such a way so that it would have a desired response from the audience. They draw recipients’ attention to a certain phenomenon or event by providing sufficient space to it and in such a way they confirm its social relevance and veracity. The prerequisite for projecting of individual types of media effects is also the capacity of journalists to create coded messages within certain social and cultural context.

The role of media in political decision-making of voters is assessed by the laic public and professional public quite unilaterally and clearly. This fact is highlighted by T. Meyer and L. Hichman according to whom the assessment of media in a political course of events has a fatalistic character because they are considered to have a great power. Media are considered as hegemonic subjects that establish a new social order – media democracy under the guardianship of mediocracy [Meyer, Hichman 2002] The important factor of interference of media in public policy sphere is in particular the phenomenon of commercialization of a media sphere and related interconnections with dominant economic and political forces and their interests not only in a given state, but also in a global context [Jírák, Köpplová 2009: 352]. From this aspect, it is obvious that media can be considered as subjects whose significant characteristics is their own economic interest and in this way they create the forefield of relationship with political subjects [McNair 2007: 6]. This aspect equally demonstrates the pragmatism of interconnections between media and political subjects.

According to J. Habermas the public sphere found itself under the guardianship of the state and purely economic interests. In such conditions a new and corporate model of power relations was created in which the influence of the public sphere starts to be permanently limited. Media have been given a new role – they serve for manipulation of a public opinion. Politics starts to be perceived by passive consumers as a special kind of spectacle offering a construct of conventional and conformal ideas [Habermas 1989].

Such a situation creates an ideal environment for promoting efforts of politicians to create a favourable image about their thinking, attitudes and acts among the general public. According to B. McNair ambitions presented by media, however, lead inevitably to restraining rationality of political programs and to reinforcing the attitude oriented on wishes and on creating the ideal image about political actors among the public by means of media. [McNair 2004: 132]. It is obvious that media are important means for achieving long-term, short-term and operative strategic plans serving for disseminating agendas of political subjects. B. McNair underlines, on the basis of examining political course of events, the importance of the relationship between media and political course of events in which actors are political organizations – political parties, politicians, pressure groups, lobby groups and government. In his opinion, it is them who have existential interest in influencing attitudes and moods of population by means of media [McNair 2007: 6].

In promoting their agendas the political subjects also use their factual or potential power vis-à-vis media subjects regardless whether it is formal lobbying, informal lobbying, power pressure or the use of legislative instruments. In this context, G. Burton and J. Jiráň underlined motivation of politicians and proven and routine behaviour of media in providing information about the political course of events. In their opinion, politicians need to appear in media in...
order to enter in the awareness of the general public; they need to present their opinions and thus to secure their prestige and credibility. Media take this ambition of politicians as a challenge – they compile the list of politicians who are suitable adepts to be appealed by media because they have communication competences. They are able to speak in public in front of microphones, cameras, dictation machines, etc.; they can react promptly; they are always available. The logical consequence of this is the personalization of such politics which is in favour of well-known faces, so-called respondents able to draw attention or to communicate in an original way. On the contrary, there are also the situations of favouring those politicians who, thanks to their incapacity to express themselves, to formulate their ideas and to behave professionally, amuse spectators and at the same time they make themselves ridiculous. Media tend to appeal and use well-known politicians but they have also “the tendency to give space to one party or to one way of thinking (politicians can use this and take revenge on them)” [Burton, Jirák 2001: 134-136].

**Media filters and creating of political programs**

Despite the wide range of attempts for a critical review of so-called concept of hegemony of E. S. Herman and N. Chomsky (McCombs, Cook, Patterson, Turow, Demers, Shaw, Carey, Louw, Edelstein etc.) it seems that their initial theses reflect, to a great extent and in many illustrating examples, the practices of media power and political power in current liberal democracies. In the well-known study *Manufacturing Consent* (1988) they concentrate mainly on the communication practices in the USA which are determined by five principal filters – ownership of media, advertising, a choice of sources, a negative feedback and a way of promoting the dominant ideology.

They believe that the filter of ownership is the result of the fact that the mainstream media are excessively controlled by solvent individuals or corporations. This is the reason why the media owned by them raise the agenda serving for their interest or interests of the social elite. The factor of advertising is determined by the existential dependence on the paying subjects. Commercial media have strategically significant objective – to sell advertising time/surface to potential advertisers or advertising clients. To achieve this objective, they have to convince advertisers about high viewership, listenership or readership. Their only ambition is to appeal as big set of potential recipients of media contents as possible. From the economic point of view, the filter of advertising confirms the significance of important advertisers who have power to influence a media agenda to the great extent. The power of the filter of advertisers lies in the fact that they have a competence and the right to choose a medium from which they will buy advertising time or pages. Ultimately, they determine which medium will survive the competition and which one not, depending on expressed loyalty to their interests. The filter of a negative feedback is very closely interconnected with the filter of advertising. For existential reasons, editorial offices are forced to take into account advertisers’ interests. In order to survive, they have to select between recipients – those who constitute for example reader, viewer or listener bases and those who are their business partners having power to make pressure on the management of editorial offices to provide information about them in their interests, i.e. in an expected or desired way.

The filter of the choice of sources is determined by the dependence of media on information sources. Editorial offices of media depend mainly on those sources that provide them with information on regular basis, are trustworthy and their obtaining is comfortable, non-demanding and cheap. Journalists obtain information at briefings of representatives of execution power, political parties, etc., together with supporting materials (leaflets, information bulletins, communiqué, photos, opinions of various politicians, etc.), which contributes decisively to an overall impression given by published news (positive, negative or neutral connotations). In this way, press departments of various institutions (including political ones) influence production of news and eliminate alternative information sources because they are demanding for searching and addressing and they are costly, as well. Thus, media and dominant institutions providing information enter in the relationship of mutual dependence but equally also in the symbiosis or pragmatic dependence and cooperation. The filter of the choice of sources is closely related to the filter of dominant ideology. It is determined by political system and its ideological postulates which result and are anchored in basic cultural elements (cultural universals, remarked the author). Dominant ideology is present in construction of various interpretations of social and cultural reality – it has an influence on vision, description, analysis, perception and evaluation of various social, economic and political processes.

It results from the above-mentioned that the choice and selection of the core media agenda does not clearly lies in free decision-making of editorial office teams and their management but there are several significant factors (media filters) which influence the choice of appropriate topics to be published. Moreover, it cannot be denied that the selection of topics is influenced, for example, by philosophy and the opinion of media (e.g. left-wing/conservative/ liberal newspapers, etc.), social values, cultural influences and so on. This fact is confirmed by a wide range of studies and research works published up to now. (see Burton, Jirák, Ramonet, Višňovský, etc.) Equally, it is evident that the choice of topics in media is to the great extent influenced by marketing strategy of promotion of political subject agendas supported and confirmed by
their factual power and advantages resulted from such power. In construction of political agenda of crucial political parties the above-mentioned filters are taken into consideration and are also subject to calculation in various ways. For creation of a political agenda it is also necessary to create such a political program which would be closely related to interests of target groups of both potential and established voters. The program reflects problems which voters have to face in their everyday lives and it offers such solutions that would persuade them to participate in elections and to cast their votes in favour of a relevant party. Creation of a program should motivate a voter therefore it offers a solution for biting questions, such as crisis, unemployment, inflation, real poverty, high criminality or terrorism.

**Political agenda and creating of events by journalists**

The current practice of political parties proves that political actors use various marketing strategies and marketing instruments, such as lobbying, economic connections, legislation, etc., in order to create and promote desired publicity by means of media. In this context, J. Jirák and B. Köpplová say that media enter in the political course of events and form it in a readable manner. They influence the public opinion and the attitudes of the public to political topics by means of the agenda constructed for media and voters – recipients. For this reason, there is no surprise that political subjects try to influence behaviour of media in their favour, especially the choice and the way of presentation of the agenda which is favourable to them. They also benefit from the mental self-confidence of media professionals who are mostly very well-aware of their influence – they consider themselves the influential force in forming political opinions because they have the possibility to interfere to the political course of events. “The aim of this can be to promote the political decision with which the editor, the advertiser or related interested groups sympathize (so-called media lobbying), or to make pressure so that the political development takes the direction wanted by people in media (so-called media activism)” [Jirák, Köpplová 2009: 349]. Political subjects know how to profit from typical characteristics of the behaviour of media creators by the application of various communication practices and tricks. They acquired and improved tactics how to get their agenda into news, how to form and precise their media agenda including its presentation at press conferences, briefings, interviews and transmitted discussion programs [Blumler, Kavanagh 1999].

The art of promotion of political party agendas among the general public is, except for marketing strategies and reinforcing of connections between political subjects and media, also creation of professionally produced stories in various genres and interpretations forms. The purpose of the stories have the common denominator – to draw attention of media and recipients, to scandalize rivals and to present own qualities, such as attitudes of principle, unshakeable morality, values, respect of law, etc. Masterfulness of representatives of political parties is to construe, offer and promote a story charged with emotions or a scandal which will draw attention of media. At the briefings they interpret such stories on the basis of a given plot, depending on the situation – angrily, pathetically, pitiably, amusingly, etc. According to J. Ftorek, a professional political marketer is a person who will learn to use and work with the journalists’ desire for a complex and attractive story and “will adopt an important instrument for efficient mediation of information of interest, regardless his own cultural, political or economic status” [Ftorek 2010: 74-75].

One example of the above-mentioned practices were the actions of political parties trying to address media and citizens before last parliamentary elections (March 2012) in Slovakia when there were various scandals published in media. The most scandalous was the scandal known as “Gorilla” in the framework of which the information about connections between the representatives of relevant parliamentary parties and the powerful financial group Penta came to light. Discussions about state clientelism, interconnection between interests of political parties and financial groups and about corruption of political parties started. The interesting fact was that the information was in major focus of media after the dispute between government parties and the parliament de facto passed a vote of no-confidence in the government, which led to the fall of the government coalition. Another interesting fact was the transfer of information. The information was published by the journalist who is the former husband of a state secretary at the Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Family who is the member of a political party (SAS) which caused the crisis and the fall of the government. Even more interesting was the fact that the information allegedly leaked from Slovak Information Service (SIS). SIS monitored the meetings of politicians with the Penta representatives in the conspirative flat. After the “Gorilla” scandal there were some other scandals as the revenge on the political party which was, according to published opinions of several analysts, the author of the “Gorilla” scandal. The scandal concerning one of the top representatives of that party (of the former minister of defence) appeared, showing the abuse of public official powers, such as interception of journalists and politicians by the counter-intelligence service, so-called the “Sasanka” scandal, etc.

It came to light that journalists got fascinating and scandalous stories quite simply thanks to the information strategies of political subjects – from so-called confidential sources through briefings of political actors to recycling of published information by the media chain system. Journalists made effort to
submit information in the most attractive way possible and to offer it (to announce it as “loudly” and “impressively” as possible in various ways) to their target and potential groups of readers, listeners or spectators. They were obtaining fascinating stories one by one and they made effort to draw attention – by a plot, dramatization, a conflict, dynamic composition, scandalizing of people, situations, a context or by mysterious circumstances, conspirators or corruption background, etc. They wanted to attract attention by stories, which corresponded typologically to social reality, by narration about concrete problems. Such trends and principles of creation of current journalism are the significant factors of building relations between political and media environments which strategists and marketers of real politics are aware of and which they use creatively.

J. Ftorek considers a journalist as a legitimate protector of public interests. In the guise of providing information to the general public, he gasps for “scalps” of often plotted negative figures (e.g. of an unpopular politician, marked the author), which saturates the desire of the public for justice or revenge. Scandalizing well-known personalities is the guarantee of higher sales of a periodical or broadcaster’s transmission time. On the other hand, “scandalizing” and the conflict represent for many recipients of media content the alternative possibility to ease their own tensions and experience of remedy for injustice suffered which may not necessarily be related to the scandal in question. This is the social valve, a scandal or a conflict not representing just a suitable detonator, but also a new and interesting element in everyday routine” [Ftorek 2010: 73]. Recipients build their own defence mechanisms of their own psychics against frustrating situations, they ventilate accumulated emotional energy; they temporarily escape from everyday problems; they damp the sensations of boredom caused by the everyday routine [Rubin 1994: 8]. From this point of view, the relationship between media and political subjects, which is determined by pragmatism, is extended and concluded by another element – recipients’ needs.

**Conclusion**

Nowadays, we can speak about creating a new corporation model of power which starts to lead to the permanent limitation of public sphere influence. Media play a new role – they serve for influencing the public opinion; recipients start to perceive politics as a particular kind of a spectacle full of scandals and emotional stories and at the same time a theatre offering a construct of conventional and conformal ideas.

On the basis of the above-mentioned facts we can agree with N. Chomsky who says that the main role of professionals, so-called strategists in the field of propaganda, is to evoke agreement of the public with a war, defence of unemployment, official policy, state doctrine, etc. Propaganda services are used by government and interested political and economic groups in totalitarian communist regimes as well as in pluralistic democracies. According to Chomsky the existence of propaganda is legitimized by the fact that rationality is a very limited capacity and just a very small group of people has it. Those who have the capacity to assess phenomena and facts create illusions and emotionally powerful but simplified fictions in order to show orientation to “disoriented chumps”, so that the elite dictates the way of thinking to the “herd” and implants opinions and beliefs according to its own schemes. [Chomsky 2001: 68-69]. Such an attitude of the elite to the “herd” is not surprising given the absence of critical thinking in European and American civilizations. Also for this reason D. Petranová reminds the need of critical thinking of recipients because it has “irreplaceable and essential importance” as regards the further development of the society” [Matuš, Ďurková 2010, eds. In: Petranová, 2010: 160] In this context, also J. Višňovský underlines the need to review the relations between the society and media, emphasizing the importance of decoding of “social communication as interaction by means of coded verbal and non-verbal symbols” [Višňovský 2009: 72].

It comes to light that successful political subjects have the elite and conveniences to influence the behaviour of media on the basis of their needs. The evidence of this is the professional approach to communication strategy creation including creation of fascinating stories and their successful transfer using the existence of media filters. In the process of the communication of a political agenda the mental capacities of voters – recipients of media contents and messages – are taken into account. The relaxation need of recipients who desire tension elimination, emotional experience and redress for various injuries, traumas, etc. with which they are confronted in everyday social and cultural reality is taken into account. Recipients want to release their “social valve” and political scandals and conflicts offered by media mean a suitable stimulus for activating their defence mechanisms of mental hygiene. Scandalizing agenda of political parties is convenient for media because it is the guarantee of higher sales of a periodical or broadcasters’ transmission time. Thus, specific needs and interests of all interested parties close the imaginary circle of the coordinates of mutual relations between political subjects, media and recipients.
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A woman is like a tea bag, you can not tell how strong she is until you put her in hot water

(Nancy Reagan)

Abstract:

The purpose of the article was to show the problem of female electoral activity in Poland. This subject fits into a current debate on the participation of women in political systems and its limitations. There are many obstacles that prevent women from political participation and their influence is still rather symbolic then real. The source of this situation is also historical and social. Moreover, young democracies are at greater risk of “marketing pathology” because their institutional mechanisms are not built on the foundations of civil society. The perception of politics differs among men and women, but this is mainly due to exogenous factors. Political marketing as a set of tools in the same range can affect men and women, although the differences appear at the level of self-creation of image, choice of strategy and the style of ruling after winning an election.

Key words:

women electoral activity, political marketing, Polish political system, stereotypes, psychological conditions of electoral activity, political participation

Electoral activity of women is a subject that fits into a current debate on the participation of women in political systems and its limitations. Much attention has been paid to create mechanisms which are to help women enter the political arena, while some are also trying to find solutions in the system which would allow the power of women to be not only symbolic but also real. Political activity...
is still a key behavioural component in the political sphere, but equally important is the political involvement – a notion which is slightly neglected. These categories are mutually interdependent, because the aspect of function (behavioural) should be supported by an intellectual aspect (cognitive-emotional). According to the theories of political psychology, activity shall be considered as a narrower concept, while the involvement as broader concept which includes, among others, interest in politics, the daily tracking of the news, frequent discussions about politics, and recognition that politics is very important in life, also membership or activity in a political party [Skarżyńska 2005].

In this article, both of the above areas have been referred to in order to analyse the psychological and marketing conditions of electoral activity of women. In the existing literature the outlined problems are present in the works of Krystyna Skarżyńska, Janusz Reykowski, Andrzej Falkowski, Wojciech Cwalina, and also in touched upon by Andrzej Antoszewski. As the last author mentions – “what we call the political consequences of the electoral system can either mean mechanical effects, being a direct result of the application of specific institutional arrangements or psychological effects, determining the behaviour those participating in” [Antoszewski 2013: 327].

Following the above observation, it has been decided to examine the nature of incentives that influence the behaviour of specific groups such as women. Political marketing and psychology of politics use and refer to the same mechanisms of an individual’s behaviour, which in terms of the market are referred to as consumer behaviour. Despite the convergence of politics with the area of economic activity, there is a peculiar characteristic of the former, which makes an individual both a reasonable client and an irrational voter. Two main hypotheses have been adopted to be verified by partial questions. The first of these involves the belief that there are no differences in the mechanisms of political marketing interaction on voters as per their gender. It is not the tools used that differentiate electoral activity but stereotypes concerning the role of men and women in politics, because they act as a filter and ultimately determine the choice of a male or female candidate in the struggle for power.

The second hypothesis refers to the question of whether the brain structure, in terms of a man and a woman, is so crucial that it may have an impact on the perception of politics, and consequently, on the political involvement or its lack thereof. In the literature of bio-politics this notion is relatively common, however, no consensus has been reached by the researchers. The latest research in neurobiology helps come to the conclusion that the differences that exist do not affect the thinking concerning politics and forming of the opinions.

The level of the brain structure is the lowest level of analysis and, therefore, this consideration should be started from it. The scientifically-proven differences in the brain structure of men and women relate primarily to the density, circuit diagram, and the size of the neurons. There are also differences in the lateralisation of speech and spatial skills, but they are not as crucial as the individual variables (independent of sex). The subtle differences in brain structure between men and women, analysed with more advanced methods, have not given answers as yet to how those anatomical differences are reflected in concrete actions, yet they have allowed us to verify the stereotypical role of women in political life [Kasińska-Metryka 2012].

It is worth mentioning that in the past it was claimed that men were standing on a higher level of evolution and they only were predisposed for activities of a political nature. The differences in the brain structure were also exaggerated (in particular due to its size) and for these reasons the woman was marginalised on the outskirts of society. Subsequent studies have shown that the male brain was usually larger and heavier than the female brain, but the relative weight (weight of the brain relative to body weight) is almost the same. It was also found that the male brain might have fewer nerve cells in some places on its surface, but we can also encounter results of studies which show the direct opposite. Furthermore, it was found that the brains of men, in spite of being larger, are prone to a faster shrinking process. From the period of maturity to the age of forty men lose their nerve tissue at a rate almost three times higher than women. Concluding the level of brain biology, it is clear that brains have “sex,” but they are more alike than different.

Lack of female political activity and involvement does not therefore derive from brain biology but from other sources, among which are:

- historical and systemic conditions (including late-attained rights to vote, the low level of political culture)
- political socialisation processes aimed mainly at boys
- intra-group mechanisms (eg. lack of solidarity among women versus solidarity among men – politicians)
- unequal division of labour (housework) among men and women
- stereotypical perception of the role of women in politics [Fiske 1998: 357-411].

The fact of the historical conditions of both physical activity and political involvement is obvious and it would bear repeating the truism that the late-attained right to vote slowed down women’s way not only to the polls, but also to the summit of power. Non-democratic systems inhibited possibilities of participation for both women and men however, it should be stressed that the fight for freedom often pushed women to the second row. Systemic changes in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe that have taken place since the late 1

80’s proved the existence of regularity – where real power was appearing the number of women as representatives was decreasing. The analysis of data on women in parliaments before and after the transformation shows that in Poland, the Soviet Union, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Romania, the phenomenon looked similar [Matland, Montgomery 2004] i.e., the number of women in parliaments drastically decreased. It should be also noted that the building of the “myth of freedom” was based on the commemoration of men and their achievements, and women’s role was marginalised, and with time ignored.

The traditional model of the family, the lack of well-developed standards of participatory democracy, unequal share of household chores between men and women, as well as the lack of mechanisms of mutual support among women contributed significantly to the consolidation of the opinion that “politics is the domain of men”. Here, it should be noted that in the case of Poland the above opinion has significantly changed over the past twenty years. The number of women who share this belief has decreased by 50% (the number of men who share this view has also decreases, but much slower). Ziemowit Jacek Pietraś presented an interesting diagnosis of the reasons for the lower participation of women in politics. He combined the conditions, which according to him derive from the brain structure and imposed social role. „Men – Pietraś said – think more logically and analytically while women are more emotional and holistic – they synthesise all of the problems based not on logic but on intuition.” [Pietraś 1998: 307]. He also notices that in the social relations men are “ladder builders” (they define their place in the hierarchy) and women are “great weavers” (seeking a good atmosphere and interpersonal relations in the group). In the political world therefore, men notice the struggle for power, status and influence, and the women a zone of cooperation and coordination [Pietraś 1998: 308].

The afore-mentioned explanation may be taken into account during the analysis of the lack political activity, however it does not fully explain the character of mechanisms responsible for decision taking while voting. Indeed, if women represent a conciliatory style of action in public life, why do they cast their votes for offensive candidates, who lead political struggles? What conclusively influences the elective decision election - political declarations or the way in which the candidate gets the message to the electorate, including women? In fact, it is a question of form and content influence. Women striving to build a good atmosphere, and happy (using a wider choice of words) to express their emotional states, appreciate in male politicians their interpersonal skills. Communication skills are a component of the image, and therefore the external image of a political entity - the candidate or a party. Is the political image perceived and evaluated differently by women and men, and if so, what are its elements and what is their extent? To what extent does electoral communication (advertising, direct marketing, political public relations) influence the voters’ decisions? Is gender a factor differentiating the impact? The above questions narrow the focus of analysis to the effects of marketing and thus integrate themselves into the broader debate on the role of political marketing in the development of modern democracy.

Supporters of marketing practices emphasise the communicative aspect of the methods and practices applied, whilst opponents often reduce marketing to modern propaganda. Without going into the unveiling of the above problem, it should be stated that marketing treated as a philosophy of action, and also as a set of tools, can be used to achieve both positive and negative objectives. Young democracies are at greater risk of “marketing pathology,” as they have not solidified institutional mechanisms and have not built the foundations of civil society. The growing political awareness, acquired experience, conducting of political discourse – they make the public resistant to influence of power centres based on a “populist marketing.” Is Poland at this stage of systemic experience? Are women more or less susceptible to the effects of marketing?

All the above questions require sound answers based on psychological research. Analysis of the forms of women’s activity who have managed to come to power proves that they engage in so-called soft areas of politics, such as social welfare, health, education, etc. Therefore, it strengthens the stereotype that issues such as national security or the defense are somehow “associated” with men. Wojciech Cwalina and Andrzej Falkowski [2005: 216] also pay attention to the fact, according to the existing opinion, women who get into parliament begin to sympathise with feminist views and thus become the representatives of their gender, not all voters. The latter opinion may, however, raise the question whether the same mechanism operates in Poland? Analysis of the political scene provides evidence that there exists a problem in female politicians’ lack of solidarity rather than “fake feminism”. Women who enter the decision-making bodies often adopt a masculine style of ruling, and prefer to be surrounded by men as their subordinates.

It is interesting that, as per opinion polls in Poland, almost half of the respondents (47 percent) believes that more women than are currently should serve important functions in the political life of the country, and less than a third of respondents (30 percent.) claims that the number of men and women in politics is just the way it should be [www.cbos.pl]. Although a relatively large number of respondents (17 percent) declare that gender politics does not matter, it is difficult to challenge the existence of gender stereotypes in the preferences during election.

Moreover, the theory of sexual patterns shows that preferences for selecting a particular gender of a candidate are rather a predisposition, not a
momentary inclination. We attribute stereotyped characteristics to candidates of a specific gender which - according to voters, prove their political competence. In light of the research conducted in 30 countries by Williams and Best’s, the content of the masculine stereotype consists of features such as: aggression, activity, authoritarianism, arrogance, self-control, courage, etc. However, the stereotype of femininity is based on assigning women’s lack of ambition, warmth, sensitivity, gentleness, shyness, modesty, etc. Even from these few exemplary features that supposedly to describe women and men, we can observe that in politics, treated as a game of power, men seem to be for voters more predestined to take part in it, and in terms of image - more attractive.

At the level of self-creation of that image, and then its management it is evident that male candidates try to expose their courage, ambition, determination, so they reinforce stereotypical characteristics. Women, on the other hand, tend to run away from the values assigned to them - that is, they play male roles.

A woman presenting herself as gentle, kind, sensitive and warm would be likely to gain favour, but that would not have any correspondence to the number of voters. The so-called conditional value (i.e. one would vote for him / her, provided that he/she has a chance of winning) makes voters look for a candidate who, though not optimal, ensures that their voice is not "lost". With only one vote assigned, a voter does not want to take the risk and give it to an individual who, though not optimal, ensures that their voice is not "lost". With only one vote assigned, a voter does not want to take the risk and give it to an individual or a group which is at the bottom of popularity rankings.

In this way, you can explain such failure of the “Women’s Party” which appeared in Poland in 2007. Its formation was preceded by a movement “Poland is a woman” and the manifesto published in the press. Founders of the Party declared its character to be beyond ideological and indicated a willingness to act on behalf of women. The same communication strategy was applied in commercial messages, out of which the most remembered was the billboard, where the founders of the party presented themselves without clothes, indicating thereby that they have “nothing to hide”. In the parliamentary elections in 2007, the Women’s Party recorded a list of candidates in only seven districts and did not exceed the threshold. Subsequent elections failed to improve the listings of the party that drifted towards the left-wing circles. In the presidential elections of 2010, the Women’s Party supported Grzegorz Napieralski - in the second round it did not support any of the candidates. Prior to the parliamentary elections in 2011, the Women’s Party again reached an agreement to start on behalf of SLD party (translator’s note: Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej, Democratic Left Alliance), but none of the candidates received a mandate. The above state of affairs is proof of the under-representation of women in politics due to cultural barriers and the final belief that it is more cost-effective casting votes for male candidates and placing them on the top of the lists [Sekula 2010: 86-87]. The observed preferences and voting behaviour encompass a wide range of attitudes towards women in politics. As observed by Richard J. Crisp and Rhiannon N. Turner there exists a phenomenon of both hostile sexism and so called benevolent sexist attitudes that characterise the idealisation of women in their traditional roles in life. “While these are positive stereotypes, they limit the entry of women to specific roles, providing justification for the social male domination” [Crisp, Turner 2009: 182].

To summarise the above-mentioned considerations, based mainly on analysis of the Polish political scene in the past 25 years, we can draw the following conclusions:

1) Complex cultural, economic and structural determinants (level of professional activity of women and men) contribute to the stereotypical image of women as less predestined to perform political roles than men, especially in terms of leadership and management of so called strategic areas.

2) Women, who decide to compete in elections create their image based on the visibility of similar features as male candidates (determination, inspiration, courage, etc.), or with an emphasis on the attributes ascribed to women (kindness, gentleness, communication skills, etc.). In the latter case, even if they get into power structures, they usually do not have any real influence on decision-making, or they deal with areas „compatible” with the nature of women, especially in education, welfare, health care. Women who are active in the areas “reserved” for men are disavowed based not on actual achievements or lack thereof, but through the prism of gender criteria. (see Joanna Mucha as a Minister of Sport).

3) Political marketing tools are used in the same way for electoral competition for both women and men. Differences arise at the stage of building electoral strategy and in this respect we can say that women less often decide to launch a negative campaign or engage in more brutal activities than men.

4) Public-opinion polls in Poland confirm that politics is much more an area of concern for men than women. Women show little interest in politics which results in less political activity, expressed by the declared willingness to participate in the elections. Women are not different from men in the preferred type of election, i.e. presidential elections are the most popular regardless of gender. The difference, however, appears in the so-called certainty of voting – there are a majority of women in the undecided electorate (although the difference is of variable size depending on the type of election) [Kobiety i mężczyźni o różnych sprawach].

The perception of politics differs among men and women, but this is mainly due to exogenous factors. Political marketing as a set of tools in the same
range can affect men and women, although the differences appear at the level of self-creation of image, choice of strategy and the style of ruling after winning an election. These arguments relating to the psychological and marketing motives of political activity and involvement, only show certain trends, as the effectiveness of measures taken in politics by both men and women can be verified in relation to a particular place and time.

References:


www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2010/K_130_10.PDF.
Witold Zygmunt Kulerski's publication of the Polish People's Party Congress in 1946

Witold Zygmunt Kulerski live from 1911-1997. His parents are mother Leontyna Kulerski (nee Trawińska) and Wiktor Kulerski. Witold's father, was the founder and publisher of Polish (a Catholic face) “Gazeta Grudziącka” peoples magazine, claming for the emancipation of the peasantry and the petty bourgeoisie, which plays a major role in the struggle for the preservation of Polish culture and Catholicism.

Witold Zygmunat Kulerski was one of the closest associates of the Prime Minister of Polish government in exile Stanisław Mikołajczyk. He met Mikołajczyk’s before the war, when he worked in the Peoples Party and he and his wife managed Wiktor Kulerski’s Publishing House and edited “Gazeta Grudziącka”. During World War II he was one of the closest collaborators of Stanisław Mikołajczyk— Office of the Vice-President of the National Council of the Republic of Poland, Deputy Prime Minister and Prime Minister of the Polish government in exile. Even after the war was one of the closest associates of Stanisław Mikołajczyk, and after his escape in 1947, he was arrested and convicted in 1951, sentenced to 12 years imprisonment. This was the highest penalty of Polish Peoples Party litigants.

After World War II he returned to London at the turn of 1945/1946. On 9 January 1946 Witold Kulerski reported about his visit in England [No. 179: 501]. He had to be expected for the composition of the Supreme Council of the PSL, when he returned to Polish before the Party Congress, which took place in Warsaw on January 19-21, 1946. During the meeting the highest committee, Witold Kulerski, he had experience in the General Council of the Peoples Party and the composition of the National Council in exile dealt with important issues, because related to foreign policy. He spoke at the Congress as chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee. His Commission (Kulerski said that it was a sub-committee) [Congress: 167] presented its findings in three parts. The first part contained general principles of foreign policy. In the second part put forward a number detailed demands, and the third- internal for the party, has entered into certain suggestions or requests to the authorities primates PSL.

In the first part of the committee chaired Kulerski put the issue of the United Nations, which is in London for the second time deliberated on further foundations, enabling “(...) full, democratic cooperation of all peace-loving nations to peace and security of the nation was possible in the nearest future” [Kongres: 167]. Kulerski’s commission called on the United Nations held in London with greeting and saying that the PSL is always to work together to ensure peace and security in the world, attaches “(...) deeply committed to the ongoing deliberations” [Kongres: 167]. On the basis of this part Kulerski’s speech, Congress PSL passed a resolution. Congress said it that one of the main aspirations of the Polish people in consolidating peace. Congress expressed confidence that the peace-loving nations will lead to the creation and consolidation of the organization [Kongres: 171-172; “Gazeta Ludowa” 1946, No. 25].

Another issue mentioned by the Kulerski’s Commission was to expand and deepen cooperation between the Polish nation and the nation of the Soviet Union. Also in this case the PSL Congress passed a resolution, which opt for the Polish-Soviet alliance.

The rest of the speech Kulski insists that Congress “(...) at the same time draws attention to the issue of the closest, most sincere and immediate economic, social and political cooperation with other countries, above all France, Great Britain and the United States (...), has had shared experiences in the past and for which we must strive to deepen and broaden our cooperation” [Kongres: 168]. Also these issues are reflected in the resolutions of the Congress [Kongres: 172; “Gazeta Ludowa” 1946, No. 25].

In the next part, the Commission, referring to the tradition of the PSL, asked the with warm words of the Slav nations, in order to “(...) lead to the strongest possible unification of the Slavic elements in order to create real, lasting and strong dam in the east (...)” [Kongres: 168] In this case, on the basis of the Kulerski’s paper, Congress passed another resolution. [Kongres: 172; “Gazeta Ludowa” 1946, No 25].

With reference to previous congresses and meeting of the peoples movement, foreign committee drew with the words, “(...) to express the deep, sincere and heartfelt hope that despite various difficulties, obstacles, faults, misunderstandings that have hurt us, and - on the other hand - despite all the things that we supposed to share, the Czech Republic, Slovak and Polish nations – we hope will find a common ground on which they will be able to communicate and find a way to resolve all conflicts in the atmosphere of friendship, and will become one of the links in this all-Slavic agreement, which has always been, is and will be continue to our endeavor, (...) One of the best opportunities for securing peace in our part of Europe, , and which can contribute in a very prominent to secure peace in the whole of Europe, and eventually the whole world” [Kongres: 168]. This part of Kulerski’s speech was also accepted by the Congress in a resolution [Kongres: 172-173, “Gazeta Ludowa” 1946].

Kulerski’s commission devoted much attention to the affairs of Germany. This issue has been leading in international affairs, it is no wonder that Congress PSL lot of space devoted to it. Speaker stressed that the People’s Movement during its period of organizational and ideological took the view that the main “(...) the objective must be to secure Polish and Slavic world securing the aggressive
Witold Zygmunt Kulerski activities – secretary Stanisław Mikołajczyk’s – after World War II

Kulerski’s commission expressed concern due to the lack of activity of the Polish government to sign agreements and treaties of trade and economic with other countries than the Soviet Union. The committee members in their speeches stressed that in many areas of trade and international agreements are being overtaken by other countries and are overlooked in transactions due to insufficient activity of the Polish Government [Kongres: 171]. Congress on this case also adopted a resolution proposed by Kulerski. [Kongres: 174; „Gazeta Ludowa” 1946, No. 25]

The final issue raised by Mikolajczyk was a demand to the authorities of the party, which would deal with matters connected to foreign policy. Its objective should be to elaborate reports on issues lying in the interest of the Party. Kulierski proposed another resolution on this question [Kongres: 174].

During the Congress, Witold Zygmunt Kulerski was elected a member of the Supreme Council of the PSL. [... „Gazeta Ludowa” 1946, No. 25], which was convened for the first time on 21 January 1946.7 At its first meeting, Witold Zygmunt Kulierski was elected the secretary of the Executive Committee of the Council [Turkowski: 25].

In addition to the activities of the party Kulierski was a member of the Board Peoples Cooperative Publishing7 [Stepięń: 297], set up on 8 May 1946 [Bartożewski: 74], where he was in charge of the technical division and, in the last few months before his detention (after Stanisław Mikołajczyk had fled Poland), performed duties of the President of the Board. In July 1947, Kulierski talked to the secretary of „Gazeta Ludowa” and complained of a lack of founds. “He said that employees of the cooperative arrange it still strikes due to non-payment of the sums due for work. Kulierski also said that due to lack of funds will be reduced volume “Gazeta Ludowa” to 4 pages. He worried that can not write a lot of articles about the Warsaw and Uprising, whose anniversary is coming” [No 91. 1947: 285]. Since Kulierski led Peoples Cooperative Publishing effort “Gazeta Ludowa” dropped to 40,000 copies, which Kulierski explained as the result of “(...) intentionally distribution disorganization, by the Krzeczowski and Banach before their departure from the PSL” [No 93. 1947: 295].

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spirit of the German” [Kongres: 169]. Kulierski believed that Germany is the eternal enemy of Polish, with the Pole can not find a common language and will never be able to trust. Similarly, however, a negative attitude towards Germany is not enough and you need to determine what the Germans have done. The Commission found that the economic, political and military Germans must disarm. This statement Congress passed with applauded [Kongres: 169]. The Commission also concluded that the then existing solution to the question of the eastern German borders on the Nysa Łużycka and Odra Rivers to Swinoujście and Szczecin was unsatisfactory. It is necessary that the actual disarmament of Germany, “(...) the deprivation of any base, also in the west, towards which we strive to ensure that in the future the central German authorities confined themselves to the west on the Rhine” [Kongres: 169]. The Commission stressed that during the last war Germany have raised their standard of living at the expense of their neighbors through economic exploitation and economic penetration of these countries. Therefore advocates the fact that „(...) Germany should be destroyed and driven to ultimate economic ruin” [Kongres: 169]. Kulierski’s Commission aim was to create a economic balance in Europe abolish inequalities that existed before the war [Kongres: 169-170]. Kulierski stressed that it is necessary to re-educate the German people. He also spoke on the Serbs and Sorbs, our Slavic brothers, “(...) who for centuries resisted effectively when it comes to the national spirit” [Kongres: 170]. Kulierski on behalf of the committee called for the internationalization of their business. This part of his speech was reflected in extensive resolution passed by the Congress [Kongres: 173, “Gazeta Ludowa” 1946].

Both in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and in embassies and consulates, there were few representatives of the PSL. Also, the influence on the PSL on the current foreign policy of the Polish state was assessed as unsatisfactory [Kongres: 170]. Congress, after hearing the Kulierski’s report adopted a relevant resolution [Kongres: 174, “Gazeta Ludowa” 1946, No. 25].

Kulierski as a second issue in specific cases raised the question of the need to counter rumors about the economic and trade relations between the Polish and Soviet Union. The Commission appealed to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the Ministry for Information and Propaganda to provide the public with reliable and regular reports on trade contracts and economic agreements done with the USSR, adding that both ministries should conduct a campaign to demonstrate mutual advantages originating from such contracts [Kongres: 171]. In this part of the speech was recorded huge applause. Because many of the officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers of the Red Army was not sufficiently informed by the committee about the great contribution of Polish efforts in the field cooperation of Polish-Soviet, commission also recommended here, the concept of appropriate measures and efforts by the Polish 1 The given list alphabetically Kulierski was placed at position No. 57 as Victor of Grudziądz, which obviously was a mistake, because it was about Witold Sigmund, the son of Victor.

2 Slightly below on the list, at number 59, Fryderyk Leyk (spelt Lejk) from Szczyno appeared (Fryderyk Leyk left the PSL on 19 November 1946);

3 Among the founders of the cooperative were Stanisław Mikołajczyk, Stanisław Bańczyk, Stanisław Wójcik and Tadeusz Rek. R. Turkowski, ibidem, p. 61. The first Board consisted of Kazimierz Banach (president), Jan dec, Stefan Koroński, Jan Szydluk and Witold Kulierski.

4 The question of establishing a publishing cooperative was already discussed on 3 April 1946 during a meeting of the Council of the PSL.

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In September 1946 Stanislaw Mikołajczyk in the company of 14 people spent about three weeks in Copenhagen at the FAO Conference. Kulerski was a secretary and translator of the Polish delegation, and after the conference, at the end of September 1946 he moved to London in order to settle their personal affairs—elimination of housing and bringing their stuff [No 214 1948: 639].

In October 1946 Witold Kulerski returned to Poland [No 222 1950: 672]. In March 1948, Maria Hulewiczowa was interviewed and said that she was not informed about whether Kulerski before leaving any command received [No 201. 1948: 536]. However, during the hearing of October 2, 1948 Hulewiczowa testified that Kulerski was ordered by Mikołajczyk to conduct a conversation with General Stanisław Tatar alias “Tabor” to request the general to send him funds for the election campaign of the PSL in Poland. According to Mrs. Hulewiczowa, a former secretary of Stanisław Mikołajczyk, Tatar discussed the request with Kulerski and sent about 20,000 dollars via the British Embassy [No 214 1948: 639].

During the hearing on 17 May Kulerski confirmed that participated in Copenhagen the FAO Conference as a secretary and translator of the Polish delegation [No 221 1950: 667]. After the conference, Mikołajczyk recommend Kulerski, who was leaving for London (where he stayed for four weeks), to contact General Tatar and ask him to sent the dollars he had left there to Poland in order to finance the election campaign and organization of the PSL. Kulerski had to ask Tatar how much money and at what time send to Polish. Mikołajczyk wanted to keep this matter secret from the Polish government. Kulerski was supposed to go to the British Ministry for Foreign Affairs and contact the head of the Section for Poland, Mr. Robert Hankey, who would be an intermediary in the transfer of money via diplomatic post. In addition, the head of the PSL instructed his secretary to intervene in the British Foreign Office, in the event that the Tatar complained of their inability to continue to reside in England. Mikołajczyk had informed Tatar that his name was mentioned in one of the processes in Poland and that he had this in mind when considering a possible return to the Polish. In addition, the head of the PSL instructed his secretary to intervene in the British Foreign Office, in the event that the Tatar complained of their inability to continue to reside in England. Mikołajczyk had informed Tatar that his name was mentioned in one of the processes in Poland and that he had this in mind when considering a possible return to the Polish. Kulerski also had to describe the situation in Poland from the point of view of the leader of the PSL. In Copenhagen, after the departure of the Polish delegation to the country by sea Kulerski went to London, where he stayed at Mrs. Mikołajczyk’s flat. A few days after arriving in London
Witold contacted Stephanie Lieberman, widow of Herman Lieberman - leader of the Polish Socialist Party, who then worked at the Polish embassy. They arranged to meeting. During the meeting (which took place in her apartment), came Tatar general. With the envoy discussed the matter sent to the Polish money necessary for the PSL campaign. Tatar said that it will provide no more than 400-500 dollars. Kulerski asked him to give the money to Ms. Lieberman, who would see to its transfer to Poland. Tabor said that as part of the funding is in Belgium, France and Italy [No 234, 1950: 714]. Kulerski has to help him with the download of the British Isles. He asked Kulserki to obtain a guarantee from the British authorities that Tatar’s emissaries would not be searched on their way back to England. Tatar going to gather in London means that it may need to Mikolajczyk. A few days later Kulserki went to the Hankey - head of the Department for Polish affairs in the British Foreign Office and asked on behalf of Mikolajczyk for assistance in the transfer of England to Polish dollars per share for the election PSL. Hankey agreed to provide help, but requested his permission to leave in the strictest confidence, even from General Tatar. Kulserki agreed that the person mediating between Tatar and Hankey will be Mrs. Lieberman. Kulserki also settled down the question of transferring money from the continent to England using Tatar’s and Hankey’s people. Also in this matter Mrs. Lieberman was to be an intermediary. General Tatar prepared a list of the names of those people and Kulserki submitted it at the meeting with Hankey. For several days before Kulserki returning to the country, Tatar provided him with 40 $ 000 packaged with four cans. Kulserki packed it in the paper, put the address of Mikolajczyk and gave them Hankey, who sent the packet through the diplomatic channel to the British Embassy in Poland. The Messenger of Mikolajczyk all matters entrusted to him filled and returned to the country [No 234. 1950: 710, 713]. Later, during his interrogation, Kulserki explained that the money had been collected from the British Embassy by Siudak, who then handed it over to Kulserki and he finally gave it to Mikolajczyk [No 223 1950: 675; No 238 1951: 727]. Envoy of the President at that hearing indicated that he does not know whether Kulserki received a further consignment of Tatar. When asked about the source of the funds, Kulserki said that during his visit to the USA in 1944, Mikolajczyk received money from President Roosevelt to fight the PSL with Germany, and some came from the Polish American community. This sum, according to the General Tatar was $ 500,000 invested in England and on the Continent [No 221 1950: 667-669]. During the interrogation on 19 May 1950, Pawel Siudak denied Kulserki’s words, who claimed that Siudak had collected the parcel from the British Embassy and gave it to Kulserki [No 222 1950: 672].

6 When asked about these issues Tatar testified that larger sums of money were in France and Sweden.
7 Tatar himself and his people claimed that Kulserki had done nothing to help them stay in England.
Witold Zygmunt Kulerski activities – secretary Stanisław Mikołajczyk’s – after World War II

confiscations of newspaper articles in “Gazeta Ludowa” and other newsletters of the party. Representatives of the PSL can only speak from the rostrum of Parliament [No 221 1948: 630]. Stassen in turn informed Mikołajczyk that during the meeting with Stalin he had an impression that the leader of the USSR was a great politician, who had a realistic view of the situation and had no intention to start another war. The talks focused on the issue of Polish-German border. Here Mikołajczyk said that „(...) all the Poles that line support and that is very concerned shall take all the negative statements Anglo-Saxons (…)” [No 211 1948: 630]. He answered Stassen’s question about the chances for the PSL, Mikołajczyk had to answer that, although the situation will be able to communicate with the political parties of the communist bloc, and of the struggle will pass [No 211 1948: 630].

Kulerski also participated in the Mikołajczyk’s conference with the American ambassador Bliss Lane. His participation in the meeting was limited only to be present at the formal adoption, then Mikołajczyk spoke without witnesses. Other contacts with foreigners Kulerski not maintained, except for talks with UNRRA in Poland, where he wanted to apply for a position but as there were no vacancies that meeting was fruitless. He has been also the PSL’s press conference, during which he was a translator.

Zygmunt Witold Kulerski was one of the closest associates of Stanislaw Mikołajczyk - President immigration People’s Party and the post-war Polish People’s Party, Deputy Prime Minister and Prime Minister of the Polish government and the Office of the Vice-President of the National Council in exile. Zygmunt Witold Kulerski was one of the closest associates of Stanisław Mikołajczyk - President immigration People’s Party and the post-war Polish Peasant Party, Deputy Prime Minister and Prime Minister of the Polish government and the Office of the Vice-President of the National Council in exile. He was not only useful to him as his personal secretary and translator, but also during the war years (since 1942) as a member of the National Council of the Republic of Poland. After the war he returned to London and became involved in political activities PSL. He attend as a translator for their leader. Failed attempt to get their mandate in fraudulent elections in 1947. After escaping from the Polish Mikołajczyk was arrested and together with a group of close associates of Mikołajczyk tried and convicted. He was given the highest sentence of 12 years of imprisonment. This article describes his public life until was arrested although the description is based on documents produced during the inquiry.

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REVIEWS

Jarosław Wichura: New media and the public opinion (Nowe media a opinia publiczna), Wydawnictwo i-Press, Kraków, 2012, s. 131.

Reviewer: Zbigniew Widera

Making your choice by voters in today’s political market largely is determined by the shape of their image in the media, both traditional and electronic how. Understanding the mechanisms that underlie the selection effect on voter is of particular importance, especially when the media use the message not without manipulation.

In any system, since the emergence of mass communication, media and public opinion mutually determine its shape. As a result - in any social and political system there is an inseparable link between the mass media and the public (political). Communication between these planes gives us the opportunity to exchange ideas, interact, follow people in the same direction. Thanks to mass media and the public can find out what they are feeling and thoughts of others, and we can express ourselves.

In this part of the issue published in 2013 the book Jarosław Wichura “Nowe media a opinia publiczna” Carefully designed, with well prepared theoretical framework indicates ambivalence of the communication process from its great value for the customer as well as the dangers involving programming communication and lack of understanding of its contents. Author comes from the description of new technologies and communication strategies, points to the issue of public opinion as a product of new technology. This approach includes different products types in the recognition of the political market mechanisms remain in close connection with the selling methods of economic markets. Highlight the growing impact of electronic technologies that increasingly affect the absorption of information and reaching with this behavior.
The present work consists of five chapters. Chapter I describes and analyzes in detail the new communication technologies (called „new media”), their characteristics and impact on our everyday lives. New media gives us a mass scale technical conditions for access to communications. They provide massive outreach of their practices, technical infrastructure, combined with the appropriate economic conditions, political system, social communication present a framework. This facilitates the crossing of spatial boundaries, overcoming barriers of time and provides opportunities for rapid transmission and propagation of messages.

Chapter II is devoted to the issue of public opinion, which is the product of new communication technologies. This chapter takes a broader approach to the issues and definitional complexity of the phenomenon, at the same time attempt to redefine and adapt it to the requirements of modern times. Public opinion as a phenomenon of modern times, is also a central category for understanding society. There is no doubt, however, that the classical concepts of the public, dating back to the 80s and 90 Twentieth century, can’t withstand the test of time and require re-evaluation due to changes in the social and technological turn of the twentieth and twenty-first century.

Chapter III deals with the Internet - a kind of „democratic machine” which is the essence of the new media, its objectives and functions exercised in society. Subject chapter focuses on explaining not only the essence of the phenomenon, but also takes an attempt to characterize the Internet community and identity and their impact on contemporary public opinion. Internet emerges as a powerful medium of the fastest growing information and communication in recent years. Virtual world is an essential part of the social environment of man, no less important than the direct contact and environmental circles unit.

Next, the IV chapter is to analyze the common coexistence of public and new media in the so-called. „Information-driven society.” In this chapter, the problem is taken up the opportunities and threats that arise in connection with the transformation of modern societies in the information society, the society rich „information potential”. In particular, I considered the quality of the information provided and are available through a variety of means of communication and the impact of that information on the shape of the public.

In the last chapter J. Wichura cites analysis of test results, referring to the subject of the discussed issues in the magazine „political preferences”, confidence surveys, assessment of reliability of media coverage and reliability of information sources. The present publication is worthy of recommendation not only for its substantive content, an indication of one of the key determinants of voting but also because of the young age of the author and his fresh perspective on the issues described.
The second chapter discusses K. Gajdka workshop and instruments spokesman. He cites a tool to communicate directly and indirectly. Chapter closes the description of the selected job evaluation methods spokesman. Recalling the development of Bogus Feliszeka proposed verifications people involved in shaping the image of a test, possible to carry out both by the person concerned and the management of the institution that employs him. The third chapter is a detailed description of the typology proposed by the author spokespersons. It shows the characteristic patterns of behavior and thus allows the reader to a surprising conclusion that „advocate, ombudsman does not equal” and the responsible professional can perform differently, how differing from each other way.

Analyzing the contents of this publication, the reader acquires experience in assessing the attitudes of Advocates, indications as to their accuracy and can recognize which maps the reality of what the Exaggerate and the more embellished. The theater created by the advocates of events, which should be kept in mind always the leading role played by the principal or his policies. Without a doubt, an assessment should analyze the voting behavior from the perspective of the mechanisms that shape it.

ABSTRACTS

Miro Haček (University of Ljubljana, Slovenia)
(Dis)trust into the rule of law in Slovenia

After the collapse of the non-democratic regime in the early 1990s, public opinion surveys became important factor in the process of democratic decision-making. Author is analysing the results of public opinion surveys, which bring together data on the attitude of the general public towards democracy, (dis)satisfaction with the political situation and (dis)satisfaction with most important political and administrative institutions with special emphasis given to the public’s (dis)trust toward the rule of law. Based on the data obtained article allocates Slovenia’s position compared to other established European democracies as well as post-communist countries from Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) on the scale of the relationship of the dimensions of societal (dis)trust in political power.

Key words: democratisation, trust, rule of law, politics, institution, Slovenia

Waldemar Wojtasik (University of Silesia, Poland)
Functions of elections in democratic systems

Elections are a procedure typical for democratic systems, but also systems which do not respect the principles of democracy often employ them. However, due to their different functional positioning, they fulfill various functions. The presented text is an attempt to present the most important functions performed by the elections in democratic systems. The adopted model of generalization has allowed for separation of seven basic functions, present in all elections: delegation of political representation; selection of the political elite; legitimisation of those in power; control over authorities; political accountability; creation of political programmes; recreation of public opinion image.
The presented typology allows for its use both in different types of elections (parliamentary, presidential, local, regional and European Parliament) as well as in relation to different electoral systems. The general nature of the described types of functions allows the separation of specific categories within its framework, but the objective of the present study has determined that the focus remains on the description and analysis of the presented types.

Key words: elections, functions of elections

Rafał Glajcar (University of Silesia, Poland)

Model of election of the head of state of the Third Polish Republic – balancing between institutional coherence and political pragmatism

Poland held its first ever popular presidential election at the end of 1990. Since then four such elections have been held i.e. in 1995, 2000, 2005 and 2010. In the meantime the position of the president gradually evolved hence giving rise to the question about which method for the election of the head of state is most “appropriate”. However, this issue was not an object of political deliberation for the major Polish political parties of the last 20 years. Firstly, this resulted from the popularity of the presidential election within society, which was reflected in high turnouts (considering Polish reality). Secondly, especially until the enactment of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 2 April 1997, no party wanted to run the risk of being accused of returning to the political transition solutions adopted at the Round Table. Thirdly, until the beginning of 2010, the competition for the office of president was “reserved” for charismatic leaders or party leaders. It was finally Donald Tusk, who decided not to contend for the presidential election of 2010 thus wanting to change the perception of the institution of president in the system of power and draw attention and emphasize the role and the importance of a government with a strong (normatively and factually) prime minister as the leader.

Key words: model of election of the head of state, the position of the president. Third Polish Republic

Sebastian Kubas (University of Silesia, Poland)

Evolution of Hungarian Electorate Preferences toward Bidimensional “Left – Right” Structure (1990 to 2013)

The article presents Hungarian electorate’s preferences in the time of transition and democratic consolidation beginning in 1990. The preferences are confronted with results of parliamentary elections held in 1990, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2006 and 2010. Author tries to show how the left and right preference division developed on the basis of socioeconomic cleavages. The evolution of Hungarian electorate preferences has moved toward bidimensional “left – right” structure since the elections in 1998, yet first symptoms appeared in 1994 when post-socialist party MSzP won the elections. Since then only this party and rightist Fidesz were able to succeed and create Hungarian governments.

Key words: Hungarian electorate, preferences, political parties.

Karolina Ticha (University of Matej Bel, Slovakia)

Comparison of the cleavages development in the Czech Republic and Poland after 1989

The aim of the article is to identify cleavages that have been in Czech and Polish party system located since 1989. These cleavages are compared to determine the hierarchy and degree of their importance. It is also demonstrated the effort to determine the potential future development of the cleavages in these two countries.

In this article as key for the formation of cleavages are considered elections to the lower houses of parliament. Elections to the upper houses of parliament and European elections are not relevant for the purpose of this work, because they are considered as second-order elections, thus they have no direct impact on the formation of cleavages.

Key words: Czech Republic party system, Poland party system, cleavages

Danuta Plecka (Karnowska) (Nicolaus Copernicus University, Poland)

Individualism and civic participation – an essay on a certain way of thinking about citizenship

Individualism, although inherently contrary to the spirit of collectivism, is the basis for the development of modern civic attitudes. For the most part, individualism determines the degree of interest in politics and the quality of democracy. Individualism is also the basis for the development of civil society, as the unique characteristics of each individual impact the civil society dynamics, quality and impact on those in power.

Key words: individualism, civil society, democracy, participations
In recent years, there has been increasing interest in phenomenon of poor political activity among young adults, manifested in large percentage of non-voters and politically non-engaged individuals. The aim of this study was to examine the relationships between voting behaviour and political preferences of young adults and their hierarchy of basic personal values, global subjective happiness and evaluations of fair and unfair treatment in social exchange.

The results of the study indicate firstly, that the most important values were power, conformity and tradition, secondly, that the non-voters evaluated hedonism lower and security higher than the voters and thirdly, that value profiles for five groups of voters differed in preferences of conformity, tradition, security and hedonism. There were no significant differences between voters and non-voters in respect of global subjective happiness and evaluations of fair and unfair treatment. However, significant differences in these variables occured between electorates of specified political parties. The findings of the current research provide a psychological characteristic of young adults in terms of basic values, subjective happiness and perception of unfairness, allowing also to identify some of the possible indicators of poor political activity in this group.

**Key words:** personal values, young voters, non-voters

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We live in the twenty-first century, which witnessed by far the most intensive marketing of politics, and traditional approaches (The Great Man Theory, situational, relational) to the process of emergence of political leadership are simply not enough. Cooperation between leaders and their followers is determined by cultural and social context, specific political situation of the time, patterns of social behavior. Development of new information technologies and dissemination of the means of mass communication have introduced another factor to the analyzed process, forced by civilizational changes. These changes initiated the processes shaping the emergence of a fourth approach to political leadership, which we may call reactive. Reactivity is an active process of management of the changing image of the leader, responding to the evolving social preferences, and subsequently disseminated through the media.

**Key words:** political leadership, reactive leadership

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The present paper presents various social influence techniques – practices aimed at increasing the likelihood that people will comply with requests, persuasion and suggestion they are addressed with. It describes sequential techniques (foot-in-the-door, door-in-the-face, foot-in-the-face, low ball) as well as techniques based on cognitive mechanisms (that’s not all, even a penny helps, dialogue involvement) or on emotional mechanisms (induction of guilt, embarrassment, fear-then-relief). The paper also presents examples of using the above mentioned techniques with special focus on some which were taken from political life.

**Key words:** social influence, compliance, emotion, sequential techniques, political engagement

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The article is focused on analysis the manner of presentation of data considering the electoral campaign in major information services during parliamentary campaign in Poland in 2011. This concerns the kinds of the subjects presented, the choice of context, politicians’ statements and the comment. An important question is whether we deal with a uniform image of the campaign or whether this image is different for particular stations. For that reason, what was investigated were the evening emissions of news bulletins of the most popular television stations, that is TVN (“Fakty”), Polsat (“Wydarzenia”) as a private television and TVP 1 (“Wiadomości) as public television.

The article consist of five most important parts: subjects, where author analyze key issues of particular campaign; pictures where are presented images accompanying main issues; faces, which are focused on main actors of campaign; and finally role of journalists who present information.

**Key words:** electoral campaign in Poland, news bulletin
Hana Pravdová (University of St. Cyril and Methodius in Trnava, Slovakia)

*Coordinates of Interests of Media, Political Subjects and Recipients*

The study primarily deals with the influence of media on perception of political subject agendas by the media audience. It will concentrate on the strategy of political subjects whose utmost objective is to provoke the specific effect – to draw attention of media and recipients and to force them to pay attention to their agendas. It underlines the practices of political subjects in gaining influence on media as well as on the public by offering their own agendas. It also deals with the role and procedures of media in interpreting political scandals and creating atmosphere in the framework of receiving the events by the target audience.

**Key words:** media, political subjects, political agenda, political programs, media filters.

Agnieszka Kasińska-Metryka (The Jan Kochanowski University in Kielce, Poland)

*Psychological and marketing conditions of electoral activity of women*

The purpose of the article was to show the problem of female electoral activity in Poland. This subject fits into a current debate on the participation of women in political systems and its limitations. There are many obstacles that prevent women from political participation and their influence is still rather symbolic than real. The source of this situation is also historical and social. Moreover, young democracies are at greater risk of “marketing pathology” because their institutional mechanisms are not built on the foundations of civil society. The perception of politics differs among men and women, but this is mainly due to exogenous factors. Political marketing as a set of tools in the same range can affect men and women, although the differences appear at the level of self-creation of image, choice of strategy and the style of ruling after winning an election.

**Key words:** women electoral activity, political marketing, Polish political system, stereotypes, psychological conditions of electoral activity, political participation.

Teresa Astramowicz-Leyk (University of Warmia and Mazury in Olsztyn, Poland)

*Witold Zygmunt Kulerski activities – secretary Stanisław Mikołajczyk’s – after World War II*

Witold Zygmunt Kulerski was one of the closest associates of the Prime Minister of Polish government in exile Stanisław Mikołajczyk. During World War II he was one of the closest collaborators of Stanislaw Mikołajczyk- Office of the Vice-President of the National Council of the Republic of Poland, Deputy Prime Minister and Prime Minister of the Polish government in exile.

Kulerski’s commission devoted much attention to the affairs of Germany. This issue has been leading in international affairs, it is no wonder that Congress PSL lot of space devoted to it. Speaker stressed that the People’s Movement during its period of organizational and ideological took the view that the main “(...) the objective must be to secure Polish and Slavic world securing the aggressive spirit of the German”.

Kulerski’s commission expressed concern due to the lack of activity of the Polish government to sign agreements and treaties of trade and economic with other countries than the Soviet Union. The committee members in their speeches stressed that in many areas of trade and international agreements are being overtaken by other countries and are overlooked in transactions due to insufficient activity of the Polish Government.

**Key words:** Witold Zygmun Kulerski, Stanisław Mikołajczyk, National Council of the Republic of Poland, Polish government in exile, Kulerski’s commission.